The DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Are You Being Served? Political Accountability and Quality of Government
Abstract
How well any government functions hinges on how good citizens are at making their politicians accountable for their actions. Political control of public officials depends on two factors. First, free and regular elections allow citizens to discipline politicians—the credible threat of losing office in the next period compels policy makers to respond to the voters' interests. Second, and equally important, the degree of citizen information curbs the opportunities politicians may have to engage in political corruption and management. The presence of a well-informed electorate in a democratic setting explains between one-half and two-thirds of the variance in the levels of governmental performance and corruption.
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Cites
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INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: CROSS‐COUNTRY TESTS USING ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES
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Cited by
Treisman, D. (2007) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.081205.095418 · Cited by 1,477
Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments
Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.4.1274 · Cited by 975
Clientelism, Credibility, and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies
Keefer, P. (2007) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00282.x · Cited by 890
Glaeser, E. L., & Saks, R. E. (2006) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.08.007 · Cited by 788
Electoral Rules and Corruption
Persson, T., Tabellini, G., & Trebbi, F. (2003) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/154247603322493203 · Cited by 782
Metadata
- Authors
- Adsera, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2003-10-01
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 445-490
- ISSN
- 1465-7341 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2162462054
- Cited by
- 801
- References
- 34
- FWCI
- 50.12
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.