The DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Are You Being Served? Political Accountability and Quality of Government
Abstract
How well any government functions hinges on how good citizens are at making their politicians accountable for their actions. Political control of public officials depends on two factors. First, free and regular elections allow citizens to discipline politicians—the credible threat of losing office in the next period compels policy makers to respond to the voters' interests. Second, and equally important, the degree of citizen information curbs the opportunities politicians may have to engage in political corruption and management. The presence of a well-informed electorate in a democratic setting explains between one-half and two-thirds of the variance in the levels of governmental performance and corruption.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American community
(2000) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.38-2454 · Cited by 28,789
Mauro, P. (1995) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2946696 · Cited by 8,820
What To Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data
Beck, N., & Katz, J. N. (1995) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082979 · Cited by 6,840
La Porta, R. (1999) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/15.1.222 · Cited by 5,699
Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions
Easterly, W., & Levine, R. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555466 · Cited by 5,649
Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy
Putnam, R. D., Leonardi, R., & Nonetti, R. Y. (1994) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctt7s8r7 · Cited by 5,580
INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: CROSS‐COUNTRY TESTS USING ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES
Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1995) · Economics & Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1995.tb00111.x · Cited by 5,084
Kuper, L., & Horowitz, D. L. (1986) · Contemporary Sociology · doi:10.2307/2069338 · Cited by 4,869
The causes of corruption: a cross-national study
Treisman, D. (2000) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(99)00092-4 · Cited by 3,889
Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development
Olson, M. (1993) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2938736 · Cited by 3,794
The Rise and Decline of Nations.
Beckerman, W., & Olson, M. (1983) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2232759 · Cited by 2,792
Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions
Alesina, A., Baqir, R., & Easterly, W. (1999) · Policy Research Working Papers · doi:10.1596/1813-9450-2108 · Cited by 2,179
Incumbent performance and electoral control
Ferejohn, J. (1986) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00124924 · Cited by 2,161
Democracy, Accountability, and Representation
(1999) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139175104 · Cited by 1,796
Rents, Competition, and Corruption
Ades, A., & Di Tella, R. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.982 · Cited by 1,763
Making votes count: strategic coordination in the world's electoral systems
(1998) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.35-2982 · Cited by 1,753
Presidents and assemblies: constitutional design and electoral dynamics
(1993) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.30-4650 · Cited by 1,626
The control of politicians: An economic model
Barro, R. J. (1973) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf01718440 · Cited by 1,553
The Correlates of Change in International Financial Regulation
Quinn, D. (1997) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2952073 · Cited by 1,397
(2006) · The Elgar Companion to Development Studies · doi:10.4337/9781847202864.00031 · Cited by 1,269
A free press is bad news for corruption
Brunetti, A., & Weder, B. (2003) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(01)00186-4 · Cited by 1,188
Separation of Powers and Political Accountability
Persson, T., Roland, G., & Tabellini, G. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555457 · Cited by 1,171
Bowling Alone: The Collapse And Revival Of American Community
Putnam, & Robert, R. (2000) · Cited by 1,133
Aggregating Governance Indicators
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Zoido, P. (1999) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.188548 · Cited by 951
Djankov, S., McLiesh, C., Nenova, T., & Shleifer, A. (2003) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/377116 · Cited by 679
Social Capital: Explaining Its Origins and Effects on Government Performance
BOIX, C., & POSNER, D. N. (1998) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123498000313 · Cited by 540
Trade and the variety of democratic institutions
Rogowski, R. (1987) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300027442 · Cited by 507
Hipsher, P. L. (1997) · Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs · doi:10.2307/166517 · Cited by 385
Elson, R. E. (1997) · The End of the Peasantry in Southeast Asia · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-25457-6_7 · Cited by 356
Measuring State Partisanship and Ideology with Survey Data
Wright, G. C., Erikson, R. S., & McIver, J. P. (1985) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.2307/2130892 · Cited by 299
Corruption, Governmental Activities, and Markets
Tanzi, V., & VTanzi@imf.org (1994) · IMF Working Papers · doi:10.5089/9781451852202.001 · Cited by 209
"I Seen My Opportunities and I Took 'Em:" Political Corruption in the American States
Meier, K. J., & Holbrook, T. M. (1992) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.2307/2131647 · Cited by 203
Vera, V. J. (2010) · Cited by 200
Accountability and Corruption: Political Institutions Matter
Loayza, N., Lederman, D., & Reis Soares, R. (2001) · World Bank, Washington, DC eBooks · doi:10.1596/1813-9450-2708 · Cited by 181
Cited by
Treisman, D. (2007) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.081205.095418 · Cited by 1,477
Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments
Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.4.1274 · Cited by 975
Clientelism, Credibility, and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies
Keefer, P. (2007) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00282.x · Cited by 890
Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail—Systemic Corruption as a Collective Action Problem
Persson, A., Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2013) · Governance · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0491.2012.01604.x · Cited by 877
Glaeser, E. L., & Saks, R. E. (2006) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.08.007 · Cited by 788
Metadata
- Authors
- Adsera, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2003-10-01
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 445-490
- ISSN
- 1465-7341 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2162462054
- Cited by
- 801
- References
- 34
- FWCI
- 50.12
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.