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Reputation and Accountability Relationships: Managing Accountability Expectations through Reputation
Open accessAbstract
Accountability is said to be about the management of expectations. Empirical studies reveal considerable variation in organizational interest, intensity, and investment in accountability relationships. Less is known, however, about what explains these observed variations. Drawing on accountability and reputation‐concerned literatures, this article argues that a reputation‐based perspective on accountability offers an underlying logic that explains how account‐giving actors and account‐holding forums actually manage these expectations and how organizations make sense of and prioritize among accountability responsibilities. Reputational considerations act as a filtering mechanism of external demands and help account for variations in degrees of interest in, and intensity of, accountability. The resulting accountability outcomes are coproduced by the reputational investment of both account‐giver and account‐holder, resulting in distinct accountability constellations and outcomes.
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Cited by
Accountable Artificial Intelligence: Holding Algorithms to Account
Busuioc, M. (2021) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.13293 · Cited by 652
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Rimkutė, D., & Mazepus, H. (2025) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.13916 · Cited by 20
Liu, R., & Han, Y. (2026) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/padm.70043 · Cited by 2
Metadata
- Authors
- Busuioc, M., & Lodge, M.
- Venue
- Public Administration Review
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2016-08-04
- Volume
- 77
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 91-100
- ISSN
- 0033-3352 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6210
- OpenAlex
- W2417601898
- Cited by
- 205
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 34.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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