The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
What is the Source of Our Knowledge of Modal Truths?
Open accessAbstract
There is currently intense interest in the question of the source of our presumed knowledge of truths concerning what is, or is not, metaphysically possible or necessary. Some philosophers locate this source in our capacities to conceive or imagine various actual or non-actual states of affairs, but this approach is open to certain familiar and seemingly powerful objections. A different and ostensibly more promising approach has been developed by Timothy Williamson, according to which our capacity for modal knowledge is just an extension, or by-product, of our general capacity to acquire knowledge of true counterfactual conditionals — a capacity that we deploy ubiquitously in everyday life. Williamson’s account crucially involves a thesis to the effect that modal truths can be explained in terms of counterfactual truths. In this paper, I query Williamson’s account on a number of points, including this thesis. My positive proposal, which owes a debt to the work of Kit Fine on modality and essence, appeals instead to our capacity to grasp essences, understood in a neo-Aristotelian fashion, according to which essences are expressed by ‘real definitions’.
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“Most of the considered studies on causal counterfactual explanation relate to either of the four theoretical milestones: Lewis-Stalnaker's theory of closest possible worlds [36], [120], Pearl's Structural Causal Models (SCM) [37], Woodward's Counterfactual Theory of Explanation (CTE) [125], or the Neyman-Rubin Causal Model (NRCM) [107], [115] (see Table 5).”
From A Survey of Contrastive and Counterfactual Explanation Generation Methods for Explainable Artificial Intelligence (2021) · cites this paper as [125]
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Self-citationLocke on Real Essence and Water as a Natural Kind: a Qualified Defence
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Self-citation
Research works printed but not linked: 3
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- 2011, NOS, 45, 22
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Stepin, I., Alonso, J. M., Catala, A., & Pereira-Farina, M. (2021) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2021.3051315 · Cited by 376
Grounding, Essence, and Identity
Correia, F., & Skiles, A. (2017) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12468 · Cited by 194
Modalism and theoretical virtues: toward an epistemology of modality
Bueno, O., & Shalkowski, S. A. (2014) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0327-7 · Cited by 95
“, knowledge of what it is to be a kind of thing) to obtain knowledge of what is necessary and what is possible (Lowe 2012); (d) an understanding-based approach that identifies a suitable modal extension principle to account for modal knowledge (Peacocke 1999).”
BackgroundClarke-Doane, J. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823667.001.0001 · Cited by 146
Strohminger, M., & Yli‐Vakkuri, J. (2017) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/anx058 · Cited by 71
“A notable recent example is Lowe (2012), who rejects NECESSITY, accepts POSSIBILITY, and proposes (following Lowe 1995) the following reduction of counterfactual to modal logic as a basis for an alternative combined epistemology of counterfactuals and modality.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Lowe, E. J.
- Affiliations
- Durham University (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Lowe, E. J.
- Venue
- Mind
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2012-10-01
- Volume
- 121
- Issue
- 484
- Pages
- 919-950
- ISSN
- 0026-4423 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-2113
- OpenAlex
- W2029395614
- Cited by
- 150
- References
- 24
- Citations by year
- 2026: 10 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 12 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 23 · 2019: 27 · 2018: 15 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 13 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 1
- FWCI
- 22.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Mind (publishedVersion)
- Durham Research Online (Durham University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
- Keywords
- modal knowledge, epistemology of modality, counterfactuals, Timothy Williamson, Kit Fine, essence, real definition, metaphysical necessity, metaphysical possibility, conceivability
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