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Cited by 101Public Procurement and PolicyPublic Policy and Administration ResearchAuction Theory and Applications

Opportunism and Honest Incompetence—Seeking Explanations for Noncompliance in Public Procurement

Kauppi, Katri, van Raaij, Erik M.·2015·Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
DOI 10.1093/jopart/mut081
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Abstract

This article utilizes agency theory to explain maverick buying in governmental agencies, that is, noncompliance to centrally negotiated frame agreements. Traditional agency theory assumes the agent to be an opportunistic self-interest seeker. A complementary view of agency problems portrays man as an honest, yet not fully competent, actor; both agents and principals may be burdened by “honest incompetence.” We apply both perspectives on principal-agent relationships to study maverick buying in government procurement and link agency problems to three governance mechanisms: monitoring, training, and guidance. We find that guidance and training help to reduce governmental employees’ noncompliance, but output monitoring does not. Our findings further indicate that maverick buying is related to goal incongruence and two different types of information asymmetry: Agency problems may arise not only because the agent has information the principal is not aware of but also because the principal may have information the agent is not aware of. Future research in public management using agency theory to study instances of hidden action could benefit from applying a similar dual lens to behaviors previously examined as purely opportunistic.

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  • Dissatisfied users of mandated e-procurement typically find ways to circumvent mandated procurement processes.

    “Despite the fact that e-procurement technology is now mandated in many organisations, individual acceptance and compliance is often extremely hard to force, with dissatisfied users typically finding ways to circumvent mandated procurement processes (Brandon-Jones, 2017; Karjalainen et al. 2009; Kauppi and van Raaij, 2015; Pearcy and Giunipero, 2008; Reunis et al. 2006).”

    From Examining the antecedents of the technology acceptance model within e-procurement (2018) · cites this paper as Kauppi and van Raaij, 2015

    The Empirical Testing section (page unavailable) says Finnish agencies were obliged to use centrally tendered frame agreements, while Data Collection describes employees bypassing one such agreement. The Discussion links noncompliance to a perceived mismatch between agreements and buyers’ needs. The paper does not establish that dissatisfied users typically circumvent mandated e-procurement technology; it studies compliance with procurement agreements, not technology acceptance. (LLM, conf=0.86)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Despite e-procurement technology being mandated in many organisations, individual acceptance and compliance is often extremely hard to force.

    “Despite the fact that e-procurement technology is now mandated in many organisations, individual acceptance and compliance is often extremely hard to force, with dissatisfied users typically finding ways to circumvent mandated procurement processes (Brandon-Jones, 2017; Karjalainen et al. 2009; Kauppi and van Raaij, 2015; Pearcy and Giunipero, 2008; Reunis et al. 2006).”

    From Examining the antecedents of the technology acceptance model within e-procurement (2018) · cites this paper as Kauppi and van Raaij, 2015

    The Empirical Testing section reports that Finnish government agencies were legally obliged to use centrally negotiated frame agreements, yet estimated usage was only 20%–80% of potential. The Discussion says monitoring was ineffective and describes noncompliant purchasing. These passages support the difficulty of enforcing procurement compliance, but the paper studies mandated frame agreements, not mandated e-procurement technology or individual acceptance of that technology. (LLM, conf=0.87)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

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Authors
Kauppi, K., & van Raaij, E. M.
Affiliations
  • Aalto University (FI)
  • Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University
ORCID
Kauppi, Katri
Venue
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2014-01-29
Volume
25
Issue
3
Pages
953-979
ISSN
  • 1053-1858 (ISSN-L)
  • 1477-9803
DOI
10.1093/jopart/mut081
OpenAlex
W2042439442
Cited by
101
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 7 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 17 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 7 · 2014: 1
FWCI
16.40
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory (publishedVersion)
  • EUR Research Repository (Erasmus University Rotterdam) (publishedVersion)
  • EUR Research Repository (Erasmus University Rotterdam) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Public Procurement and Policy
  • Social Sciences › Public Administration › Public Policy and Administration Research
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
Keywords
public procurement, non-compliance, principal-agent relationship, principal-agent problem, information asymmetry, goal incongruence, monitoring, training, guidance, hidden action, public sector employees

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