The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
What is the Source of Our Knowledge of Modal Truths?
Open accessAbstract
There is currently intense interest in the question of the source of our presumed knowledge of truths concerning what is, or is not, metaphysically possible or necessary. Some philosophers locate this source in our capacities to conceive or imagine various actual or non-actual states of affairs, but this approach is open to certain familiar and seemingly powerful objections. A different and ostensibly more promising approach has been developed by Timothy Williamson, according to which our capacity for modal knowledge is just an extension, or by-product, of our general capacity to acquire knowledge of true counterfactual conditionals — a capacity that we deploy ubiquitously in everyday life. Williamson’s account crucially involves a thesis to the effect that modal truths can be explained in terms of counterfactual truths. In this paper, I query Williamson’s account on a number of points, including this thesis. My positive proposal, which owes a debt to the work of Kit Fine on modality and essence, appeals instead to our capacity to grasp essences, understood in a neo-Aristotelian fashion, according to which essences are expressed by ‘real definitions’.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Most of the considered studies on causal counterfactual explanation relate to either of the four theoretical milestones: Lewis-Stalnaker's theory of closest possible worlds [36], [120], Pearl's Structural Causal Models (SCM) [37], Woodward's Counterfactual Theory of Explanation (CTE) [125], or the Neyman-Rubin Causal Model (NRCM) [107], [115] (see Table 5).”
From A Survey of Contrastive and Counterfactual Explanation Generation Methods for Explainable Artificial Intelligence (2021) · cites this paper as [125]
Citations
Cites
Kripke, S. A. (1972) · Semantics of Natural Language · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7_9 · Cited by 7,028
Parfit, D. (1986) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/019824908x.001.0001 · Cited by 5,803
Williamson, T. L. (2007) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9780470696675 · Cited by 2,283
Suits, B. (1978) · University of Toronto Press eBooks · doi:10.3138/9781487574338 · Cited by 1,560
Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong
Bach, K., & Fodor, J. A. (2000) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2693638 · Cited by 936
Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?
Chalmers, D. J. (2002) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198250890.003.0004 · Cited by 893
Merricks, T. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0199245363.001.0001 · Cited by 824
Causal and Metaphysical Necessity
Shoemaker, S. (1998) · Pacific philosophical quarterly · doi:10.1111/1468-0114.00050 · Cited by 438
Review: Conceivability and Possibility
Divers, J. (2004) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/113.450.347 · Cited by 277
(1998) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1023/a:1017159501073 · Cited by 229
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- 2006, DIALECTICA, 61, 63
- 2011, NOS, 45, 22
- 2007, Mind, 115, 659
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Stepin, I., Alonso, J. M., Catala, A., & Pereira-Farina, M. (2021) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2021.3051315 · Cited by 376
Grounding, Essence, and Identity
Correia, F., & Skiles, A. (2017) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12468 · Cited by 194
Modalism and theoretical virtues: toward an epistemology of modality
Bueno, O., & Shalkowski, S. A. (2014) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0327-7 · Cited by 95
“, knowledge of what it is to be a kind of thing) to obtain knowledge of what is necessary and what is possible (Lowe 2012); (d) an understanding-based approach that identifies a suitable modal extension principle to account for modal knowledge (Peacocke 1999).”
BackgroundClarke-Doane, J. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823667.001.0001 · Cited by 146
Strohminger, M., & Yli‐Vakkuri, J. (2017) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/anx058 · Cited by 71
“A notable recent example is Lowe (2012), who rejects NECESSITY, accepts POSSIBILITY, and proposes (following Lowe 1995) the following reduction of counterfactual to modal logic as a basis for an alternative combined epistemology of counterfactuals and modality.”
BackgroundModerately naturalistic metaphysics
Morganti, M., & Tahko, T. E. (2016) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1068-2 · Cited by 55
“Lowe (2008, 2012) specifies that the relevant epistemic process is not based on intuitions or thought experiments, but rather on direct a priori access to essentialist facts which ground modal truths.”
BackgroundGregory, D. (2019) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12275 · Cited by 51
The Knowledge Argument Is an Argument about Knowledge
Crane, T. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316494134.002 · Cited by 50
Putting modal metaphysics first
Mallozzi, A. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1828-2 · Cited by 48
“I call “reductionists” those who think, like I do, that once we have a grip on the metaphysics of essence we have all the elements in place to understand our knowledge of metaphysical modality (e.g. Lowe 2012; Hale 2013).”
BackgroundFrom Essence to Necessity via Identity
Leech, J. F. (2020) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/fzaa012 · Cited by 44
Clarke‐Doane, J. (2017) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12205 · Cited by 38
The epistemology of modality and the problem of modal epistemic friction
Vaidya, A. J., & Wallner, M. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1860-2 · Cited by 36
“…(2002), Chudnoff (2013)] • Conceivability [Yablo (1993), Chalmers (2002)] • Counterfactuals [Williamson (2007), Kroedel (2012)] • Deduction [Kripke (1971), Lowe (2008, 2012), Hale (2013)] • Conventions [Sidelle (1989), Sveinsdóttir (2008, 2013), Thomasson (2013)] • Implicit Knowledge of Principles…”
BackgroundKocurek, A. W. (2021) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12787 · Cited by 34
“One source of criticism for Williamson’s account concerns whether it is adequate as a modal epistemology (Jenkins, 2008; Malmgren, 2011; Peacocke, 2011; Lowe, 2012; Tahko, 2012; Clarke-Doane, 2017).”
Kment, B. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-01903-1 · Cited by 33
“That is a question to which there are still few well-developed answers (despite some recent progress; see Lowe 2012, Hale 2013: Ch. 11, Mallozzi 2018, Tahko 2018).”
BackgroundEssence, Potentiality, and Modality
Vetter, B. (2020) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/fzaa049 · Cited by 29
Acquaintance and Phenomenal Concepts
Pitt, D. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316494134.005 · Cited by 28
Kind, A. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316494134.009 · Cited by 28
Acquaintance, Parsimony, and Epiphenomenalism
Gertler, B. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316494134.004 · Cited by 27
Against the reduction of modality to essence
Wildman, N. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1667-6 · Cited by 27
“6 For example, see Fine (1994a, b, 1995a, b, 2000, 2015), Correia (2006, 2007, 2012, 2013), Lowe (2008, 2012a), Oderberg (2007), and Shalkowski (2008). foundation for our modal edifice, offering as it does the tantalizing possibility of a fully reductive account of modality.”
BackgroundModal Knowledge: Beyond Rationalism and Empiricism
Vaidya, A. J. (2016) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-44309-6_6 · Cited by 24
Essence, Explanation, and Modality
Wallner, M., & Vaidya, A. J. (2020) · Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0031819120000200 · Cited by 24
“15 Interestingly, (Lowe, 2008, 2012) rejects that essences themselves have essences for he fears the infinite regress ensuing from this view.”
BackgroundMerely partial definition and the analysis of knowledge
Elgin, S. Z. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1846-0 · Cited by 23
Bengson, J., Cuneo, T. D., & Shafer‐Landau, R. (2022) · British Journal for the History of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/09608788.2021.2007846 · Cited by 22
Empirically-Informed Modal Rationalism
Tahko, T. E. (2016) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-44309-6_3 · Cited by 22
The Knowledge Argument Meets Representationalism about Colour Experience
Jackson, F. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316494134.006 · Cited by 21
The Knowledge Argument and the Self
Howell, R. J. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316494134.013 · Cited by 21
The Knowledge Argument Is Either Indefensible or Redundant
McClelland, T. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316494134.010 · Cited by 21
Grounding, Analysis, and Russellian Monism
Goff, P. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316494134.011 · Cited by 21
Knowing how things might have been
Jago, M. T. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1869-6 · Cited by 21
Yli‐Vakkuri, J., & Hawthorne, J. T. (2018) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12268 · Cited by 21
A theory-based epistemology of modality
Fischer, B. (2016) · Canadian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00455091.2016.1159121 · Cited by 21
“…and then take the process of evaluating counterfactuals to be his story about the mechanism by which we transfer justification from our theories to specific modal claims. likewise, think about the views of lowe (2012) and hale (2003, 2013), who base our modal knowledge on knowledge of essence.”
BackgroundConcept Mastery, Social Externalism, and Mary’s New Knowledge
Alter, T. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316494134.008 · Cited by 20
Introduction: The Enduring Significance of Jackson’s Knowledge Argument
Coleman, S. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316494134.001 · Cited by 20
ROSENTHAL, D. M. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316494134.003 · Cited by 20
Glazier, M. (2022) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108935494 · Cited by 18
Hakkarainen, J., & Keinänen, M. (2023) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009070126 · Cited by 17
Cheng, T. (2024) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009243834 · Cited by 15
Horvath, J. (2014) · Thought A Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1002/tht3.135 · Cited by 15
Husserlian essentialism revisited : a study of essence, necessity and predication
Spinelli, N. (2026) · Warwick Research Archive Portal (University of Warwick) · doi:10.82444/warw.33721813 · Cited by 15
Counterfactual reasoning and knowledge of possibilities
Gregory, D. (2016) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0707-2 · Cited by 14
“B)&( A_hB)) (Lowe 2012, 9).”
The New Aristotelian Essentialists
Noonan, H. W. (2017) · Metaphysica · doi:10.1515/mp-2018-0004 · Cited by 14
“…‘it is preferable to try to explicate the notions of metaphysical necessity and possibility in terms of the notion of essence, rather than vice versa’ (Lowe 2012: 934), since the modal account ‘puts the cart before the horse’ in attempting to ‘characterize essence in terms of antecedently assumed…”
Background(2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316494134 · Cited by 13
Superexplanations for counterfactual knowledge
Mallozzi, A. (2020) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-020-01477-0 · Cited by 13
God from God: the essential dependence model of eternal generation
Makin, M. (2018) · Religious Studies · doi:10.1017/s0034412518000197 · Cited by 11
Casullo, A. (2020) · Metaphysics · doi:10.5334/met.23 · Cited by 11
“Blackburn motivates his position 1 In a series of papers, E. J. Lowe (2008, 2012, 2014) provides a less systematic treatment of these issues.”
Background(2018) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqy043 · Cited by 11
Two notions of metaphysical modality
Mallozzi, A. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1702-2 · Cited by 10
“See also Hale (forthcoming; 2013: ch. 11), and Lowe (2012).”
BackgroundThe Structure of Essentialist Explanations of Necessity
Wallner, M. (2019) · Thought A Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1002/tht3.436 · Cited by 10
“Fine (1994), Lowe (2008, 2012), Hale (2013, 2018) and others argue or accept the view that necessity is to be explained by (or grounded in) essences: Necessarily p iff, and because, there is some x whose essence ensures that p. Hale, however, believes that this strategy is not universally…”
BackgroundResultInfluentialModal epistemology made concrete
Dohrn, D. (2018) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1135-2 · Cited by 10
Clarke‐Doane, J. (2017) · Canadian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00455091.2017.1315289 · Cited by 9
“In addition to Benacerraf (1973), Mackie (1977) and the references mentioned in the subsequent footnote, see Field (1989 and 2005) and Lowe (2012, 946). 7. See, for instance, Chihara (1990) or Hellman (1989). 8. A similar point applies to apparent talk of ‘reasons’ (though the issue is moot for Scanlon, since he is no…”
BackgroundInfluentialNon‐uniformism about the Epistemology of Modality: Strong and Weak
Wirling, Y. S. (2019) · Analytic Philosophy · doi:10.1111/phib.12172 · Cited by 9
Possibility Precedes Actuality
Tahko, T. E. (2022) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-022-00518-w · Cited by 9
“Let me now move on to my previous response (Tahko 2017) to this objection, and Casullo’s (2020) as well as Vaidya and Wallner’s (2021) rejoinders.”
BackgroundRoca-Royes, S. (2023) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009004596 · Cited by 9
Modal Pluralism and Higher‐Order Logic
Clarke‐Doane, J., & McCarthy, W. (2022) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.1111/phpe.12165 · Cited by 8
Hale on the Architecture of Modal Knowledge
Fischer, B. (2016) · Analytic Philosophy · doi:10.1111/phib.12078 · Cited by 8
Thought experiments without possible worlds
Dohrn, D. (2017) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-017-0871-z · Cited by 8
Modal inferences in science: a tale of two epistemologies
Hirvonen, I., Koskinen, R., & Pättiniemi, I. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03399-8 · Cited by 7
“Rather than starting with strong philosophical assumptions (see, e.g., Lewis, 1986; Chalmers, 2002; Lowe, 2012; Hale, 2013; Mallozzi, 2021a; Kment, 2021a), we feel that the epistemology of modality should benefit from paying closer attention to the scientific practice of constructing and evaluating…”
BackgroundSpinelli, N. (2021) · Husserl Studies · doi:10.1007/s10743-021-09285-y · Cited by 7
“Non-Husserlian ones abound: see Fine (1994), Hale (1996, 2013), Lowe (2012), Mulligan (2004).”
Epistemologists of modality wanted
Boardman, S., & Schoonen, T. (2023) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-023-04416-8 · Cited by 6
“We conclude in §6, by reflecting on the relation between the metaphysics of modality and the epistemology of modality.”
Is Knowledge of Essence Required for Thinking about Something?
Sgaravatti, D. (2016) · dialectica · doi:10.1111/1746-8361.12141 · Cited by 6
Special issue of synthese on new directions in the epistemology of modality: introduction
Mallozzi, A. (2019) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02358-8 · Cited by 6
“Lowe (2008, 2012), Hale (2013), as well as arguably Kripke (1980), all put forward pioneering essentialist accounts of modal knowledge.”
BackgroundAn integrative design? How liberalised modal empiricism fails the integration challenge
Wirling, Y. S. (2019) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02426-z · Cited by 6
“…epistemologies, we find Bealer’s modal intuitionism (2002); the conceivability theories of Yablo (1993), Menzies (1998), and Chalmers (2002); the essence-based modal epistemologies of Lowe (2012) and Hale (2013); and the account based on grasping “principles of possibility” due to Peacocke (1999).”
BackgroundAndow, J. (2015) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/anv062 · Cited by 6
Compound powerful qualities: properties as compounds of distinct powers and qualities
Taylor, H. (2023) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-023-04339-4 · Cited by 5
Is Knowledge of Essence the Basis of Modal Knowledge?
Casullo, A. (2020) · Res Philosophica · doi:10.11612/resphil.1940 · Cited by 5
Phenomenal KnowledgeWhy: The Explanatory Knowledge Argument against Physicalism
Mørch, H. H. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316494134.012 · Cited by 5
Mallozzi, A. (2023) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2023.2221670 · Cited by 4
Tahko, T. E. (2020) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315112596-27 · Cited by 4
“For one might insist that we need to have some grasp of the kind of thing that statues and lumps are before we are in any position to draw the philosophically important conclusions (cf. Lowe 2012).”
BackgroundThe moral parody argument against panpsychism
Blaesi, Z. (2021) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-021-01731-z · Cited by 3
“According to Lowe (2012), ‘‘We should regard essence-based explanation just as one more distinctive species of explanation’’ (p. 938). made this concession, I have three points in service of showing that this horn remains sharp enough to put pressure on the panmoralist.”
BackgroundJ. Ladyman, D. Dennett and E. J. Lowe: Scientific Realism and Metaphysics of Possibilities
Golovko, N. V., & Ertel, I. I. (2022) · Siberian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.25205/2541-7517-2021-19-4-5-33 · Cited by 3
Inductive Knowability of the Modal
Roca-Royes, S. (2023) · Disputatio · doi:10.2478/disp-2023-0007 · Cited by 3
On the Alleged Knowledge of Metaphysical Modality
Deng, D.-M. (2016) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-016-9699-6 · Cited by 3
Essentialism and Nonnaturalist Normative Supervenience
Corradini, A. (2017) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-017-9458-8 · Cited by 3
Sense, Incomplete Understanding, and the Problem of Normative Guidance
Pedriali, W. B. (2016) · Grazer Philosophische Studien · doi:10.1163/18756735-09303001 · Cited by 2
Strawson, G. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316494134.007 · Cited by 2
Aristotle’s Explanationist Epistemology of Essence
Hauser, C. (2019) · Metaphysics · doi:10.5334/met.24 · Cited by 2
Counterfactual Logic and the Necessity of Mathematics
Elgin, S. Z. (2020) · Journal of Philosophical Logic · doi:10.1007/s10992-020-09563-8 · Cited by 2
“However, for alternate accounts of our epistemic access to modality, see, for example, [16, 21, 33].”
BackgroundNew frontiers in ground, essence, and modality: introduction
Conaill, D. Ó., & Tahko, T. E. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-02067-8 · Cited by 2
“…realism (Wolff 2012; French 2014, McKenzie 2014; Ó Conaill 2014) and mathematical structuralism (Linnebo 2008); in arguments against priority monism (Lowe 2012b; Tallant 2015); and in discussions of revelation, the thesis that we can come to know the essence of phenomenal properties by attending…”
BackgroundE. J. Lowe on the modal ontological argument
Eklund, D.-J. (2019) · Religious Studies · doi:10.1017/s0034412519000131 · Cited by 2
What Uninformed Mary Can Teach Us
Tye, M. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316494134.014 · Cited by 2
Martha Kneale on Why Metaphysical Necessities Are NotA Priori
Leech, J. F. (2019) · Journal of the American Philosophical Association · doi:10.1017/apa.2018.56 · Cited by 2
J. Ladyman, D. Dennett and E.J. Lowe: How the electron exists
Golovko, N. V. (2022) · Siberian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.25205/2541-7517-2022-20-2-19-42 · Cited by 1
Vincent, W. (2024) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-024-02214-7 · Cited by 1
“…conception of essence, a property P is essential to xx just in case 5 (Gorman, 2005, p. 288), (Oderberg, 2011, p. 98), (Koslicki, 2012, p. 196), (Lowe, 2012, p. 935), (Hale, 2013, p. 151), (Lowe, 2013, pp. 201–202), (Torza, 2015, p. 766), (Dasgupta, 2016, p. 385), (Glazier, 2017, p. 2887),…”
Metaphysical and nomic modalities in J. Lowe’s serious essentialism
Syrmich, S. Y. (2026) · Siberian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.25205/2541-7517-2025-23-3-5-32 · Cited by 1
On the role of modal intuition in modal logic
Jayprakash, V. (2014) · Belgrade Philosophical Annual · doi:10.5937/bpa1427167j · Cited by 1
Filosofía, análisis y juegos: el inútil intento de definir las cosas
Briceño, S. (2020) · Tópicos Revista de Filosofía · doi:10.21555/top.v0i59.1074 · Cited by 1
“Las esencias son ontológicamente prioritarias: aunque todas existen, sólo algunas de ellas tienen instancias concretas; y ellas son el fundamento de la necesidad, ellas explican el hecho de que ciertas cosas y verdades sean invariantes en el espacio modal (Fine, 1994; Lowe, 2012).”
BackgroundThe Knowledge of What Things Are: Possible Views
Abath, A. J. (2022) · Synthese Library/Synthese library · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-07365-6_2 · Cited by 1
Is Colour incompatibility analytic?
Knowles, W. B. (2023) · Ratio · doi:10.1111/rati.12364 · Cited by 1
Encinas, M. J. G. (2023) · Disputatio · doi:10.2478/disp-2023-0009 · Cited by 1
Structural Models for Williamson’s Modal Epistemology
Deng, D.-M. (2015) · Logic in Asia: Studia logica library · doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48357-2_4 · Cited by 1
The unconditioned in philosophy of religion
Shakespeare, S. (2018) · Humanities and Social Sciences Communications · doi:10.1057/s41599-018-0172-y · Cited by 1
Correct Conceivability and its Role in the Epistemology of Modality
Michels, R. (2020) · Collège de France eBooks · doi:10.4000/books.cdf.8079 · Cited by 1
“Epistemologists of modality usually focus on the first of these two questions, but this does not mean that the second question is insubstantial or uninteresting.6 One may therefore argue that while 5See for example Lowe (2012), Hale (2013), ch. 11, Tahko (2016), Tahko (2017).”
BackgroundContim, F. D. V. (2020) · Collège de France eBooks · doi:10.4000/books.cdf.7959 · Cited by 1
From Essence to Metaphysical Modality?
Noonan, H. W. (2020) · Axiomathes · doi:10.1007/s10516-020-09527-2 · Cited by 1
“However, since then, largely due to the seminal work of Kit Fine (1994, 1995a, 1995b, 2000) and that of Jonathan Lowe (1997, 2007, 2008, 2011, 2012a, 2012b), there has been a resurgence of interest in giving a broadly Aristotelian account of essence according to which we can specify the essential properties an individ…”
BackgroundRealism, Objectivity, and Evaluation
Clarke‐Doane, J. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823667.003.0007 · Cited by 1
Necessity and linguistic rules
Kment, B. (2023) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2023.2231030 · Cited by 1
“A natural strategy for explaining these connections is to analyze modality in terms of the hyperintensional notion of essence (see Fine 1994; also see Ditter 2020; Hale 2013: Ch. 11; Lowe 2006; 2007; 2012; Teitel 2019).”
Substantial priority : an essay in fundamental mereology
Inman, R. D. (2013) · Arrow@dit (Dublin Institute of Technology) · Cited by 1
Hale, B. (2017) · doi:10.1002/9781118972090.ch31 · Cited by 1
Powers, necessitation, and time
Westland, D. W. (2015) · Durham e-Theses (Durham University)
Metadata
- Authors
- Lowe, E. J.
- Affiliations
- Durham University (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Lowe, E. J.
- Venue
- Mind
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2012-10-01
- Volume
- 121
- Issue
- 484
- Pages
- 919-950
- ISSN
- 0026-4423 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-2113
- OpenAlex
- W2029395614
- Cited by
- 150
- References
- 24
- Citations by year
- 2026: 10 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 12 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 23 · 2019: 27 · 2018: 15 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 13 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 1
- FWCI
- 22.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Mind (publishedVersion)
- Durham Research Online (Durham University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
- Keywords
- modal knowledge, epistemology of modality, counterfactuals, Timothy Williamson, Kit Fine, essence, real definition, metaphysical necessity, metaphysical possibility, conceivability
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
