Frege’s Puzzle and the Objects of Credence
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The objects of credence are the entities to which credences are assigned for the purposes of a successful theory of credence. I use cases akin to Frege's puzzle to argue against referentialism about credence: the view that objects of credence are determined by the objects and properties at which one's credence is directed. I go on to develop a non-referential account of the objects of credence in terms of sets of epistemically possible scenarios.
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Citations
Cites
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“Cases like this are familiar from the work of Perry (1979) and Lewis (1983). The following variant on Lewis’s ‘two gods’ case makes the point clearest for our purposes. 6This sort of strategy is reminiscent of the appeal to metalinguistic propositions by Stalnaker (1984).”
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Cited by
Items 101–112 of 112
The intrapersonal normative twin earth argument
Hambly, J. (2024) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-024-04651-7
Williamson, T. L. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197779217.003.0001
Williamson, T. L. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197779217.003.0005
Williamson, T. L. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197779217.002.0006
Case Study: Hyperintensionalism
Williamson, T. L. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197779217.003.0003
Williamson, T. L. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197779217.002.0003
Williamson, T. L. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197779217.003.0004
Bennett, K., & Zimmerman, D. W. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197779217.002.0005
Berto, F. (2025) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-025-01023-6
“…structures of Fregean Sinne , as well as two-dimensional semantic frameworks (Schroeter, 2021 ), have been invoked to help: e.g., Chalmers-style (Chalmers, 2006, 2011 ) accounts of propositions, where con - tents are represented by double-barreled intensions, with primary ones tracking…”
A clear case for scientific progress at the origin of analytic philosophy
Garancini, D. B. (2026) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-026-05594-x
“…and justified than Frege’s and Russell’s because it accounted for evidence that they did not know about, and the theories developed more recently—by Chalmers ( 2011) and Goodman and Lederman ( 2021) among others—are even more verisimilar and justified because they account for evidence revealed…”
Prior adjustments and moral encroachment on credences
Liu, Y. (2026) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-026-05770-z
“Instead, errors of identification are a general limitation of belief and credence formation under imperfect information (see, e.g., Chalmers, 2011).”
Russellian acquaintance and the problem of indexical thought
Boccardi, E., & Valente, M. (2026) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-026-05822-4
Metadata
- Authors
- Chalmers, D. J.
- Affiliations
- Australian National University (AU)
- Corresponding author
- Chalmers, D. J.
- ORCID
- Chalmers, D. J.
- Venue
- Mind
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2011-07-01
- Volume
- 120
- Issue
- 479
- Pages
- 587-635
- ISSN
- 0026-4423 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-2113
- OpenAlex
- W2168749096
- Cited by
- 113
- References
- 30
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 26 · 2023: 12 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 9 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 3 · 2012: 28
- FWCI
- 92.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Mind (publishedVersion)
- ANU Open Research (Australian National University) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
- Keywords
- Frege's puzzle, referentialism, epistemic modality
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