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Cited by 31Philosophy and Theoretical SciencePsychiatry, Mental Health, NeuroscienceEmbodied and Extended Cognition

A possible evolutionary function of phenomenal conscious experience of pain

Open access
Kolodny, Oren, Moyal, Roy, Edelman, Shimon·2021·Neuroscience of Consciousness
DOI 10.1093/nc/niab012PMC PMC8206511
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Abstract

Evolutionary accounts of feelings, and in particular of negative affect and of pain, assume that creatures that feel and care about the outcomes of their behavior outperform those that do not in terms of their evolutionary fitness. Such accounts, however, can only work if feelings can be shown to contribute to fitness-influencing outcomes. Simply assuming that a learner that feels and cares about outcomes is more strongly motivated than one that does is not enough, if only because motivation can be tied directly to outcomes by incorporating an appropriate reward function, without leaving any apparent role to feelings (as it is done in state-of-the-art engineered systems based on reinforcement learning). Here, we propose a possible mechanism whereby pain contributes to fitness: an actor-critic functional architecture for reinforcement learning, in which pain reflects the costs imposed on actors in their bidding for control, so as to promote honest signaling and ultimately help the system optimize learning and future behavior.

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  • Feelings in the form of subjectively felt valence are the most basic constitutive phenomenal states, they pervade all of experience, guiding the organism to fitness-promoting states.

    “On this view, feelings in the form of subjectively felt valence are the most basic constitutive phenomenal states, they pervade all of experience, guiding the organism to fitness-promoting states (Inzlicht et al. 2015; Kolodny et al. 2021).”

    From Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution (2021) · cites this paper as Kolodny et al. 2021

    In “Phenomenality, Feelings, and Pain” (page unavailable), the paper says feelings are integral to conscious experience and that phenomenal awareness in a typical human has obligatory aspects of affect and valence. Its Abstract proposes a possible fitness-related function specifically for pain; it does not establish that subjectively felt valence generally guides organisms to fitness-promoting states. It calls phenomenal awareness basic, rather than identifying feelings as the most basic phenomenal states. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • The present account puts subjective valuation as the most basic constitutive feature of a conscious experience-sensation is always infused with what it means for the organism.

    “The present account puts subjective valuation as the most basic constitutive feature of a conscious experience—sensation is always infused with what it ‘means’ for the organism: ‘not everything that happens to us enters our awareness, not by far … but everything that does is not merely informationally registered but also felt’ (Kolodny et al. 2021, 2).”

    From Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution (2021) · cites this paper as Kolodny et al. 2021

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Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. Barto AG. Intrinsic motivation and reinforcement learning. In Baldassarre G, Mirolli M (eds), Intrinsically Motivated Learning in Natural and Artificial Systems. Berlin: Springer, 2013, 16– 47.
  2. Edelman GM, Finkel L. Neuronal group selection in the cerebral cortex. In Edelman GM, Gall WE, Cowan WM(eds), Dynamical Aspects of Neocortical Function. New York: Wiley, 1984 653– 95.
  3. Kirk R. Zombies. In Zalta EN (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2019 edition. 2019.
  4. Zahavi A, Zahavi A. The logic of analog signaling and the theory of signal selection. Israel J Ecol Evol 2012; 58: 269– 78.

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Authors
Kolodny, O., Moyal, R., & Edelman, S.
Affiliations
  • Hebrew University of Jerusalem (IL)
  • Department of Psychology, Uris Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA
Corresponding author
Edelman, Shimon
ORCID
Venue
Neuroscience of Consciousness
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2021-05-01
Volume
2021
Issue
2
Pages
niab012-niab012
ISSN
2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1093/nc/niab012
PMC
PMC8206511
OpenAlex
W3171159361
Cited by
31
References
120
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 19 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 1
FWCI
2.66
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Neuroscience of Consciousness (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
  • PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
Israel Science Foundation
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Psychiatry, Mental Health, Neuroscience
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
Keywords
pain, phenomenal consciousness, negative affect, feelings, reinforcement learning, actor-critic architecture, honest signaling, motivation, fitness

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