Why Do Countries Adopt Constitutional Review?
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In recent decades, there has been a wide-ranging global movement towards constitutional review. This development poses important puzzles of political economy: Why would self-interested governments willingly constrain themselves by constitutional means? What explains the global shift toward judicial supremacy? Though different theories have been proposed, none have been systematically tested against each other using quantitative empirical methods. In this article, we utilize a unique new dataset on constitutional review for 204 countries for the period 1781–2011 to test various theories that explain the adoption of constitutional review. Using a fixed-effects spatial lag model, we find substantial evidence that the adoption of constitutional review is driven by domestic electoral politics. By contrast, we find no general evidence that constitutional review adoption results from ideational factors, federalism, or international norm diffusion. (JEL: K00, K19, K49)
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250042 · Cited by 18,025
North, D. C., & Weingast, B. R. (1989) · The Journal of Economic History · doi:10.1017/s0022050700009451 · Cited by 5,300
Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data
King, G., & Zeng, L. (2001) · Political Analysis · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.pan.a004868 · Cited by 4,316 · cited 1×
“King and Zeng (2001) show that, in cases like ours when onsets are rare, standard maximum likelihood procedures may substantially underestimate the probability of an event occurring.”
Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach
Miguel, E., Satyanath, S., & Sergenti, E. (2004) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/421174 · Cited by 2,460 · cited 1×
“To nonetheless explore whether the incidental parameters problem may affect our results, we re-estimate the specification reported in Table 1, column 1 using a fixed effects linear probability model (see Goderis & Versteeg (2011) and Miguel et al. (2004)).”
Acemoglu, D., & Johnson, S. (2005) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/432166 · Cited by 2,385
Acemoglu, D., & Johnson, S. (2004) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.442900 · Cited by 333
Tushnet, M. (2009) · doi:10.1515/9781400828159 · Cited by 311
Metadata
- Authors
- Ginsburg, T., & Versteeg, M.
- Venue
- Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2013-07-23
- Volume
- 30
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 587-622
- ISSN
- 1465-7341 (ISSN-L)
- 8756-6222
- OpenAlex
- W3125895997
- Cited by
- 249
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 135.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Why Do Countries Adopt Constitutional Review? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/jleo/ewt008
- The paper
- Ginsburg, T., & Versteeg, M. (2014). Why Do Countries Adopt Constitutional Review? Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewt008
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.