Cognitive Enhancement, Hyperagency, and Responsibility Explosion
Open accessAbstract
Hyperagency objections appeal to the risk that cognitive enhancement may negatively impact our well-being by giving us too much control. I charitably formulate and engage with a prominent version of this objection due to Sandel (2009) —viz., that cognitive enhancement may negatively impact our well-being by creating an “explosion” of responsibilities. I first outline why this worry might look prima facie persuasive, and then I show that it can ultimately be defended against. At the end of the day, if we are to resist cognitive enhancement, it should not be based on a Sandel-style hyperagency argument.
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The "cheapened achievements" worry is overstated as a general argument.
“Recent literature and bioethics suggests that the “cheapened achievements” worry is overstated as a general argument [18,72]”
From Ethical considerations for the use of brain–computer interfaces for cognitive enhancement (2024) · cites this paper as [18]
Section III discusses whether enhanced achievements are creditable to the person and sketches a response to the related objection that enhanced capacities do not genuinely belong to them (no page available). But the paper’s argument, summarized in Sections VI–VII, addresses responsibility explosion and well-being, not the ‘cheapened achievements’ worry as a general argument. (LLM, conf=0.76)
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“The idea is that—at least as recent work in the philosophy of cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers, 1998; Palermos, 2011, 2014) suggests— even when capacities do in fact derive from “unnatural, external means of becoming enhanced,” it may very well still be that the capacities are ours in…”
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Ethical considerations for the use of brain–computer interfaces for cognitive enhancement
Gordon, E. C., & Seth, A. K. (2024) · PLOS Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.3002899 · Cited by 64 · see citing works
Self-citation
- Authors
- Gordon, E. C.
- Affiliations
- University of Glasgow (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Gordon, Emma C
- ORCID
- Gordon, Emma C
- Venue
- The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2024-06-24
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 488-498
- ISSN
- 0360-5310 (ISSN-L)
- 1744-5019
- PMC
- PMC11369811
- OpenAlex
- W4399940061
- Cited by
- 3
- References
- 3
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2024: 2
- FWCI
- 0.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- ENLIGHTEN (Jurnal Bimbingan dan Konseling Islam) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health › Ethics and bioethics in healthcare
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- cognitive enhancement, Michael Sandel, well-being, moral responsibility, ethics of enhancement
- MeSH terms
- Cognition, Humans, Philosophy, Medical, Social Responsibility, Biomedical Enhancement
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