The Grain Problem1
Abstract
There is, today, no glimmer of a consensus amongst philosophers about the mind-body problem. Nevertheless, an increasing number of philosophers find themselves occupying a middle ground between physicalist reductionism, on the one hand, and dualism on the other. Physicalist reductionism I take to be the view that the physical story about what is going on in the brain and the world with which it interacts is in some sense the whole story. If there really are such things as mental states and processes—which eliminative materialists notoriously deny—then their existence must be logically implicit in facts statable in the language of physics. Space does not permit a detailed rebuttal of reductionist physicalism; nor do the arguments I have elsewhere presented admit of brief summary.
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The potential of basic dispositions of matter for generating awareness could be a matter of the application of certain currently unknown laws to their familiar physical attributes.
“Their [basic dispositions of matter] potential for generating awareness could be a matter of the application of certain currently unknown laws to their familiar physical attributes (in which laws, of course, there would be an essential reference to the emergent attributes).”
From Neutral monism reconsidered (2010) · cites this paper as Lockwood (1993)
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- Authors
- Lockwood, M.
- Corresponding author
- Lockwood, Michael
- Venue
- Objections To Physicalism
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 1993-03-18
- Pages
- 271-291
- OpenAlex
- W4388215616
- Cited by
- 58
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2025: 16 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 14 · 2018: 3
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- mind-body problem, physicalism, reductionism, dualism, eliminativism, mental states, philosophy of mind
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