Transactional Authority and Bureaucratic Politics
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Bureaucratic politics research couched within the new institutionalism paradigm has largely focused on principal authority rooted in formal (institutional) mechanisms that are ultimately both devised and chosen by politicians. A nascent literature has emerged over the past two decades whose underpinnings reflect increasing gravitation towards a transactional authority perspective, one that is compatible with behavioral theories of organizations. This transactional authority perspective departs from an exclusive reliance on formal mechanisms insofar that agent compliance is motivated by either mutual or bilateral agreement for both the principal and the agent. This perspective is rooted in not only the agent’s “sanctioned acceptance” of the principal’s authority but also the principal’s “sanctioned acceptance” of the agent’s legitimacy. We explore the logical implications of this transactional authority perspective for better understanding principal–agent relationships in the study of bureaucratic politics. We conclude by recommending that future research should redirect scholarly attention towards analyzing informal compliance and resistance mechanisms in bureaucratic politics, as well as offer a richer pluralist conception of bureaucratic governance in a democracy.
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Citations
Cites
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00083 · Cited by 3,172
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Cited by
Reputation and Accountability Relationships: Managing Accountability Expectations through Reputation
Busuioc, M., & Lodge, M. (2017) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.12612 · Cited by 205
Artificial intelligence and administrative evil
Young, M. M., Himmelreich, J., Bullock, J. B., & Kim, K.-C. (2021) · Perspectives on Public Management and Governance · doi:10.1093/ppmgov/gvab006 · Cited by 76
Implementation of sustainable public procurement in local governments: a measurement approach
Hsueh, L., Bretschneider, S., Stritch, J. M., & Darnall, N. (2020) · International Journal of Public Sector Management · doi:10.1108/ijpsm-09-2019-0233 · Cited by 33
Rimkutė, D., & Mazepus, H. (2025) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.13916 · Cited by 20
Metadata
- Authors
- Carpenter, D., & Krause, G. A.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2014-06-20
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 5-25
- ISSN
- 1053-1858 (ISSN-L)
- 1477-9803
- OpenAlex
- W2334883855
- Cited by
- 149
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 18.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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