The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Of maps and grids
Open accessAbstract
Neuroscience has made remarkable advances in accounting for how the brain performs its various functions. Consciousness, too, is usually approached in functional terms: the goal is to understand how the brain represents information, accesses that information, and acts on it. While useful for prediction, this functional, information-processing approach leaves out the subjective structure of experience: it does not account for how experience feels. Here, we consider a simple model of how a “grid-like” network meant to resemble posterior cortical areas can represent spatial information and act on it to perform a simple “fixation” function. Using standard neuroscience tools, we show how the model represents topographically the retinal position of a stimulus and triggers eye muscles to fixate or follow it. Encoding, decoding, and tuning functions of model units illustrate the working of the model in a way that fully explains what the model does. However, these functional properties have nothing to say about the fact that a human fixating a stimulus would also “see” it—experience it at a location in space. Using the tools of Integrated Information Theory, we then show how the subjective properties of experienced space—its extendedness—can be accounted for in objective, neuroscientific terms by the “cause-effect structure” specified by the grid-like cortical area. By contrast, a “map-like” network without lateral connections, meant to resemble a pretectal circuit, is functionally equivalent to the grid-like system with respect to representation, action, and fixation but cannot account for the phenomenal properties of space.
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![Figure 5. Input/output (i/o) functional descriptions. Each system was run through 10 000 iterations of the “drifting target” condition for 200 time steps each. This i/o description emulates a “perturb each input unit and observe average system response” experiment. Each matrix (A, B) shows the probability of some output state (of the muscle units, listed on the y-axis) given some single-unit-ON input state (of the receptor units, on the x-axis). Not all output states are possible for either system (e.g. HIJK = [0101] is not possible); only possible states are listed. (C) “Tuning functions” on the input array, given each possible output state. Five of the seven possible output states are associated with a selective tuning function on the input. Grid (black lines) and map (red dashed lines) systems hardly differ in this property.](https://figures.cochat.ai/paper-figures/b2004f5ddd9e4595b9cb662def67a8a6/of-maps-and-grids-figure-5.jpg)



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“For example, IIT posits that (1) hierarchically organized grid-like cortical structures with lateral and recurrent convergent-divergent connections, such as those found in posterior cortex, are optimally suited for integrating information and thus correspond to the neural substrate of consciousness, 96”
From An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [96]
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“For IIT the cause-effect structure of grid-like cortices with recurrent pyramid-like, convergent-divergent connections (such as those found in posterior areas) (Figure 7B) is thought to correspond to a maximum of complexity and thus be sufficient for conscious experience.96,97”
From An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [96]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
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“An important implication of this approach is its rejection of functionalism: two systems may have equivalent (or practically indistinguishable) input-output functions (i.e., respond to identical stimuli in the same way), yet the degree and quality of conscious experience may differ dramatically between systems depending on the cause-effect powers realised by their architectures (Albantakis et al.,”
From Integrated information and predictive processing theories of consciousness: An adversarial collaborative review (2026) · cites this paper as Grasso et al., 2021
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“For example, an IIT-based analysis of spatial extendedness suggests a grid-like substrate would be required to instantiate this kind of experience, which is consistent with the structure of posterior cortical regions implicated in visual processing (Grasso et al., 2021; Haun & Tononi, 2019).”
From Integrated information and predictive processing theories of consciousness: An adversarial collaborative review (2026) · cites this paper as Grasso et al., 2021
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“Proponents of IIT have identified the 2D grid-like organisation of posterior cortical networks as a prime candidate for explaining the phenomenal character of spatial extendedness in the visual modality”
From Integrated information and predictive processing theories of consciousness: An adversarial collaborative review (2026) · cites this paper as Grasso et al., 2021
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Cites
Hohwy, J. (2013) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682737.001.0001 · Cited by 1,914
Integrated information theory: from consciousness to its physical substrate
Tononi, G., Boly, M., Massimini, M., & Koch, C. (2016) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn.2016.44 · Cited by 1,727
Self-citationRetinotopic organization in human visual cortex and the spatial precision of functional MRI
Engel, S. (1997) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/7.2.181 · Cited by 1,621
From the phenomenology to the mechanisms of consciousness: integrated information theory 3.0
Oizumi, M., Albantakis, L., & Tononi, G. (2014) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003588 · Cited by 1,128
Self-citationKriegeskorte, N. (2015) · Annual Review of Vision Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-vision-082114-035447 · Cited by 1,093
Striate cortex of monkey and cat: contrast response function.
Albrecht, D. G., & Hamilton, D. B. (1982) · Journal of Neurophysiology · doi:10.1152/jn.1982.48.1.217 · Cited by 950
Lateral Connectivity and Contextual Interactions in Macaque Primary Visual Cortex
Stettler, D. D., Das, A., Bennett, J., & Gilbert, C. D. (2002) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/s0896-6273(02)01029-2 · Cited by 504
Hlavin, L. (1990) · Neurology · doi:10.1212/wnl.40.2.388-c · Cited by 424
Imaging retinotopic maps in the human brain
Wandell, B. A., & Winawer, J. (2011) · Vision Research · doi:10.1016/j.visres.2010.08.004 · Cited by 373
Martin, J. H. (1989) · Cited by 295
Cited by
An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness
Storm, J. F., Klink, P. C., Aru, J., Senn, W., Goebel, R., Pigorini, A., Avanzini, P., Vanduffel, W., Roelfsema, P. R., Massimini, M., et al. (2024) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2024.02.004 · Cited by 114
“…as those found in posterior cortex, are optimally suited for integrating information and thus correspond to the neural substrate of consciousness, 96 and (2) that phenomenal space—the feeling of extendedness—can be…”
Consciousness and the fallacy of misplaced objectivity
Ellia, F., Hendren, J., Grasso, M., Kozma, C., Mindt, G., P. Lang, J., M. Haun, A., Albantakis, L., Boly, M., & Tononi, G. (2021) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niab032 · Cited by 57
Self-citationVishne, G., Gerber, E. M., Knight, R. T., & Deouell, L. Y. (2023) · Cell Reports · doi:10.1016/j.celrep.2023.112752 · Cited by 46
Dissociating Artificial Intelligence from Artificial Consciousness
Findlay, G., Marshall, W., Albantakis, L., David, I., Mayner, W. G., Koch, C., & Tononi, G. (2024) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2412.04571 · Cited by 41
“…consciousness may split under some concurrent tasks [29], why specific contents of consciousness such as the visual field, temporal flow or mental objects may feel the way they do [40, 41, 91–93], and why consciousness may have evolved due to selective pressure for information integration [94–96].”
Self-citationSpontaneous and Perturbational Complexity in Cortical Cultures
Colombi, I., Nieus, T. R., Massimini, M., & Chiappalone, M. (2021) · Brain Sciences · doi:10.3390/brainsci11111453 · Cited by 29
Metadata
- Authors
- Grasso, M., Haun, A. M., & Tononi, G.
- Affiliations
- University of Wisconsin–Madison (US)
- Corresponding author
- Tononi, Giulio
- Venue
- Neuroscience of Consciousness
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2021-09-01
- Volume
- 2021
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- niab022-niab022
- ISSN
- 2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC8452603
- OpenAlex
- W3201266294
- Cited by
- 19
- References
- 23
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 2
- FWCI
- 2.42
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Neuroscience of Consciousness (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, other-oa)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Tiny Blue Dot Foundation
- Templeton World Charity Foundation
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural dynamics and brain function
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
- Keywords
- grid cells, eye fixations, spatial representation, integrated information theory, phenomenal space, subjective experience, causal structure, topographic map
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