The DOI matches its Crossref record; 46 of the 46 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Institutions and Organizational Structure: The Case of State-Owned Corporate Pyramids
Abstract
Pyramidal organizational structures are common throughout the world. This article considers an explanation for pyramids built by the state: separating firms from political interference. Although intermediate pyramidal layers insulate managers from a pyramid’s top owners and hence induce agency costs, they also minimize political costs of state intervention. All else equal, the optimal division of power between the government and the managers should be the point at which the marginal agency costs are equal to the marginal political costs. Our empirical results, based on hand-collected data for 742 local government-owned Chinese business groups are generally in line with this hypothesis. (JEL: D21, D23, G32, L22, L32, P31).
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Cites
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The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Reply
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Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L. H. P. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00067-2 · Cited by 5,754
Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation
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Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J. P. H., & Lang, L. H. P. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00511 · Cited by 3,842
Self-citationShleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1994) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118354 · Cited by 3,336
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Cited by
Political Incentives to Suppress Negative Information: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms
PIOTROSKI, J. D., WONG, T. J., & ZHANG, T. (2015) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12071 · Cited by 709
Self-citationIntellectual Property Rights Protection, Ownership, and Innovation: Evidence from China
Fang, L. H., Lerner, J., & Wu, C. (2017) · The Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhx023 · Cited by 620
Xu, D., Zhou, K. Z., & Du, F. (2019) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2016.0749 · Cited by 510
Piotroski, J. D., & Zhang, T. (2014) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.10.012 · Cited by 496
Self-citationFan, J. P. H., Wei, K. C. J., & Xu, X. (2011) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2010.12.001 · Cited by 453
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Metadata
- Authors
- Fan, J. P. H., Wong, T. J., & Zhang, T.
- Venue
- Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2012-09-13
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1217-1252
- ISSN
- 1465-7341 (ISSN-L)
- 8756-6222
- OpenAlex
- W2012412999
- Cited by
- 361
- References
- 46
- FWCI
- 62.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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