Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This resource is an interdisciplinary exploration of the nature of delusions that brings together the psychological literature on the aetiology and the behavioural manifestations of delusions, and the philosophical literature on belief ascription and rationality. It suggests that delusions are continuous with ordinary beliefs, a thesis that could have not only significant theoretical implications for debates in the philosophy of mind and psychology, but also practical implications for psychiatric classification and the clinical treatment of subjects with delusions.
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Citations
Cites
(1960) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 5,851
Without good reason: the rationality debate in philosophy and cognitive science
(1996) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.33-6237 · Cited by 441
In Defence of Modest Doxasticism About Delusions
Bortolotti, L. (2011) · Neuroethics · doi:10.1007/s12152-011-9122-8 · Cited by 67
Self-citation
Cited by
Brain disorders? Not really: Why network structures block reductionism in psychopathology research
Borsboom, D., Cramer, A. O. J., & Kalis, A. (2019) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x17002266 · Cited by 468
Neither Fish nor Fowl: Implicit Attitudes as Patchy Endorsements
Levy, N. (2015) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12074 · Cited by 226
The epistemic innocence of motivated delusions
Bortolotti, L. (2015) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2014.10.005 · Cited by 136
“Motivated delusions can be characterised as irrational beliefs, in that they are implausible, they do not accurately represent reality, they do not respond to evidence, and they may not always be consistently reflected in behaviour (Bortolotti, 2009).”
Self-citationThe Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs
Bortolotti, L. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198863984.001.0001 · Cited by 127
Self-citationBell, V., Raihani, N., & Wilkinson, S. (2021) · Clinical Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/2167702620951553 · Cited by 78
“…accounts draw on the longestablished historical idea that delusions reflect an impairment to rationality (Berrios, 1991), which now forms one of the central tenets of explanation for delusional beliefs (see reviews in Bortolotti, 2010; Gold & Hohwy, 2000; Leeser & O’Donohue, 1999; Radden, 1985).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Bortolotti, L.
- Venue
- Oxford University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2009-11
- OpenAlex
- W614830498
- Cited by
- 438
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 13.32
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Bortolotti, L. (2009). Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. Oxford University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1093/med/9780199206162.001.1
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.