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Cited by 300Public Policy and Administration ResearchSocial Policy and Reform StudiesManagement and Organizational Studies

The Organization of Discipline: From Performance Management to Perversity and Punishment

Soss, J., Fording, R., Schram, S. F.·2011·Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
DOI 10.1093/jopart/muq095
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Abstract

Drawing on participant observation, in-depth interviews, and statistical analysis of administrative data, this article explores the operation of performance management in the Florida Welfare Transition program and its effects on decisions to sanction welfare clients. Unlike most econometric research on welfare sanctions, we approach sanctioning as an organized practice that reflects, not just client characteristics and behaviors, but also organizational needs, routines, values, authority relations, environments, and systems of reward and punishment. Our analysis focuses on the organization of discipline and, in the process, suggests that scholars may misrepresent and misinterpret the incidence of discipline when they fail to account for the dynamic ways that organization and management shape sanctioning patterns.

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  • Caseworkers report imposing sanctions on citizens even when they know it offers no instrumental benefits, simply because they have grown tired of dealing with troublesome clients.

    “For example, caseworkers report imposing sanctions on citizens even when they know that it offers no instrumental benefits, simply because they have grown tired of dealing with troublesome clients (Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011).”

    From Human Capital and Administrative Burden: The Role of Cognitive Resources in Citizen‐State Interactions (2020) · cites this paper as Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011

    In “From Performance Pressures to Sanctioning: A Field Perspective on Mechanisms,” a caseworker describes sanctioning a frustrating “problem case” despite being able to allow more time; an official says case managers sometimes sanction because they are angry. The same section says many doubt sanctions help clients and nearly all believe high sanction rates hurt performance, but it does not establish that caseworkers know each such sanction offers no instrumental benefit. (LLM, conf=0.84)

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Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 29

  1. Baumgartner, M. P. 1992. The myth of discretion. In The uses of discretion, ed. Keith Hawkins, 129-62. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  2. Brodkin, Evelyn Z. 1997. Inside the welfare contract. Social Service Review 71:1-33.
  3. ---. 2007. Bureaucracy redux. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 17:1-17.
  4. ---. 2011. Policy work: Street-level organizations under new managerialism. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 21(Supp 2).
  5. Considine, Mark. 2003. Governance and competition: The role of nonprofit organizations in the delivery of public services. Australian Journal of Political Science 38:63-77.
  6. Dias Johnson, Janice, and Stephen Maynard-Moody. 2006. For-profit welfare: Contracts, conflicts, and the performance paradox. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 17:189-211.
  7. Ewalt, Jo Ann, and Edward T. Jennings, Jr. 2004. Administration, governance, and policy tools in welfare implementation. Public Administration Review 64:449-62.
  8. Feldman, Martha S. 1992. Social limits to discretion. An organizational view. In The uses of discretion, ed. Keith Hawkins, 163-84. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  9. Fording, Richard C., Joe Soss, and Sanford F. Schram. 2007. Devolution, discretion and the impact of local political values on TANF sanctioning. Social Service Review 81:285-316.
  10. Gainsborough, Juliet F. 2003. To devolve or not to devolve? Welfare reform in the states. Policy Studies Journal 31:603-23.
  11. Gilliom, John. 2001. Overseers of the poor: Resistance, surveillance, and the limits of privacy. Chicago, IL: Univ. of Chicago Press.
  12. Hasenfeld, Yeheskel, Toorjo Ghose, and Kadyce Larson. 2004. The logic of sanctioning welfare re- cipients: An empirical assessment. Social Service Review 78:304-19.
  13. Heinrich, Carolyn J. 2000. Organizational form and performance: An empirical investigation of nonprofit and for-profit job-training service providers. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 19:233-61.
  14. Kalil, Ariel, Kristin S. Seefeldt, and Hui-chen Wang. 2002. Sanctions and material hardship under TANF. Social Service Review 76:643-62.
  15. Lurie, Irene. 2006. At the frontlines of the welfare system: A perspective on the decline in welfare caseloads. Albany, NY: State Univ. of New York Press.
  16. Mashaw, Jerry L. 1983. Bureaucratic justice. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
  17. Maynard-Moody, Steven, and Michael Musheno. 2003. Cops, teachers, counselors: Stories from the front lines of public service. Ann Arbor, MI: Univ. of Michigan Press.
  18. Mead, Lawrence M. 2004. Government matters: Welfare reform in Wisconsin. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
  19. Moynihan, Donald P. 2008. The dynamics of performance management: Constructing information and reform. Washington, DC: Georgetown Univ. Press.
  20. ---. 2006. Managing for results in state government: Evaluating a decade of reform. Public Administration Review 77-89.
  21. Pavetti, LaDonna, Michelle K. Derr, and Heather Hesketh. 2003. Review of sanction policies and research studies: Final literature review. Report prepared for Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation. Washington, DC Mathematica Policy Research.
  22. Radin, Beryl A. 2006. Challenging the performance movement: Accountability, complexity, and demo- cratic values. Washington, DC: Georgetown Univ. Press.
  23. Riccucci, Norma. 2005. How management matters: Street-level bureaucrats and welfare reform. Washington, DC: Georgetown Univ. Press.
  24. Ridzi, Frank. 2004. Making TANF work: Organizational restructuring, staff buy-in, and performance monitoring in local implementation. Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare 31:2.
  25. Talbot, Colin. 2005. Performance management. In The Oxford handbook of public management, eds. E. Ferlie, L. E. Lynn, Jr., and C. Pollitt, 491-517. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
  26. Watkins-Hayes, Celeste. 2009. The new welfare bureaucrats: Situated bureaucrats and entanglements of race, class, and welfare. Chicago, IL: Univ. of Chicago Press.
  27. ---. 2011. Race, respect, and red tape: Inside the black box of racially representative bureaucracies. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 21(Supp 2):i229-i47
  28. Weisbrod, Burton A. 1998. To profit or not to profit: The commercial transformation of the nonprofit sector. New York, NY: Cambridge Univ. Press.
  29. Wu, Chi-Fang, Maria Cancian, Daniel R. Meyer, and Geoffrey Wallace. 2006. How do welfare sanctions work? Social Service Review 30:33-51.

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Authors
Soss, J., Fording, R., & Schram, S. F.
Affiliations
  • University of Minnesota (US)
  • University of Kentucky (US)
  • Bryn Mawr College (US)
ORCID
Venue
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2011-03-28
Volume
21
Issue
Supplement 2
Pages
i203-i232
ISSN
  • 1053-1858 (ISSN-L)
  • 1477-9803
DOI
10.1093/jopart/muq095
OpenAlex
W2058599019
Cited by
300
References
2
Citations by year
2026: 11 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 19 · 2023: 28 · 2022: 22 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 23 · 2019: 26 · 2018: 26 · 2017: 16 · 2016: 18 · 2015: 20 · 2014: 14 · 2013: 17 · 2012: 10
FWCI
46.72
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory (publishedVersion)
  • UKnowledge (University of Kentucky) (submittedVersion)
Funders
Annie E. Casey Foundation
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Public Administration › Public Policy and Administration Research
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Social Policy and Reform Studies
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Management and Organizational Studies
Keywords
welfare sanctions, performance management, organizational routines, reward and punishment, welfare bureaucracy, public assistance administration

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