Aristotle on Consciousness
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Abstract
Aristotle's discussion of perceiving that we perceive (On the Soul 3.2) has points of contact with two contemporary debates about consciousness: the first over whether consciousness is an intrinsic feature of mental states or a higher‐order thought or perception; the second concerning the qualitative nature of experience. In both cases, Aristotle's views cut down the middle of an apparent dichotomy, in a way that does justice to each set of intuitions, while avoiding their attendant difficulties. With regard to the first issue—the primary focus of this paper—he argues that consciousness is both intrinsic and higher‐order, due to its reflexive nature. This, in turn, has consequences for the second issue, where again Aristotle seeks out the middle ground. He is committed against qualia in any strong sense of the term. Yet he also holds that the phenomenal quality of experience is not exhausted by its representational content.
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Cited by
Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience
Block, N. (2007) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x07002786 · Cited by 1,146
The higher order approach to consciousness is defunct
Block, N. (2011) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/anr037 · Cited by 144
The merits of higher-order thought theories
Coleman, S. (2018) · Trans/Form/Ação · doi:10.1590/0101-3173.2018.v41esp.04.p31 · Cited by 18
“See Caston (2002).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Caston, V.
- Venue
- Mind
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2002-10-01
- Volume
- 111
- Issue
- 444
- Pages
- 751-815
- ISSN
- 0026-4423 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-2113
- OpenAlex
- W1981438123
- Cited by
- 287
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 4.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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