CoChat

The higher order approach to consciousness is defunct

Block, N. · 2011 · Analysis

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 42 of the 42 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

The higher order approach to consciousness attempts to build a theory of consciousness from the insight that a conscious state is one that the subject is conscious of. There is a well-known objection to the higher order approach, a version of which is fatal (Balog 2000b; Byrne 1997; Kriegel 2003; Levine 2001; Mandik 2009; Neander 1998; Rey 2000; Van Gulick 2000, 2004; Weisberg 2010). Proponents of the higher order approach have realized that the objection is significant. They have dealt with it via what David Rosenthal calls a ‘retreat’ (2005b: 179) but that retreat fails to solve the problem. The fatal objection is short and simple, but some ground-clearing is required in order to state it. There are two quite different approaches to the nature of consciousness. One line of thought (that I have favoured) emphasizes the notoriously elusive ‘what it is like’ (Nagel 1974) to have an experience (Block 1978; Chalmers 1996; Levine 1983; McGinn 1989). Higher order theorists often use the phrase ‘what it is like’, supposing, controversially, that their theories are able to account for what-it-is-like-ness, and I will contest that claim, taking advantage of that common terminology.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1093/analys/anr037

Cites

42 of 42 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

This paper’s full text isn’t openly available, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Citations

Cites

Show all 42 references

Research works printed but not linked: 12

  1. 1978, PROCEEDINGS OF THE RUSSELLIAN SOCIETY, 3, 65
  2. 2000, Consciousness and cognition, 9, 215
  3. 1978, MINNESOTA STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, 9, 261
  4. 1995, The Behavioral and brain sciences, 182, 227
  5. 2005, Trends in cognitive sciences, 92, 46
  6. 2002, Mind, 444, 751
  7. 2010, COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHIATRY, 151, 1
  8. 2008, 45, 233
  9. 2009, JOURNAL OF CONSCIOUSNESS STUDIES, 161, 5
  10. 1998, PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES, 12, 411
  11. 1986, 493, 329
  12. 2000, Consciousness and cognition, 92, 231

Cited by

See all 154

Metadata

Authors
Block, N.
Affiliations
New York University (US)
Corresponding author
Block, N.
Venue
Analysis
Published
2011-05-18
Volume
71
Issue
3
Pages
419-431
ISSN
  • 0003-2638 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-8284
OpenAlex
W2072306674
Cited by
144
References
42
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 26 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 24 · 2018: 8 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 8 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 4
FWCI
9.09
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Analysis (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
Keywords
theory of consciousness, what it is like, phenomenal experience, David Rosenthal, nature of consciousness

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The higher order approach to consciousness is defunct. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/analys/anr037
The paper
Block, N. (2011). The higher order approach to consciousness is defunct. Analysis. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anr037

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.