Frege’s Puzzle and the Objects of Credence
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The objects of credence are the entities to which credences are assigned for the purposes of a successful theory of credence. I use cases akin to Frege's puzzle to argue against referentialism about credence: the view that objects of credence are determined by the objects and properties at which one's credence is directed. I go on to develop a non-referential account of the objects of credence in terms of sets of epistemically possible scenarios.
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BackgroundSelf‐Location and Other‐Location
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“Russellian 1 Chalmers 2011 is a revision of Chalmers 2006, which was presented at the Online Philosophy Conference in 2006.”
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“Chalmers (2011) enumerates a few.”
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“As Chalmers (2011) emphasizes, we can construct probabilistic analogues to Frege’s examples.”
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“This is Frege’s Puzzle, discussed in the context of interpreting the Bayesian formalism by Chalmers (2011).”
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Fitts, J. J. (2013) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0223-6 · Cited by 5
“As he says: “It is natural for a two-dimensionalist to be a semantic pluralist, holding that there are many ways to associate expressions and utterances with quasi-semantic values, where different quasi-semantic values play different explanatory roles” (Chalmers, 2011b, p.5).”
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“…when claiming that each of us is ‘presented to himself in a particular and primitive way in which he is presented to no-one else’.24 Senses associated with de se thoughts involve a mode of 24See Frege (1918/1997); also Chalmers (2011). presentation only available to the subject of the thought.”
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“This is in accordance with research [9] which states that for understand an object, do not need to present a real object but can be replaced with objects that can represent the object's role.”
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“(Chalmers 2011, p. 590) The sense of ‘object of credence’ stipulated here, after the colon, is the focus of most of my article.”
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“14 sentences (see Chalmers 2011).”
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“See Frege (1892), Fodor (1975), Salmon (1986), Castañeda (1989), Moschvakis (1994), Chalmers (2011), Braun (2016), and Fitts (2014), among others. requires is that you be certain that the English sentence ‘I am here now’ is true; and what rationality permits is uncertainty about whether the…”
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6 Generalized Conditionalization
Titelbaum, M. G. (2012) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.003.0006
Titelbaum, M. G. (2012) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.003.0009
Titelbaum, M. G. (2012) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.003.0001
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(2012) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.002.0009
(2012) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.005.0001
(2012) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.005.0002
(2012) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.005.0003
(2012) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.005.0004
(2012) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.002.0004
(2012) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.005.0005
(2012) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.002.0003
(2012) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.002.0008
List of Abbreviations and Symbols
(2012) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.002.0007
Propositions as (Flexible) Types of Possibilities
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Pertierra, I. X. L. (2022) · The Philosophical Forum · doi:10.1111/phil.12328
“To get to such metaphysically possible worlds, we would need an ideal imagination (Chalmers, 2002, 149-50), while getting merely to epistemically possible worlds would be through non-ideal imagination via the use of centered worlds (Chalmers, 2011).”
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Kurniawati, A. (2022) · Jurnal Prakarsa Paedagogia · doi:10.24176/jpp.v5i1.9004
(2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198860556.002.0003
Ideal and Non-Ideal Epistemology
Greco, D. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198860556.003.0008
Greco, D. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198860556.003.0002
Greco, D. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198860556.003.0007
Greco, D. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198860556.003.0004
Greco, D. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198860556.003.0009
Greco, D. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198860556.003.0005
Greco, D. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198860556.003.0001
Greco, D. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198860556.003.0003
Mahtani, A. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198847892.003.0009
States as Metaphysically Possible Worlds
Mahtani, A. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198847892.003.0007
Mahtani, A. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198847892.003.0003
Mahtani, A. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198847892.002.0003
Mahtani, A. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198847892.003.0005
Mahtani, A. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198847892.003.0008
Mahtani, A. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198847892.003.0004
Mahtani, A. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198847892.003.0002
Mahtani, A. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198847892.003.0001
Metadata
- Authors
- Chalmers, D. J.
- Affiliations
- Australian National University (AU)
- Corresponding author
- Chalmers, D. J.
- ORCID
- Chalmers, D. J.
- Venue
- Mind
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2011-07-01
- Volume
- 120
- Issue
- 479
- Pages
- 587-635
- ISSN
- 0026-4423 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-2113
- OpenAlex
- W2168749096
- Cited by
- 113
- References
- 30
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 26 · 2023: 12 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 9 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 3 · 2012: 28
- FWCI
- 92.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Mind (publishedVersion)
- ANU Open Research (Australian National University) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
- Keywords
- Frege's puzzle, referentialism, epistemic modality
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