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Neutral monism reconsidered
Open accessBanks, Erik C.·2010·Philosophical Psychology
Abstract
Neutral monism is a position in metaphysics defended by Mach, James, and Russell in the early twentieth century. It holds that minds and physical objects are essentially two different orderings of the same underlying neutral elements of nature. This paper sets out some of the central concepts, theses and the historical background of ideas that inform this doctrine of elements. The discussion begins with the classic neutral monism of Mach, James, and Russell in the first part of the paper, then considers recent neo-Russellian versions in the second half. The chances for a revival of neutral monism are probably slight; its key ideas and starting points lie far from those in contemporary philosophy of mind. A better route might be through the philosophy of science and a deeper understanding of causation.
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Crossref · 10.1080/09515081003690418
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- Interpretationreasoning§ 2. What are Elements? Four Theses
Elements are isolated empirically by holding one constant against the variations of the other elements that accompany it, rather than starting from a basic set as in logical constructions.
“We don't start from a basic set, as in logical constructions a `la Carnap, but rather isolate an element from a complex empirically, by holding it constant against the variations of the other elements that always accompany it.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ 1. Introduction
For Mach, the elements that made up minds and bodies were in themselves neither mental sensation qualities nor physical objects in space and time, but neutral between both domains and distinguished provisionally as mental or physical variations.
“The elements that made up minds and bodies were in themselves neither mental sensation qualities, nor physical objects in space and time, but rather neutral between both domains and distinguished provisionally by isolating out one kind of variation of elements as 'mental' and one kind of variation as 'physical'.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Mach, 1959
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ 1. Introduction
In Mach's view, there was no dualism either of elements or of variations.
“In reality, there was no such dualism, either of elements or variations (Mach, 1959, pp. 16, 310-311; see also James, 1977;Russell, 1914Russell, /1984Russell, , 1921Russell, , 1927Russell, /1959)).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Mach, 1959
Not checked in the free run.
- cites James, 1977
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- cites Russell, 1914/1984
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- Premisecitation§ 1. Introduction
For Mach, sensation/elements were concrete realities in their own right, existing independently of the act of perceiving them.
“Rather than thinking of sensation/elements as defined by the subject who apprehended them, elements were concrete realities in their own right, existing independently of the act of perceiving them.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ 1. Introduction
Mach's ideal for physics was to replace the object-property ontology with a world of powers or world elements linked in functional relations, a power-ontology he believed held all the way down to a basic structure of nature more fundamental than atoms.
“Mach's ideal for physics, then, was to replace the object-property ontology with a world of powers, or world elements, linked to each other in functional relations, a power-ontology which Mach believed held all the way down to a basic structure of nature even more fundamental than atoms (Banks, 2003).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Banks, 2003 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ 1. Introduction
Mach's theory of the elements emerged as a reaction to his mentor G. T. Fechner, the founder of psychophysics.
“As Michael Heidelberger (2004, 2007) has shown, Mach's theory of the elements emerged as a reaction to his mentor G.T. Fechner, the founder of psychophysics.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Heidelberger, 2004 source
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- cites Heidelberger, 2007
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- Interpretationnone given§ 2. What are Elements? Four Theses
Monism is implicit in classic neutral monism: the mental and physical domains are part of a greater natural domain of elements and their functional variations.
“1. Monism: the mental and physical domains are part of a greater natural domain of elements and their functional variations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ 4. Russell Redux: Neo-Neutral Monism and Panpsychism Neutral monism never really disappeared in the twentieth century.After Russell, it was taken up in a problematic way by Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle, by Erwin Schro ¨dinger, by Herbert Feigl and many others (Carnap, 2003;Feigl, 1967;Schro ¨dinger, 2006).Recently, there has been a modest revival of the position deriving from a passage in Russell's (1927Russell's ( /1959) ) Analysis of Matter (see Banks, 2003Banks, , 2004;;Chalmers, 1996Chalmers, , 2003;;Holman, 2008;Lockwood, 1989;Maxwell, 1978;Rosenberg, 2004;Stoljar, 2001a;Strawson, 2006;and Unger, 1999, among others): Physics, in itself, is exceedingly abstract and reveals only certain mathematical characteristics of the material with which it deals.It does not tell us anything as to the intrinsic character of this material . . . .But by bringing physics and perception together, we are able to include psychical events in the material of physics and to give physics the greater concreteness which results from our more intimate acquaintance with the subject matter of our own experience . . . .As to intrinsic character, we do not know enough about it in the physical world to have a right to say that it is very different from that of percepts.(Russell, 1927/1959, pp.10; 400-401) 14 In other words, physics deals with the relational or dispositional characteristics of matter, which can enter into abstract mathematical laws.It does not deal with the intrinsic character of matter, or what concretely instantiates those dispositions.One option is to adopt a suitably enhanced physicalism, 15 in which these externally described dispositions are concretely instantiated by something with ''intrinsic character,'' presumably the same way our sensations concretely instantiate states of our physically described brains (as Russell held elsewhere; Russell, 1921). The mathematician Max Newman (1928) pointed out that Russell's preliminary definition of physics as purely relational would not suffice, since (according to Russell's own theory of relations!)given any cardinal number of objects, all of the abstract combinatorial relations between them simply come along for free.Which among all these abstract possibilities are concretely instantiated by physics, for example by genuine causal connections between objects?Russell readily admitted this criticism (Demopoulos & Friedman, 1989;Seager, 2006), but Newman is actually endorsing Russell's real proposal for an enhanced physicalism, in which causal dispositions are concretely instantiated by qualities and are not just abstract combinations of objects.It is this proposal for an enhanced physicalism that most authors have taken from the quote.Rather than canvass all of the different proposals cited above, I will make use of David Chalmer's (2003) concise summary in which he dubs the Neo-Russellian position 'Type-F monism'.According to Chalmers: Type F monism is the view that consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities: that is, by the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions.On this view, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are located at the fundamental level of physical reality and in a certain sense, underlie physical reality itself . . . .As a bonus this view is perfectly compatible with the causal closure of the microphysical, and indeed with existing physical laws.The view can retain the structure of physical theory as it already exists; it simply supplements this structure with an intrinsic nature . . .(proto)phenomenal properties serve as the ultimate categorical basis of all physical causation.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 265) These 'categorical properties' are, for Chalmers, the concrete instantiations of causal forces, and are themselves dispositions (see Banks, 2009).They have both an intrinsic, or concrete, aspect as real qualities, and they have also the relational or dispositional aspect as it is known in physics.Thesis number four above seems completely satisfied by Type F-Monism.On the other hand, these categorical properties are what Chalmers calls ''(proto) phenomenal properties'' inside of even the smallest parts of matter, a suggestion with disturbing panpsychist overtones.As the physical stuff combines, according to physical laws, into ever more complex structures like the brain, these tiny protophenomenal properties inside matter combine into conscious experience and sensation.Chalmers suggests that there must be principles for how these protophenomenal properties combine, which would run in parallel with, but be independent of, the way that the physical dispositions combine: This is . . . the combination problem for panpsychism.To answer it, it seems that we need a much better understanding of the compositional principles of phenomenology: that is, the principles by which phenomenal properties can be composed or constituted from underlying phenomenal properties, or from protophenomenal properties.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 266) Philosophical Psychology 181 Why would we need two completely different, parallel orders of composition if the protophenomenal properties are exactly the occupants of the known causal roles of physics?Won't the principles of combination be just the same?I can't see how there could be a second ordering besides that by which physical dispositions ordinarily configure by known physical laws.16 Moreover the idea that physical dispositions in matter are little ''proto-sensations'' seems wrong, much less proto-sensations in little ''proto-egos'' (Strawson, 2006).Elements are concrete instantiations of physical dispositions, but they are not all sensations, or even possible sensations, and they certainly don't depend on there being little egos to perceive them.So Type-F monism appears to lack features of classic neutral monism already. Instead, as outlined above, why not let the phenomenal properties (sensations) be the concrete instantiations of higher order dispositions, while the lower-level physical dispositions are concretely instantiated by physical elements in matter that are not anyone's sensations, nor related to them by a line of descent?Here, Chalmers explicitly rejects the notion that a sensation quality might be intrinsic ''to high level physical dispositions (e.g., those involved in neural states)'': If the low-level network is causally closed and the high level intrinsic properties are not constituted by low-level intrinsic properties, the high level intrinsic properties will be epiphenomenal.The only way to embrace this position would seem to be in combination with a denial of microphysical causal closure, holding that there are fundamental dispositions above the microphysical level which have phenomenal properties as their grounds.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 267) I give him credit for seeing the possibility, but he, too, has fallen for the one-size-fits-all notion of causation criticized above.This prevents him from seeing the appeal of making sensations the instantiation of higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Given that we are still owed a definition of causation, why is it impossible that a configuration of elements instantiating a cluster of micro-physical dispositions might not also collectively instantiate a disposition of the cluster as a whole?17 There is no need for a mysterious line of descent from conscious sensation to inorganic matter by which protophenomenal properties combine by a set of weird laws into conscious phenomenal properties; we can just stick with physics and its laws, complemented by further empirical laws describing the higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Lockwood (1993) addresses this point explicitly: Their [basic dispositions of matter] potential for generating awareness could be a matter of the application of certain currently unknown laws to their familiar physical attributes (in which laws, of course, there would be an essential reference to the emergent attributes).This fairly elementary point seems to have escaped those authors who have argued that, if we are made of electrons, quarks, gluons, and the like, then-given that we are conscious-electrons, quarks and so forth must themselves be possessed of some sort of primitive proto-consciousness.As I see it, this is a complete non-sequitur (p.281).
The idea that physical dispositions in matter are little proto-sensations is wrong.
“Moreover the idea that physical dispositions in matter are little ''proto-sensations'' seems wrong, much less proto-sensations in little ''proto-egos'' (Strawson, 2006).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Strawson (2006)
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationcitation§ 2. What are Elements? Four Theses
The response that the interior aspect of neural energy is different from its exterior aspect is inadequate because it tables the problem without explaining why they seem so different.
“It must be admitted that this response still seems inadequate.It tables the problem without explaining why this interior aspect of neural energy is, or perhaps only seems to be, so very different from its exterior aspect (McGinn, 1991;Papineau, 2002).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites McGinn, 1991
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Papineau, 2002
Not checked in the free run.
- Rests on an assumption: It does not seem possible that a cluster of cells carrying out complex electrochemical signaling could look like green even from the inside.
- Interpretationreasoning§ 4. Russell Redux: Neo-Neutral Monism and Panpsychism Neutral monism never really disappeared in the twentieth century.After Russell, it was taken up in a problematic way by Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle, by Erwin Schro ¨dinger, by Herbert Feigl and many others (Carnap, 2003;Feigl, 1967;Schro ¨dinger, 2006).Recently, there has been a modest revival of the position deriving from a passage in Russell's (1927Russell's ( /1959) ) Analysis of Matter (see Banks, 2003Banks, , 2004;;Chalmers, 1996Chalmers, , 2003;;Holman, 2008;Lockwood, 1989;Maxwell, 1978;Rosenberg, 2004;Stoljar, 2001a;Strawson, 2006;and Unger, 1999, among others): Physics, in itself, is exceedingly abstract and reveals only certain mathematical characteristics of the material with which it deals.It does not tell us anything as to the intrinsic character of this material . . . .But by bringing physics and perception together, we are able to include psychical events in the material of physics and to give physics the greater concreteness which results from our more intimate acquaintance with the subject matter of our own experience . . . .As to intrinsic character, we do not know enough about it in the physical world to have a right to say that it is very different from that of percepts.(Russell, 1927/1959, pp.10; 400-401) 14 In other words, physics deals with the relational or dispositional characteristics of matter, which can enter into abstract mathematical laws.It does not deal with the intrinsic character of matter, or what concretely instantiates those dispositions.One option is to adopt a suitably enhanced physicalism, 15 in which these externally described dispositions are concretely instantiated by something with ''intrinsic character,'' presumably the same way our sensations concretely instantiate states of our physically described brains (as Russell held elsewhere; Russell, 1921). The mathematician Max Newman (1928) pointed out that Russell's preliminary definition of physics as purely relational would not suffice, since (according to Russell's own theory of relations!)given any cardinal number of objects, all of the abstract combinatorial relations between them simply come along for free.Which among all these abstract possibilities are concretely instantiated by physics, for example by genuine causal connections between objects?Russell readily admitted this criticism (Demopoulos & Friedman, 1989;Seager, 2006), but Newman is actually endorsing Russell's real proposal for an enhanced physicalism, in which causal dispositions are concretely instantiated by qualities and are not just abstract combinations of objects.It is this proposal for an enhanced physicalism that most authors have taken from the quote.Rather than canvass all of the different proposals cited above, I will make use of David Chalmer's (2003) concise summary in which he dubs the Neo-Russellian position 'Type-F monism'.According to Chalmers: Type F monism is the view that consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities: that is, by the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions.On this view, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are located at the fundamental level of physical reality and in a certain sense, underlie physical reality itself . . . .As a bonus this view is perfectly compatible with the causal closure of the microphysical, and indeed with existing physical laws.The view can retain the structure of physical theory as it already exists; it simply supplements this structure with an intrinsic nature . . .(proto)phenomenal properties serve as the ultimate categorical basis of all physical causation.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 265) These 'categorical properties' are, for Chalmers, the concrete instantiations of causal forces, and are themselves dispositions (see Banks, 2009).They have both an intrinsic, or concrete, aspect as real qualities, and they have also the relational or dispositional aspect as it is known in physics.Thesis number four above seems completely satisfied by Type F-Monism.On the other hand, these categorical properties are what Chalmers calls ''(proto) phenomenal properties'' inside of even the smallest parts of matter, a suggestion with disturbing panpsychist overtones.As the physical stuff combines, according to physical laws, into ever more complex structures like the brain, these tiny protophenomenal properties inside matter combine into conscious experience and sensation.Chalmers suggests that there must be principles for how these protophenomenal properties combine, which would run in parallel with, but be independent of, the way that the physical dispositions combine: This is . . . the combination problem for panpsychism.To answer it, it seems that we need a much better understanding of the compositional principles of phenomenology: that is, the principles by which phenomenal properties can be composed or constituted from underlying phenomenal properties, or from protophenomenal properties.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 266) Philosophical Psychology 181 Why would we need two completely different, parallel orders of composition if the protophenomenal properties are exactly the occupants of the known causal roles of physics?Won't the principles of combination be just the same?I can't see how there could be a second ordering besides that by which physical dispositions ordinarily configure by known physical laws.16 Moreover the idea that physical dispositions in matter are little ''proto-sensations'' seems wrong, much less proto-sensations in little ''proto-egos'' (Strawson, 2006).Elements are concrete instantiations of physical dispositions, but they are not all sensations, or even possible sensations, and they certainly don't depend on there being little egos to perceive them.So Type-F monism appears to lack features of classic neutral monism already. Instead, as outlined above, why not let the phenomenal properties (sensations) be the concrete instantiations of higher order dispositions, while the lower-level physical dispositions are concretely instantiated by physical elements in matter that are not anyone's sensations, nor related to them by a line of descent?Here, Chalmers explicitly rejects the notion that a sensation quality might be intrinsic ''to high level physical dispositions (e.g., those involved in neural states)'': If the low-level network is causally closed and the high level intrinsic properties are not constituted by low-level intrinsic properties, the high level intrinsic properties will be epiphenomenal.The only way to embrace this position would seem to be in combination with a denial of microphysical causal closure, holding that there are fundamental dispositions above the microphysical level which have phenomenal properties as their grounds.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 267) I give him credit for seeing the possibility, but he, too, has fallen for the one-size-fits-all notion of causation criticized above.This prevents him from seeing the appeal of making sensations the instantiation of higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Given that we are still owed a definition of causation, why is it impossible that a configuration of elements instantiating a cluster of micro-physical dispositions might not also collectively instantiate a disposition of the cluster as a whole?17 There is no need for a mysterious line of descent from conscious sensation to inorganic matter by which protophenomenal properties combine by a set of weird laws into conscious phenomenal properties; we can just stick with physics and its laws, complemented by further empirical laws describing the higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Lockwood (1993) addresses this point explicitly: Their [basic dispositions of matter] potential for generating awareness could be a matter of the application of certain currently unknown laws to their familiar physical attributes (in which laws, of course, there would be an essential reference to the emergent attributes).This fairly elementary point seems to have escaped those authors who have argued that, if we are made of electrons, quarks, gluons, and the like, then-given that we are conscious-electrons, quarks and so forth must themselves be possessed of some sort of primitive proto-consciousness.As I see it, this is a complete non-sequitur (p.281).
There is no need for a mysterious line of descent from conscious sensation to inorganic matter by which protophenomenal properties combine by a set of weird laws into conscious phenomenal properties.
“There is no need for a mysterious line of descent from conscious sensation to inorganic matter by which protophenomenal properties combine by a set of weird laws into conscious phenomenal properties; we can just stick with physics and its laws, complemented by further empirical laws describing the higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 4. Russell Redux: Neo-Neutral Monism and Panpsychism Neutral monism never really disappeared in the twentieth century.After Russell, it was taken up in a problematic way by Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle, by Erwin Schro ¨dinger, by Herbert Feigl and many others (Carnap, 2003;Feigl, 1967;Schro ¨dinger, 2006).Recently, there has been a modest revival of the position deriving from a passage in Russell's (1927Russell's ( /1959) ) Analysis of Matter (see Banks, 2003Banks, , 2004;;Chalmers, 1996Chalmers, , 2003;;Holman, 2008;Lockwood, 1989;Maxwell, 1978;Rosenberg, 2004;Stoljar, 2001a;Strawson, 2006;and Unger, 1999, among others): Physics, in itself, is exceedingly abstract and reveals only certain mathematical characteristics of the material with which it deals.It does not tell us anything as to the intrinsic character of this material . . . .But by bringing physics and perception together, we are able to include psychical events in the material of physics and to give physics the greater concreteness which results from our more intimate acquaintance with the subject matter of our own experience . . . .As to intrinsic character, we do not know enough about it in the physical world to have a right to say that it is very different from that of percepts.(Russell, 1927/1959, pp.10; 400-401) 14 In other words, physics deals with the relational or dispositional characteristics of matter, which can enter into abstract mathematical laws.It does not deal with the intrinsic character of matter, or what concretely instantiates those dispositions.One option is to adopt a suitably enhanced physicalism, 15 in which these externally described dispositions are concretely instantiated by something with ''intrinsic character,'' presumably the same way our sensations concretely instantiate states of our physically described brains (as Russell held elsewhere; Russell, 1921). The mathematician Max Newman (1928) pointed out that Russell's preliminary definition of physics as purely relational would not suffice, since (according to Russell's own theory of relations!)given any cardinal number of objects, all of the abstract combinatorial relations between them simply come along for free.Which among all these abstract possibilities are concretely instantiated by physics, for example by genuine causal connections between objects?Russell readily admitted this criticism (Demopoulos & Friedman, 1989;Seager, 2006), but Newman is actually endorsing Russell's real proposal for an enhanced physicalism, in which causal dispositions are concretely instantiated by qualities and are not just abstract combinations of objects.It is this proposal for an enhanced physicalism that most authors have taken from the quote.Rather than canvass all of the different proposals cited above, I will make use of David Chalmer's (2003) concise summary in which he dubs the Neo-Russellian position 'Type-F monism'.According to Chalmers: Type F monism is the view that consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities: that is, by the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions.On this view, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are located at the fundamental level of physical reality and in a certain sense, underlie physical reality itself . . . .As a bonus this view is perfectly compatible with the causal closure of the microphysical, and indeed with existing physical laws.The view can retain the structure of physical theory as it already exists; it simply supplements this structure with an intrinsic nature . . .(proto)phenomenal properties serve as the ultimate categorical basis of all physical causation.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 265) These 'categorical properties' are, for Chalmers, the concrete instantiations of causal forces, and are themselves dispositions (see Banks, 2009).They have both an intrinsic, or concrete, aspect as real qualities, and they have also the relational or dispositional aspect as it is known in physics.Thesis number four above seems completely satisfied by Type F-Monism.On the other hand, these categorical properties are what Chalmers calls ''(proto) phenomenal properties'' inside of even the smallest parts of matter, a suggestion with disturbing panpsychist overtones.As the physical stuff combines, according to physical laws, into ever more complex structures like the brain, these tiny protophenomenal properties inside matter combine into conscious experience and sensation.Chalmers suggests that there must be principles for how these protophenomenal properties combine, which would run in parallel with, but be independent of, the way that the physical dispositions combine: This is . . . the combination problem for panpsychism.To answer it, it seems that we need a much better understanding of the compositional principles of phenomenology: that is, the principles by which phenomenal properties can be composed or constituted from underlying phenomenal properties, or from protophenomenal properties.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 266) Philosophical Psychology 181 Why would we need two completely different, parallel orders of composition if the protophenomenal properties are exactly the occupants of the known causal roles of physics?Won't the principles of combination be just the same?I can't see how there could be a second ordering besides that by which physical dispositions ordinarily configure by known physical laws.16 Moreover the idea that physical dispositions in matter are little ''proto-sensations'' seems wrong, much less proto-sensations in little ''proto-egos'' (Strawson, 2006).Elements are concrete instantiations of physical dispositions, but they are not all sensations, or even possible sensations, and they certainly don't depend on there being little egos to perceive them.So Type-F monism appears to lack features of classic neutral monism already. Instead, as outlined above, why not let the phenomenal properties (sensations) be the concrete instantiations of higher order dispositions, while the lower-level physical dispositions are concretely instantiated by physical elements in matter that are not anyone's sensations, nor related to them by a line of descent?Here, Chalmers explicitly rejects the notion that a sensation quality might be intrinsic ''to high level physical dispositions (e.g., those involved in neural states)'': If the low-level network is causally closed and the high level intrinsic properties are not constituted by low-level intrinsic properties, the high level intrinsic properties will be epiphenomenal.The only way to embrace this position would seem to be in combination with a denial of microphysical causal closure, holding that there are fundamental dispositions above the microphysical level which have phenomenal properties as their grounds.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 267) I give him credit for seeing the possibility, but he, too, has fallen for the one-size-fits-all notion of causation criticized above.This prevents him from seeing the appeal of making sensations the instantiation of higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Given that we are still owed a definition of causation, why is it impossible that a configuration of elements instantiating a cluster of micro-physical dispositions might not also collectively instantiate a disposition of the cluster as a whole?17 There is no need for a mysterious line of descent from conscious sensation to inorganic matter by which protophenomenal properties combine by a set of weird laws into conscious phenomenal properties; we can just stick with physics and its laws, complemented by further empirical laws describing the higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Lockwood (1993) addresses this point explicitly: Their [basic dispositions of matter] potential for generating awareness could be a matter of the application of certain currently unknown laws to their familiar physical attributes (in which laws, of course, there would be an essential reference to the emergent attributes).This fairly elementary point seems to have escaped those authors who have argued that, if we are made of electrons, quarks, gluons, and the like, then-given that we are conscious-electrons, quarks and so forth must themselves be possessed of some sort of primitive proto-consciousness.As I see it, this is a complete non-sequitur (p.281).
Elements are concrete instantiations of physical dispositions.
“Elements are concrete instantiations of physical dispositions, but they are not all sensations, or even possible sensations, and they certainly don't depend on there being little egos to perceive them.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 4. Russell Redux: Neo-Neutral Monism and Panpsychism Neutral monism never really disappeared in the twentieth century.After Russell, it was taken up in a problematic way by Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle, by Erwin Schro ¨dinger, by Herbert Feigl and many others (Carnap, 2003;Feigl, 1967;Schro ¨dinger, 2006).Recently, there has been a modest revival of the position deriving from a passage in Russell's (1927Russell's ( /1959) ) Analysis of Matter (see Banks, 2003Banks, , 2004;;Chalmers, 1996Chalmers, , 2003;;Holman, 2008;Lockwood, 1989;Maxwell, 1978;Rosenberg, 2004;Stoljar, 2001a;Strawson, 2006;and Unger, 1999, among others): Physics, in itself, is exceedingly abstract and reveals only certain mathematical characteristics of the material with which it deals.It does not tell us anything as to the intrinsic character of this material . . . .But by bringing physics and perception together, we are able to include psychical events in the material of physics and to give physics the greater concreteness which results from our more intimate acquaintance with the subject matter of our own experience . . . .As to intrinsic character, we do not know enough about it in the physical world to have a right to say that it is very different from that of percepts.(Russell, 1927/1959, pp.10; 400-401) 14 In other words, physics deals with the relational or dispositional characteristics of matter, which can enter into abstract mathematical laws.It does not deal with the intrinsic character of matter, or what concretely instantiates those dispositions.One option is to adopt a suitably enhanced physicalism, 15 in which these externally described dispositions are concretely instantiated by something with ''intrinsic character,'' presumably the same way our sensations concretely instantiate states of our physically described brains (as Russell held elsewhere; Russell, 1921). The mathematician Max Newman (1928) pointed out that Russell's preliminary definition of physics as purely relational would not suffice, since (according to Russell's own theory of relations!)given any cardinal number of objects, all of the abstract combinatorial relations between them simply come along for free.Which among all these abstract possibilities are concretely instantiated by physics, for example by genuine causal connections between objects?Russell readily admitted this criticism (Demopoulos & Friedman, 1989;Seager, 2006), but Newman is actually endorsing Russell's real proposal for an enhanced physicalism, in which causal dispositions are concretely instantiated by qualities and are not just abstract combinations of objects.It is this proposal for an enhanced physicalism that most authors have taken from the quote.Rather than canvass all of the different proposals cited above, I will make use of David Chalmer's (2003) concise summary in which he dubs the Neo-Russellian position 'Type-F monism'.According to Chalmers: Type F monism is the view that consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities: that is, by the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions.On this view, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are located at the fundamental level of physical reality and in a certain sense, underlie physical reality itself . . . .As a bonus this view is perfectly compatible with the causal closure of the microphysical, and indeed with existing physical laws.The view can retain the structure of physical theory as it already exists; it simply supplements this structure with an intrinsic nature . . .(proto)phenomenal properties serve as the ultimate categorical basis of all physical causation.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 265) These 'categorical properties' are, for Chalmers, the concrete instantiations of causal forces, and are themselves dispositions (see Banks, 2009).They have both an intrinsic, or concrete, aspect as real qualities, and they have also the relational or dispositional aspect as it is known in physics.Thesis number four above seems completely satisfied by Type F-Monism.On the other hand, these categorical properties are what Chalmers calls ''(proto) phenomenal properties'' inside of even the smallest parts of matter, a suggestion with disturbing panpsychist overtones.As the physical stuff combines, according to physical laws, into ever more complex structures like the brain, these tiny protophenomenal properties inside matter combine into conscious experience and sensation.Chalmers suggests that there must be principles for how these protophenomenal properties combine, which would run in parallel with, but be independent of, the way that the physical dispositions combine: This is . . . the combination problem for panpsychism.To answer it, it seems that we need a much better understanding of the compositional principles of phenomenology: that is, the principles by which phenomenal properties can be composed or constituted from underlying phenomenal properties, or from protophenomenal properties.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 266) Philosophical Psychology 181 Why would we need two completely different, parallel orders of composition if the protophenomenal properties are exactly the occupants of the known causal roles of physics?Won't the principles of combination be just the same?I can't see how there could be a second ordering besides that by which physical dispositions ordinarily configure by known physical laws.16 Moreover the idea that physical dispositions in matter are little ''proto-sensations'' seems wrong, much less proto-sensations in little ''proto-egos'' (Strawson, 2006).Elements are concrete instantiations of physical dispositions, but they are not all sensations, or even possible sensations, and they certainly don't depend on there being little egos to perceive them.So Type-F monism appears to lack features of classic neutral monism already. Instead, as outlined above, why not let the phenomenal properties (sensations) be the concrete instantiations of higher order dispositions, while the lower-level physical dispositions are concretely instantiated by physical elements in matter that are not anyone's sensations, nor related to them by a line of descent?Here, Chalmers explicitly rejects the notion that a sensation quality might be intrinsic ''to high level physical dispositions (e.g., those involved in neural states)'': If the low-level network is causally closed and the high level intrinsic properties are not constituted by low-level intrinsic properties, the high level intrinsic properties will be epiphenomenal.The only way to embrace this position would seem to be in combination with a denial of microphysical causal closure, holding that there are fundamental dispositions above the microphysical level which have phenomenal properties as their grounds.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 267) I give him credit for seeing the possibility, but he, too, has fallen for the one-size-fits-all notion of causation criticized above.This prevents him from seeing the appeal of making sensations the instantiation of higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Given that we are still owed a definition of causation, why is it impossible that a configuration of elements instantiating a cluster of micro-physical dispositions might not also collectively instantiate a disposition of the cluster as a whole?17 There is no need for a mysterious line of descent from conscious sensation to inorganic matter by which protophenomenal properties combine by a set of weird laws into conscious phenomenal properties; we can just stick with physics and its laws, complemented by further empirical laws describing the higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Lockwood (1993) addresses this point explicitly: Their [basic dispositions of matter] potential for generating awareness could be a matter of the application of certain currently unknown laws to their familiar physical attributes (in which laws, of course, there would be an essential reference to the emergent attributes).This fairly elementary point seems to have escaped those authors who have argued that, if we are made of electrons, quarks, gluons, and the like, then-given that we are conscious-electrons, quarks and so forth must themselves be possessed of some sort of primitive proto-consciousness.As I see it, this is a complete non-sequitur (p.281).
Newman is actually endorsing Russell's real proposal for an enhanced physicalism, in which causal dispositions are concretely instantiated by qualities and are not just abstract combinations of objects.
“but Newman is actually endorsing Russell's real proposal for an enhanced physicalism, in which causal dispositions are concretely instantiated by qualities and are not just abstract combinations of objects.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Newman (1928)
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationcitation§ Philosophical Psychology 177 Analysis of Sensations (1959), speaking as a physicist versed in the interpretation of physical laws (in his famous Mechanics for example): I cannot here refrain from expressing my surprise that the principle of the conservation of energy has so often been dragged in in connexion with the question of whether there is a special psychical agent.On the assumption that energy is constant, the course of physical processes is limited but not necessarily determined with perfect uniqueness.That the principle of conservation of energy is satisfied in all physiological cases merely tells us that the psyche neither uses up work, nor performs it.For all that, the psyche may still be a partly determinant factor.When a philosopher asks the question . . . he usually misses the point of the principle of the conservation of energy and the stock reply of the physicist has no intelligible meaning in a case so far removed from the scope of his ideas.(Mach, 1959, p. 55n) A principle like the conservation of energy is a general phenomenological law, a blanket statement, about the initial and final states of a process in a closed system.It is silent about mechanisms, does not say how the process runs, nor does it prevent us from interpolating another process between the initial and final states, so long as there is no net energy absorbed or contributed by it.Mach also addressed this point in his Principle of the Conservation of Energy (1911) remarking that the closure of a system says nothing about its specific transformations from state to state, configuration to configuration, only about the energy going in and going out. 12 He points out in the earlier book that little islets or closed systems of activity ''shut up in themselves'' might occur in an overall system (like the brain) and the conservation law says nothing about how closed systems form, or what effects such formations might have.If, for example, the sensations or behavior of an organism supervenes not on the energy per se but on these intermediary closed islets, configurations of neural energies, specific changes not predicted by, or described by, energy data, could make a recognizable difference to the behavior of the organism and still be in accord with the principle. But if by 'causal closure' we mean something other than a blanket conservation principle, this is where we can get into trouble, for there is really no agreed upon definition of cause (Hausman, 1998).'Cause' may refer to micro-causation only, effecting change according to fundamental laws of physics (Kim, 1998).Or 'cause' may also refer to 'wide' causation or macro-causation, i.e., the effect of macro-types of configuration on each other and on micro-events.Notions of macro-causation, variously defined, are available in Dretske (1993), Garfinkel (1990), Lockwood (2007), Rosenberg (2004), Yablo (1992Yablo ( , 2003Yablo ( , 2009)), and Yoo (2006).The effect of causation by macro-types is not to cause micro-events directly and one to one, but to limit micro-caused events in these configurations to other broad type-classes of configuration, or to exclude them.Properties of configurations of neurons could include macro-symmetry or asymmetry, spatio-temporal patterns or islets of firing bounded by inhibitory areas, anatomical location in the brain, and relations to neighboring islets of neural activity.An example of wide causation of individual neural events might be the way that structural features of a configuration constrain the firing of individual neurons by forcing them to accommodate the firing of neighboring cells in a pattern.Macro-causation does not make the effect happen in the same way that the micro-mechanisms do; a configuration does not 'fire', individual cells do.But the range of micro-physically caused events may be limited by being grouped into certain types of configuration and not others, which may be just as important a feature of neural events, especially if sensations or behavior supervene on the macro-types of configuration in which firings occur, and any higher order laws taking one macro-class of configurations to another macro-class. The opponent of macro-causation points out that configurations of micro-states are already included in a complete micro-causal description of events, so, if the causal powers of configurations are produced by a constellation of micro-factors, the factors and the combination are already included in the micro-description.This is true, the principle of the causal closure of the micro-physical covers all factors and all micro-configurations-configurations of things micro-physically described-in a blanket statement, but for that very reason it is not capable of specifying laws governing the formation of macro-types of configuration (see Banks, 2009).This for the familiar reason that macro-types of configuration may not be realized by a single recognizable type of micro-configuration.Micro-causation is a general physical description of all micro-states in all possible micro-configurations: all are causally closed, all are the result of micro-factors acting together in concert in configurations.Macro-causation, however, describes how some class of macro-configurations A either fosters, limits, or rules out another class of macro-configurations B. This is more specific information not contained in the micro-descriptions of either events or configurations micro-physically described, hence macro-causation is not redundant, or epiphenomenal.Instead, macro-physical configurations may be taken to instantiate legitimate higher-order natural dispositions which are not exhausted, or screened off, by the micro-physical dispositions that realize them case by individual case.Example: I can tell you that an individual configuration a has a probability of 1/2 of evolving into an individual configuration b, but that macro-configurations of type A, to which a individually belongs, evolve into macro-configurations of class B with a probability of 9/10.The higher order law may even be a stronger natural disposition.13 As this paper is not a study of wide causation per se, I will simply note in passing that this kind of ''two levels'' approach is relevant to, and works well with, Mach's language above about 'physical' versus 'psychical' variations of the self-same elements on causal maps.As illustrated below, a physical neural cluster (e) is a cluster or configuration of micro-physical dispositions (e 1 . . ..e n ) and appears to an external investigator as a population of separate cells in a snarl of complex connections to one another, any of which may be investigated separately.These are its 'physical' variations.The neural energy of this whole cluster in itself, however, has the psychical disposition to appear as the quality green (s/e) and to interact and interfere with, or inhibit other sensations as one provisional sensory quality among others (see Figure 1). Hence the causal map will represent both kinds of causal relation among elements some individual, some polyadic type relations, some micro, some macro, Philosophical Psychology 179 without preferring one over the other.Indeed Mach's flexible notion of causation-cum-functional relations allows this quite naturally.Of course we still need further proof that such macro-types really exist and then we need the laws that relate them.But it is best not to prejudge the question.Levels of explanation and modeling can be very important in the sciences and perhaps especially for biology and neuroscience.In specific, our sense organs are probably adapted to overall environmental macro-conditions, and very insensitive to micro-conditions or realizations.Lockwood (1989Lockwood ( , 2007) ) gives an interesting range of scientific examples from convection cells to quantum wave-functions.
The principle of causal closure of the micro-physical covers all factors and micro-configurations in a blanket statement, but for that very reason cannot specify laws governing the formation of macro-types of configuration.
“This is true, the principle of the causal closure of the micro-physical covers all factors and all micro-configurations-configurations of things micro-physically described-in a blanket statement, but for that very reason it is not capable of specifying laws governing the formation of macro-types of configuration (see Banks, 2009).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Banks, 2009
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Philosophical Psychology 177 Analysis of Sensations (1959), speaking as a physicist versed in the interpretation of physical laws (in his famous Mechanics for example): I cannot here refrain from expressing my surprise that the principle of the conservation of energy has so often been dragged in in connexion with the question of whether there is a special psychical agent.On the assumption that energy is constant, the course of physical processes is limited but not necessarily determined with perfect uniqueness.That the principle of conservation of energy is satisfied in all physiological cases merely tells us that the psyche neither uses up work, nor performs it.For all that, the psyche may still be a partly determinant factor.When a philosopher asks the question . . . he usually misses the point of the principle of the conservation of energy and the stock reply of the physicist has no intelligible meaning in a case so far removed from the scope of his ideas.(Mach, 1959, p. 55n) A principle like the conservation of energy is a general phenomenological law, a blanket statement, about the initial and final states of a process in a closed system.It is silent about mechanisms, does not say how the process runs, nor does it prevent us from interpolating another process between the initial and final states, so long as there is no net energy absorbed or contributed by it.Mach also addressed this point in his Principle of the Conservation of Energy (1911) remarking that the closure of a system says nothing about its specific transformations from state to state, configuration to configuration, only about the energy going in and going out. 12 He points out in the earlier book that little islets or closed systems of activity ''shut up in themselves'' might occur in an overall system (like the brain) and the conservation law says nothing about how closed systems form, or what effects such formations might have.If, for example, the sensations or behavior of an organism supervenes not on the energy per se but on these intermediary closed islets, configurations of neural energies, specific changes not predicted by, or described by, energy data, could make a recognizable difference to the behavior of the organism and still be in accord with the principle. But if by 'causal closure' we mean something other than a blanket conservation principle, this is where we can get into trouble, for there is really no agreed upon definition of cause (Hausman, 1998).'Cause' may refer to micro-causation only, effecting change according to fundamental laws of physics (Kim, 1998).Or 'cause' may also refer to 'wide' causation or macro-causation, i.e., the effect of macro-types of configuration on each other and on micro-events.Notions of macro-causation, variously defined, are available in Dretske (1993), Garfinkel (1990), Lockwood (2007), Rosenberg (2004), Yablo (1992Yablo ( , 2003Yablo ( , 2009)), and Yoo (2006).The effect of causation by macro-types is not to cause micro-events directly and one to one, but to limit micro-caused events in these configurations to other broad type-classes of configuration, or to exclude them.Properties of configurations of neurons could include macro-symmetry or asymmetry, spatio-temporal patterns or islets of firing bounded by inhibitory areas, anatomical location in the brain, and relations to neighboring islets of neural activity.An example of wide causation of individual neural events might be the way that structural features of a configuration constrain the firing of individual neurons by forcing them to accommodate the firing of neighboring cells in a pattern.Macro-causation does not make the effect happen in the same way that the micro-mechanisms do; a configuration does not 'fire', individual cells do.But the range of micro-physically caused events may be limited by being grouped into certain types of configuration and not others, which may be just as important a feature of neural events, especially if sensations or behavior supervene on the macro-types of configuration in which firings occur, and any higher order laws taking one macro-class of configurations to another macro-class. The opponent of macro-causation points out that configurations of micro-states are already included in a complete micro-causal description of events, so, if the causal powers of configurations are produced by a constellation of micro-factors, the factors and the combination are already included in the micro-description.This is true, the principle of the causal closure of the micro-physical covers all factors and all micro-configurations-configurations of things micro-physically described-in a blanket statement, but for that very reason it is not capable of specifying laws governing the formation of macro-types of configuration (see Banks, 2009).This for the familiar reason that macro-types of configuration may not be realized by a single recognizable type of micro-configuration.Micro-causation is a general physical description of all micro-states in all possible micro-configurations: all are causally closed, all are the result of micro-factors acting together in concert in configurations.Macro-causation, however, describes how some class of macro-configurations A either fosters, limits, or rules out another class of macro-configurations B. This is more specific information not contained in the micro-descriptions of either events or configurations micro-physically described, hence macro-causation is not redundant, or epiphenomenal.Instead, macro-physical configurations may be taken to instantiate legitimate higher-order natural dispositions which are not exhausted, or screened off, by the micro-physical dispositions that realize them case by individual case.Example: I can tell you that an individual configuration a has a probability of 1/2 of evolving into an individual configuration b, but that macro-configurations of type A, to which a individually belongs, evolve into macro-configurations of class B with a probability of 9/10.The higher order law may even be a stronger natural disposition.13 As this paper is not a study of wide causation per se, I will simply note in passing that this kind of ''two levels'' approach is relevant to, and works well with, Mach's language above about 'physical' versus 'psychical' variations of the self-same elements on causal maps.As illustrated below, a physical neural cluster (e) is a cluster or configuration of micro-physical dispositions (e 1 . . ..e n ) and appears to an external investigator as a population of separate cells in a snarl of complex connections to one another, any of which may be investigated separately.These are its 'physical' variations.The neural energy of this whole cluster in itself, however, has the psychical disposition to appear as the quality green (s/e) and to interact and interfere with, or inhibit other sensations as one provisional sensory quality among others (see Figure 1). Hence the causal map will represent both kinds of causal relation among elements some individual, some polyadic type relations, some micro, some macro, Philosophical Psychology 179 without preferring one over the other.Indeed Mach's flexible notion of causation-cum-functional relations allows this quite naturally.Of course we still need further proof that such macro-types really exist and then we need the laws that relate them.But it is best not to prejudge the question.Levels of explanation and modeling can be very important in the sciences and perhaps especially for biology and neuroscience.In specific, our sense organs are probably adapted to overall environmental macro-conditions, and very insensitive to micro-conditions or realizations.Lockwood (1989Lockwood ( , 2007) ) gives an interesting range of scientific examples from convection cells to quantum wave-functions.
If sensations or behavior supervene on intermediary closed islets or configurations of neural energies rather than on energy per se, specific changes not predicted by energy data could make a recognizable difference to behavior while according with the conservation principle.
“If, for example, the sensations or behavior of an organism supervenes not on the energy per se but on these intermediary closed islets, configurations of neural energies, specific changes not predicted by, or described by, energy data, could make a recognizable difference to the behavior of the organism and still be in accord with the principle.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ Philosophical Psychology 177 Analysis of Sensations (1959), speaking as a physicist versed in the interpretation of physical laws (in his famous Mechanics for example): I cannot here refrain from expressing my surprise that the principle of the conservation of energy has so often been dragged in in connexion with the question of whether there is a special psychical agent.On the assumption that energy is constant, the course of physical processes is limited but not necessarily determined with perfect uniqueness.That the principle of conservation of energy is satisfied in all physiological cases merely tells us that the psyche neither uses up work, nor performs it.For all that, the psyche may still be a partly determinant factor.When a philosopher asks the question . . . he usually misses the point of the principle of the conservation of energy and the stock reply of the physicist has no intelligible meaning in a case so far removed from the scope of his ideas.(Mach, 1959, p. 55n) A principle like the conservation of energy is a general phenomenological law, a blanket statement, about the initial and final states of a process in a closed system.It is silent about mechanisms, does not say how the process runs, nor does it prevent us from interpolating another process between the initial and final states, so long as there is no net energy absorbed or contributed by it.Mach also addressed this point in his Principle of the Conservation of Energy (1911) remarking that the closure of a system says nothing about its specific transformations from state to state, configuration to configuration, only about the energy going in and going out. 12 He points out in the earlier book that little islets or closed systems of activity ''shut up in themselves'' might occur in an overall system (like the brain) and the conservation law says nothing about how closed systems form, or what effects such formations might have.If, for example, the sensations or behavior of an organism supervenes not on the energy per se but on these intermediary closed islets, configurations of neural energies, specific changes not predicted by, or described by, energy data, could make a recognizable difference to the behavior of the organism and still be in accord with the principle. But if by 'causal closure' we mean something other than a blanket conservation principle, this is where we can get into trouble, for there is really no agreed upon definition of cause (Hausman, 1998).'Cause' may refer to micro-causation only, effecting change according to fundamental laws of physics (Kim, 1998).Or 'cause' may also refer to 'wide' causation or macro-causation, i.e., the effect of macro-types of configuration on each other and on micro-events.Notions of macro-causation, variously defined, are available in Dretske (1993), Garfinkel (1990), Lockwood (2007), Rosenberg (2004), Yablo (1992Yablo ( , 2003Yablo ( , 2009)), and Yoo (2006).The effect of causation by macro-types is not to cause micro-events directly and one to one, but to limit micro-caused events in these configurations to other broad type-classes of configuration, or to exclude them.Properties of configurations of neurons could include macro-symmetry or asymmetry, spatio-temporal patterns or islets of firing bounded by inhibitory areas, anatomical location in the brain, and relations to neighboring islets of neural activity.An example of wide causation of individual neural events might be the way that structural features of a configuration constrain the firing of individual neurons by forcing them to accommodate the firing of neighboring cells in a pattern.Macro-causation does not make the effect happen in the same way that the micro-mechanisms do; a configuration does not 'fire', individual cells do.But the range of micro-physically caused events may be limited by being grouped into certain types of configuration and not others, which may be just as important a feature of neural events, especially if sensations or behavior supervene on the macro-types of configuration in which firings occur, and any higher order laws taking one macro-class of configurations to another macro-class. The opponent of macro-causation points out that configurations of micro-states are already included in a complete micro-causal description of events, so, if the causal powers of configurations are produced by a constellation of micro-factors, the factors and the combination are already included in the micro-description.This is true, the principle of the causal closure of the micro-physical covers all factors and all micro-configurations-configurations of things micro-physically described-in a blanket statement, but for that very reason it is not capable of specifying laws governing the formation of macro-types of configuration (see Banks, 2009).This for the familiar reason that macro-types of configuration may not be realized by a single recognizable type of micro-configuration.Micro-causation is a general physical description of all micro-states in all possible micro-configurations: all are causally closed, all are the result of micro-factors acting together in concert in configurations.Macro-causation, however, describes how some class of macro-configurations A either fosters, limits, or rules out another class of macro-configurations B. This is more specific information not contained in the micro-descriptions of either events or configurations micro-physically described, hence macro-causation is not redundant, or epiphenomenal.Instead, macro-physical configurations may be taken to instantiate legitimate higher-order natural dispositions which are not exhausted, or screened off, by the micro-physical dispositions that realize them case by individual case.Example: I can tell you that an individual configuration a has a probability of 1/2 of evolving into an individual configuration b, but that macro-configurations of type A, to which a individually belongs, evolve into macro-configurations of class B with a probability of 9/10.The higher order law may even be a stronger natural disposition.13 As this paper is not a study of wide causation per se, I will simply note in passing that this kind of ''two levels'' approach is relevant to, and works well with, Mach's language above about 'physical' versus 'psychical' variations of the self-same elements on causal maps.As illustrated below, a physical neural cluster (e) is a cluster or configuration of micro-physical dispositions (e 1 . . ..e n ) and appears to an external investigator as a population of separate cells in a snarl of complex connections to one another, any of which may be investigated separately.These are its 'physical' variations.The neural energy of this whole cluster in itself, however, has the psychical disposition to appear as the quality green (s/e) and to interact and interfere with, or inhibit other sensations as one provisional sensory quality among others (see Figure 1). Hence the causal map will represent both kinds of causal relation among elements some individual, some polyadic type relations, some micro, some macro, Philosophical Psychology 179 without preferring one over the other.Indeed Mach's flexible notion of causation-cum-functional relations allows this quite naturally.Of course we still need further proof that such macro-types really exist and then we need the laws that relate them.But it is best not to prejudge the question.Levels of explanation and modeling can be very important in the sciences and perhaps especially for biology and neuroscience.In specific, our sense organs are probably adapted to overall environmental macro-conditions, and very insensitive to micro-conditions or realizations.Lockwood (1989Lockwood ( , 2007) ) gives an interesting range of scientific examples from convection cells to quantum wave-functions.
The conservation law says nothing about how closed systems form or what effects such formations might have.
“He points out in the earlier book that little islets or closed systems of activity ''shut up in themselves'' might occur in an overall system (like the brain) and the conservation law says nothing about how closed systems form, or what effects such formations might have.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Mach, 1959
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationcitation§ Philosophical Psychology 177 Analysis of Sensations (1959), speaking as a physicist versed in the interpretation of physical laws (in his famous Mechanics for example): I cannot here refrain from expressing my surprise that the principle of the conservation of energy has so often been dragged in in connexion with the question of whether there is a special psychical agent.On the assumption that energy is constant, the course of physical processes is limited but not necessarily determined with perfect uniqueness.That the principle of conservation of energy is satisfied in all physiological cases merely tells us that the psyche neither uses up work, nor performs it.For all that, the psyche may still be a partly determinant factor.When a philosopher asks the question . . . he usually misses the point of the principle of the conservation of energy and the stock reply of the physicist has no intelligible meaning in a case so far removed from the scope of his ideas.(Mach, 1959, p. 55n) A principle like the conservation of energy is a general phenomenological law, a blanket statement, about the initial and final states of a process in a closed system.It is silent about mechanisms, does not say how the process runs, nor does it prevent us from interpolating another process between the initial and final states, so long as there is no net energy absorbed or contributed by it.Mach also addressed this point in his Principle of the Conservation of Energy (1911) remarking that the closure of a system says nothing about its specific transformations from state to state, configuration to configuration, only about the energy going in and going out. 12 He points out in the earlier book that little islets or closed systems of activity ''shut up in themselves'' might occur in an overall system (like the brain) and the conservation law says nothing about how closed systems form, or what effects such formations might have.If, for example, the sensations or behavior of an organism supervenes not on the energy per se but on these intermediary closed islets, configurations of neural energies, specific changes not predicted by, or described by, energy data, could make a recognizable difference to the behavior of the organism and still be in accord with the principle. But if by 'causal closure' we mean something other than a blanket conservation principle, this is where we can get into trouble, for there is really no agreed upon definition of cause (Hausman, 1998).'Cause' may refer to micro-causation only, effecting change according to fundamental laws of physics (Kim, 1998).Or 'cause' may also refer to 'wide' causation or macro-causation, i.e., the effect of macro-types of configuration on each other and on micro-events.Notions of macro-causation, variously defined, are available in Dretske (1993), Garfinkel (1990), Lockwood (2007), Rosenberg (2004), Yablo (1992Yablo ( , 2003Yablo ( , 2009)), and Yoo (2006).The effect of causation by macro-types is not to cause micro-events directly and one to one, but to limit micro-caused events in these configurations to other broad type-classes of configuration, or to exclude them.Properties of configurations of neurons could include macro-symmetry or asymmetry, spatio-temporal patterns or islets of firing bounded by inhibitory areas, anatomical location in the brain, and relations to neighboring islets of neural activity.An example of wide causation of individual neural events might be the way that structural features of a configuration constrain the firing of individual neurons by forcing them to accommodate the firing of neighboring cells in a pattern.Macro-causation does not make the effect happen in the same way that the micro-mechanisms do; a configuration does not 'fire', individual cells do.But the range of micro-physically caused events may be limited by being grouped into certain types of configuration and not others, which may be just as important a feature of neural events, especially if sensations or behavior supervene on the macro-types of configuration in which firings occur, and any higher order laws taking one macro-class of configurations to another macro-class. The opponent of macro-causation points out that configurations of micro-states are already included in a complete micro-causal description of events, so, if the causal powers of configurations are produced by a constellation of micro-factors, the factors and the combination are already included in the micro-description.This is true, the principle of the causal closure of the micro-physical covers all factors and all micro-configurations-configurations of things micro-physically described-in a blanket statement, but for that very reason it is not capable of specifying laws governing the formation of macro-types of configuration (see Banks, 2009).This for the familiar reason that macro-types of configuration may not be realized by a single recognizable type of micro-configuration.Micro-causation is a general physical description of all micro-states in all possible micro-configurations: all are causally closed, all are the result of micro-factors acting together in concert in configurations.Macro-causation, however, describes how some class of macro-configurations A either fosters, limits, or rules out another class of macro-configurations B. This is more specific information not contained in the micro-descriptions of either events or configurations micro-physically described, hence macro-causation is not redundant, or epiphenomenal.Instead, macro-physical configurations may be taken to instantiate legitimate higher-order natural dispositions which are not exhausted, or screened off, by the micro-physical dispositions that realize them case by individual case.Example: I can tell you that an individual configuration a has a probability of 1/2 of evolving into an individual configuration b, but that macro-configurations of type A, to which a individually belongs, evolve into macro-configurations of class B with a probability of 9/10.The higher order law may even be a stronger natural disposition.13 As this paper is not a study of wide causation per se, I will simply note in passing that this kind of ''two levels'' approach is relevant to, and works well with, Mach's language above about 'physical' versus 'psychical' variations of the self-same elements on causal maps.As illustrated below, a physical neural cluster (e) is a cluster or configuration of micro-physical dispositions (e 1 . . ..e n ) and appears to an external investigator as a population of separate cells in a snarl of complex connections to one another, any of which may be investigated separately.These are its 'physical' variations.The neural energy of this whole cluster in itself, however, has the psychical disposition to appear as the quality green (s/e) and to interact and interfere with, or inhibit other sensations as one provisional sensory quality among others (see Figure 1). Hence the causal map will represent both kinds of causal relation among elements some individual, some polyadic type relations, some micro, some macro, Philosophical Psychology 179 without preferring one over the other.Indeed Mach's flexible notion of causation-cum-functional relations allows this quite naturally.Of course we still need further proof that such macro-types really exist and then we need the laws that relate them.But it is best not to prejudge the question.Levels of explanation and modeling can be very important in the sciences and perhaps especially for biology and neuroscience.In specific, our sense organs are probably adapted to overall environmental macro-conditions, and very insensitive to micro-conditions or realizations.Lockwood (1989Lockwood ( , 2007) ) gives an interesting range of scientific examples from convection cells to quantum wave-functions.
The closure of a system says nothing about its specific transformations from state to state or configuration to configuration, only about the energy going in and going out.
“Mach also addressed this point in his Principle of the Conservation of Energy (1911) remarking that the closure of a system says nothing about its specific transformations from state to state, configuration to configuration, only about the energy going in and going out.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Mach, 1911
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ 2. What are Elements? Four Theses
As Mach and Russell emphasized, a sensation of green is identical with a certain neural energy of the brain, which may be very complex.
“As Mach and Russell emphasized, however, a sensation of green is identical with a certain neural energy of the brain (which may be very complex).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 4. Russell Redux: Neo-Neutral Monism and Panpsychism Neutral monism never really disappeared in the twentieth century.After Russell, it was taken up in a problematic way by Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle, by Erwin Schro ¨dinger, by Herbert Feigl and many others (Carnap, 2003;Feigl, 1967;Schro ¨dinger, 2006).Recently, there has been a modest revival of the position deriving from a passage in Russell's (1927Russell's ( /1959) ) Analysis of Matter (see Banks, 2003Banks, , 2004;;Chalmers, 1996Chalmers, , 2003;;Holman, 2008;Lockwood, 1989;Maxwell, 1978;Rosenberg, 2004;Stoljar, 2001a;Strawson, 2006;and Unger, 1999, among others): Physics, in itself, is exceedingly abstract and reveals only certain mathematical characteristics of the material with which it deals.It does not tell us anything as to the intrinsic character of this material . . . .But by bringing physics and perception together, we are able to include psychical events in the material of physics and to give physics the greater concreteness which results from our more intimate acquaintance with the subject matter of our own experience . . . .As to intrinsic character, we do not know enough about it in the physical world to have a right to say that it is very different from that of percepts.(Russell, 1927/1959, pp.10; 400-401) 14 In other words, physics deals with the relational or dispositional characteristics of matter, which can enter into abstract mathematical laws.It does not deal with the intrinsic character of matter, or what concretely instantiates those dispositions.One option is to adopt a suitably enhanced physicalism, 15 in which these externally described dispositions are concretely instantiated by something with ''intrinsic character,'' presumably the same way our sensations concretely instantiate states of our physically described brains (as Russell held elsewhere; Russell, 1921). The mathematician Max Newman (1928) pointed out that Russell's preliminary definition of physics as purely relational would not suffice, since (according to Russell's own theory of relations!)given any cardinal number of objects, all of the abstract combinatorial relations between them simply come along for free.Which among all these abstract possibilities are concretely instantiated by physics, for example by genuine causal connections between objects?Russell readily admitted this criticism (Demopoulos & Friedman, 1989;Seager, 2006), but Newman is actually endorsing Russell's real proposal for an enhanced physicalism, in which causal dispositions are concretely instantiated by qualities and are not just abstract combinations of objects.It is this proposal for an enhanced physicalism that most authors have taken from the quote.Rather than canvass all of the different proposals cited above, I will make use of David Chalmer's (2003) concise summary in which he dubs the Neo-Russellian position 'Type-F monism'.According to Chalmers: Type F monism is the view that consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities: that is, by the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions.On this view, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are located at the fundamental level of physical reality and in a certain sense, underlie physical reality itself . . . .As a bonus this view is perfectly compatible with the causal closure of the microphysical, and indeed with existing physical laws.The view can retain the structure of physical theory as it already exists; it simply supplements this structure with an intrinsic nature . . .(proto)phenomenal properties serve as the ultimate categorical basis of all physical causation.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 265) These 'categorical properties' are, for Chalmers, the concrete instantiations of causal forces, and are themselves dispositions (see Banks, 2009).They have both an intrinsic, or concrete, aspect as real qualities, and they have also the relational or dispositional aspect as it is known in physics.Thesis number four above seems completely satisfied by Type F-Monism.On the other hand, these categorical properties are what Chalmers calls ''(proto) phenomenal properties'' inside of even the smallest parts of matter, a suggestion with disturbing panpsychist overtones.As the physical stuff combines, according to physical laws, into ever more complex structures like the brain, these tiny protophenomenal properties inside matter combine into conscious experience and sensation.Chalmers suggests that there must be principles for how these protophenomenal properties combine, which would run in parallel with, but be independent of, the way that the physical dispositions combine: This is . . . the combination problem for panpsychism.To answer it, it seems that we need a much better understanding of the compositional principles of phenomenology: that is, the principles by which phenomenal properties can be composed or constituted from underlying phenomenal properties, or from protophenomenal properties.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 266) Philosophical Psychology 181 Why would we need two completely different, parallel orders of composition if the protophenomenal properties are exactly the occupants of the known causal roles of physics?Won't the principles of combination be just the same?I can't see how there could be a second ordering besides that by which physical dispositions ordinarily configure by known physical laws.16 Moreover the idea that physical dispositions in matter are little ''proto-sensations'' seems wrong, much less proto-sensations in little ''proto-egos'' (Strawson, 2006).Elements are concrete instantiations of physical dispositions, but they are not all sensations, or even possible sensations, and they certainly don't depend on there being little egos to perceive them.So Type-F monism appears to lack features of classic neutral monism already. Instead, as outlined above, why not let the phenomenal properties (sensations) be the concrete instantiations of higher order dispositions, while the lower-level physical dispositions are concretely instantiated by physical elements in matter that are not anyone's sensations, nor related to them by a line of descent?Here, Chalmers explicitly rejects the notion that a sensation quality might be intrinsic ''to high level physical dispositions (e.g., those involved in neural states)'': If the low-level network is causally closed and the high level intrinsic properties are not constituted by low-level intrinsic properties, the high level intrinsic properties will be epiphenomenal.The only way to embrace this position would seem to be in combination with a denial of microphysical causal closure, holding that there are fundamental dispositions above the microphysical level which have phenomenal properties as their grounds.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 267) I give him credit for seeing the possibility, but he, too, has fallen for the one-size-fits-all notion of causation criticized above.This prevents him from seeing the appeal of making sensations the instantiation of higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Given that we are still owed a definition of causation, why is it impossible that a configuration of elements instantiating a cluster of micro-physical dispositions might not also collectively instantiate a disposition of the cluster as a whole?17 There is no need for a mysterious line of descent from conscious sensation to inorganic matter by which protophenomenal properties combine by a set of weird laws into conscious phenomenal properties; we can just stick with physics and its laws, complemented by further empirical laws describing the higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Lockwood (1993) addresses this point explicitly: Their [basic dispositions of matter] potential for generating awareness could be a matter of the application of certain currently unknown laws to their familiar physical attributes (in which laws, of course, there would be an essential reference to the emergent attributes).This fairly elementary point seems to have escaped those authors who have argued that, if we are made of electrons, quarks, gluons, and the like, then-given that we are conscious-electrons, quarks and so forth must themselves be possessed of some sort of primitive proto-consciousness.As I see it, this is a complete non-sequitur (p.281).
Chalmers has fallen for the one-size-fits-all notion of causation criticized above.
“I give him credit for seeing the possibility, but he, too, has fallen for the one-size-fits-all notion of causation criticized above.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 4. Russell Redux: Neo-Neutral Monism and Panpsychism Neutral monism never really disappeared in the twentieth century.After Russell, it was taken up in a problematic way by Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle, by Erwin Schro ¨dinger, by Herbert Feigl and many others (Carnap, 2003;Feigl, 1967;Schro ¨dinger, 2006).Recently, there has been a modest revival of the position deriving from a passage in Russell's (1927Russell's ( /1959) ) Analysis of Matter (see Banks, 2003Banks, , 2004;;Chalmers, 1996Chalmers, , 2003;;Holman, 2008;Lockwood, 1989;Maxwell, 1978;Rosenberg, 2004;Stoljar, 2001a;Strawson, 2006;and Unger, 1999, among others): Physics, in itself, is exceedingly abstract and reveals only certain mathematical characteristics of the material with which it deals.It does not tell us anything as to the intrinsic character of this material . . . .But by bringing physics and perception together, we are able to include psychical events in the material of physics and to give physics the greater concreteness which results from our more intimate acquaintance with the subject matter of our own experience . . . .As to intrinsic character, we do not know enough about it in the physical world to have a right to say that it is very different from that of percepts.(Russell, 1927/1959, pp.10; 400-401) 14 In other words, physics deals with the relational or dispositional characteristics of matter, which can enter into abstract mathematical laws.It does not deal with the intrinsic character of matter, or what concretely instantiates those dispositions.One option is to adopt a suitably enhanced physicalism, 15 in which these externally described dispositions are concretely instantiated by something with ''intrinsic character,'' presumably the same way our sensations concretely instantiate states of our physically described brains (as Russell held elsewhere; Russell, 1921). The mathematician Max Newman (1928) pointed out that Russell's preliminary definition of physics as purely relational would not suffice, since (according to Russell's own theory of relations!)given any cardinal number of objects, all of the abstract combinatorial relations between them simply come along for free.Which among all these abstract possibilities are concretely instantiated by physics, for example by genuine causal connections between objects?Russell readily admitted this criticism (Demopoulos & Friedman, 1989;Seager, 2006), but Newman is actually endorsing Russell's real proposal for an enhanced physicalism, in which causal dispositions are concretely instantiated by qualities and are not just abstract combinations of objects.It is this proposal for an enhanced physicalism that most authors have taken from the quote.Rather than canvass all of the different proposals cited above, I will make use of David Chalmer's (2003) concise summary in which he dubs the Neo-Russellian position 'Type-F monism'.According to Chalmers: Type F monism is the view that consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities: that is, by the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions.On this view, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are located at the fundamental level of physical reality and in a certain sense, underlie physical reality itself . . . .As a bonus this view is perfectly compatible with the causal closure of the microphysical, and indeed with existing physical laws.The view can retain the structure of physical theory as it already exists; it simply supplements this structure with an intrinsic nature . . .(proto)phenomenal properties serve as the ultimate categorical basis of all physical causation.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 265) These 'categorical properties' are, for Chalmers, the concrete instantiations of causal forces, and are themselves dispositions (see Banks, 2009).They have both an intrinsic, or concrete, aspect as real qualities, and they have also the relational or dispositional aspect as it is known in physics.Thesis number four above seems completely satisfied by Type F-Monism.On the other hand, these categorical properties are what Chalmers calls ''(proto) phenomenal properties'' inside of even the smallest parts of matter, a suggestion with disturbing panpsychist overtones.As the physical stuff combines, according to physical laws, into ever more complex structures like the brain, these tiny protophenomenal properties inside matter combine into conscious experience and sensation.Chalmers suggests that there must be principles for how these protophenomenal properties combine, which would run in parallel with, but be independent of, the way that the physical dispositions combine: This is . . . the combination problem for panpsychism.To answer it, it seems that we need a much better understanding of the compositional principles of phenomenology: that is, the principles by which phenomenal properties can be composed or constituted from underlying phenomenal properties, or from protophenomenal properties.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 266) Philosophical Psychology 181 Why would we need two completely different, parallel orders of composition if the protophenomenal properties are exactly the occupants of the known causal roles of physics?Won't the principles of combination be just the same?I can't see how there could be a second ordering besides that by which physical dispositions ordinarily configure by known physical laws.16 Moreover the idea that physical dispositions in matter are little ''proto-sensations'' seems wrong, much less proto-sensations in little ''proto-egos'' (Strawson, 2006).Elements are concrete instantiations of physical dispositions, but they are not all sensations, or even possible sensations, and they certainly don't depend on there being little egos to perceive them.So Type-F monism appears to lack features of classic neutral monism already. Instead, as outlined above, why not let the phenomenal properties (sensations) be the concrete instantiations of higher order dispositions, while the lower-level physical dispositions are concretely instantiated by physical elements in matter that are not anyone's sensations, nor related to them by a line of descent?Here, Chalmers explicitly rejects the notion that a sensation quality might be intrinsic ''to high level physical dispositions (e.g., those involved in neural states)'': If the low-level network is causally closed and the high level intrinsic properties are not constituted by low-level intrinsic properties, the high level intrinsic properties will be epiphenomenal.The only way to embrace this position would seem to be in combination with a denial of microphysical causal closure, holding that there are fundamental dispositions above the microphysical level which have phenomenal properties as their grounds.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 267) I give him credit for seeing the possibility, but he, too, has fallen for the one-size-fits-all notion of causation criticized above.This prevents him from seeing the appeal of making sensations the instantiation of higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Given that we are still owed a definition of causation, why is it impossible that a configuration of elements instantiating a cluster of micro-physical dispositions might not also collectively instantiate a disposition of the cluster as a whole?17 There is no need for a mysterious line of descent from conscious sensation to inorganic matter by which protophenomenal properties combine by a set of weird laws into conscious phenomenal properties; we can just stick with physics and its laws, complemented by further empirical laws describing the higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Lockwood (1993) addresses this point explicitly: Their [basic dispositions of matter] potential for generating awareness could be a matter of the application of certain currently unknown laws to their familiar physical attributes (in which laws, of course, there would be an essential reference to the emergent attributes).This fairly elementary point seems to have escaped those authors who have argued that, if we are made of electrons, quarks, gluons, and the like, then-given that we are conscious-electrons, quarks and so forth must themselves be possessed of some sort of primitive proto-consciousness.As I see it, this is a complete non-sequitur (p.281).
There cannot be a second ordering of composition besides that by which physical dispositions ordinarily configure by known physical laws.
“I can't see how there could be a second ordering besides that by which physical dispositions ordinarily configure by known physical laws.16”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation§ 4. Russell Redux: Neo-Neutral Monism and Panpsychism Neutral monism never really disappeared in the twentieth century.After Russell, it was taken up in a problematic way by Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle, by Erwin Schro ¨dinger, by Herbert Feigl and many others (Carnap, 2003;Feigl, 1967;Schro ¨dinger, 2006).Recently, there has been a modest revival of the position deriving from a passage in Russell's (1927Russell's ( /1959) ) Analysis of Matter (see Banks, 2003Banks, , 2004;;Chalmers, 1996Chalmers, , 2003;;Holman, 2008;Lockwood, 1989;Maxwell, 1978;Rosenberg, 2004;Stoljar, 2001a;Strawson, 2006;and Unger, 1999, among others): Physics, in itself, is exceedingly abstract and reveals only certain mathematical characteristics of the material with which it deals.It does not tell us anything as to the intrinsic character of this material . . . .But by bringing physics and perception together, we are able to include psychical events in the material of physics and to give physics the greater concreteness which results from our more intimate acquaintance with the subject matter of our own experience . . . .As to intrinsic character, we do not know enough about it in the physical world to have a right to say that it is very different from that of percepts.(Russell, 1927/1959, pp.10; 400-401) 14 In other words, physics deals with the relational or dispositional characteristics of matter, which can enter into abstract mathematical laws.It does not deal with the intrinsic character of matter, or what concretely instantiates those dispositions.One option is to adopt a suitably enhanced physicalism, 15 in which these externally described dispositions are concretely instantiated by something with ''intrinsic character,'' presumably the same way our sensations concretely instantiate states of our physically described brains (as Russell held elsewhere; Russell, 1921). The mathematician Max Newman (1928) pointed out that Russell's preliminary definition of physics as purely relational would not suffice, since (according to Russell's own theory of relations!)given any cardinal number of objects, all of the abstract combinatorial relations between them simply come along for free.Which among all these abstract possibilities are concretely instantiated by physics, for example by genuine causal connections between objects?Russell readily admitted this criticism (Demopoulos & Friedman, 1989;Seager, 2006), but Newman is actually endorsing Russell's real proposal for an enhanced physicalism, in which causal dispositions are concretely instantiated by qualities and are not just abstract combinations of objects.It is this proposal for an enhanced physicalism that most authors have taken from the quote.Rather than canvass all of the different proposals cited above, I will make use of David Chalmer's (2003) concise summary in which he dubs the Neo-Russellian position 'Type-F monism'.According to Chalmers: Type F monism is the view that consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities: that is, by the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions.On this view, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are located at the fundamental level of physical reality and in a certain sense, underlie physical reality itself . . . .As a bonus this view is perfectly compatible with the causal closure of the microphysical, and indeed with existing physical laws.The view can retain the structure of physical theory as it already exists; it simply supplements this structure with an intrinsic nature . . .(proto)phenomenal properties serve as the ultimate categorical basis of all physical causation.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 265) These 'categorical properties' are, for Chalmers, the concrete instantiations of causal forces, and are themselves dispositions (see Banks, 2009).They have both an intrinsic, or concrete, aspect as real qualities, and they have also the relational or dispositional aspect as it is known in physics.Thesis number four above seems completely satisfied by Type F-Monism.On the other hand, these categorical properties are what Chalmers calls ''(proto) phenomenal properties'' inside of even the smallest parts of matter, a suggestion with disturbing panpsychist overtones.As the physical stuff combines, according to physical laws, into ever more complex structures like the brain, these tiny protophenomenal properties inside matter combine into conscious experience and sensation.Chalmers suggests that there must be principles for how these protophenomenal properties combine, which would run in parallel with, but be independent of, the way that the physical dispositions combine: This is . . . the combination problem for panpsychism.To answer it, it seems that we need a much better understanding of the compositional principles of phenomenology: that is, the principles by which phenomenal properties can be composed or constituted from underlying phenomenal properties, or from protophenomenal properties.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 266) Philosophical Psychology 181 Why would we need two completely different, parallel orders of composition if the protophenomenal properties are exactly the occupants of the known causal roles of physics?Won't the principles of combination be just the same?I can't see how there could be a second ordering besides that by which physical dispositions ordinarily configure by known physical laws.16 Moreover the idea that physical dispositions in matter are little ''proto-sensations'' seems wrong, much less proto-sensations in little ''proto-egos'' (Strawson, 2006).Elements are concrete instantiations of physical dispositions, but they are not all sensations, or even possible sensations, and they certainly don't depend on there being little egos to perceive them.So Type-F monism appears to lack features of classic neutral monism already. Instead, as outlined above, why not let the phenomenal properties (sensations) be the concrete instantiations of higher order dispositions, while the lower-level physical dispositions are concretely instantiated by physical elements in matter that are not anyone's sensations, nor related to them by a line of descent?Here, Chalmers explicitly rejects the notion that a sensation quality might be intrinsic ''to high level physical dispositions (e.g., those involved in neural states)'': If the low-level network is causally closed and the high level intrinsic properties are not constituted by low-level intrinsic properties, the high level intrinsic properties will be epiphenomenal.The only way to embrace this position would seem to be in combination with a denial of microphysical causal closure, holding that there are fundamental dispositions above the microphysical level which have phenomenal properties as their grounds.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 267) I give him credit for seeing the possibility, but he, too, has fallen for the one-size-fits-all notion of causation criticized above.This prevents him from seeing the appeal of making sensations the instantiation of higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Given that we are still owed a definition of causation, why is it impossible that a configuration of elements instantiating a cluster of micro-physical dispositions might not also collectively instantiate a disposition of the cluster as a whole?17 There is no need for a mysterious line of descent from conscious sensation to inorganic matter by which protophenomenal properties combine by a set of weird laws into conscious phenomenal properties; we can just stick with physics and its laws, complemented by further empirical laws describing the higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Lockwood (1993) addresses this point explicitly: Their [basic dispositions of matter] potential for generating awareness could be a matter of the application of certain currently unknown laws to their familiar physical attributes (in which laws, of course, there would be an essential reference to the emergent attributes).This fairly elementary point seems to have escaped those authors who have argued that, if we are made of electrons, quarks, gluons, and the like, then-given that we are conscious-electrons, quarks and so forth must themselves be possessed of some sort of primitive proto-consciousness.As I see it, this is a complete non-sequitur (p.281).
There has recently been a modest revival of neutral monism deriving from a passage in Russell's Analysis of Matter.
“Recently, there has been a modest revival of the position deriving from a passage in Russell's (1927Russell's ( /1959) ) Analysis of Matter (see Banks, 2003Banks, , 2004;;Chalmers, 1996Chalmers, , 2003;;Holman, 2008;Lockwood, 1989;Maxwell, 1978;Rosenberg, 2004;Stoljar, 2001a;Strawson, 2006;and Unger, 1999, among others):”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Banks, 2003 source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Chalmers, 1996
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Strawson, 2006
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Philosophical Psychology 177 Analysis of Sensations (1959), speaking as a physicist versed in the interpretation of physical laws (in his famous Mechanics for example): I cannot here refrain from expressing my surprise that the principle of the conservation of energy has so often been dragged in in connexion with the question of whether there is a special psychical agent.On the assumption that energy is constant, the course of physical processes is limited but not necessarily determined with perfect uniqueness.That the principle of conservation of energy is satisfied in all physiological cases merely tells us that the psyche neither uses up work, nor performs it.For all that, the psyche may still be a partly determinant factor.When a philosopher asks the question . . . he usually misses the point of the principle of the conservation of energy and the stock reply of the physicist has no intelligible meaning in a case so far removed from the scope of his ideas.(Mach, 1959, p. 55n) A principle like the conservation of energy is a general phenomenological law, a blanket statement, about the initial and final states of a process in a closed system.It is silent about mechanisms, does not say how the process runs, nor does it prevent us from interpolating another process between the initial and final states, so long as there is no net energy absorbed or contributed by it.Mach also addressed this point in his Principle of the Conservation of Energy (1911) remarking that the closure of a system says nothing about its specific transformations from state to state, configuration to configuration, only about the energy going in and going out. 12 He points out in the earlier book that little islets or closed systems of activity ''shut up in themselves'' might occur in an overall system (like the brain) and the conservation law says nothing about how closed systems form, or what effects such formations might have.If, for example, the sensations or behavior of an organism supervenes not on the energy per se but on these intermediary closed islets, configurations of neural energies, specific changes not predicted by, or described by, energy data, could make a recognizable difference to the behavior of the organism and still be in accord with the principle. But if by 'causal closure' we mean something other than a blanket conservation principle, this is where we can get into trouble, for there is really no agreed upon definition of cause (Hausman, 1998).'Cause' may refer to micro-causation only, effecting change according to fundamental laws of physics (Kim, 1998).Or 'cause' may also refer to 'wide' causation or macro-causation, i.e., the effect of macro-types of configuration on each other and on micro-events.Notions of macro-causation, variously defined, are available in Dretske (1993), Garfinkel (1990), Lockwood (2007), Rosenberg (2004), Yablo (1992Yablo ( , 2003Yablo ( , 2009)), and Yoo (2006).The effect of causation by macro-types is not to cause micro-events directly and one to one, but to limit micro-caused events in these configurations to other broad type-classes of configuration, or to exclude them.Properties of configurations of neurons could include macro-symmetry or asymmetry, spatio-temporal patterns or islets of firing bounded by inhibitory areas, anatomical location in the brain, and relations to neighboring islets of neural activity.An example of wide causation of individual neural events might be the way that structural features of a configuration constrain the firing of individual neurons by forcing them to accommodate the firing of neighboring cells in a pattern.Macro-causation does not make the effect happen in the same way that the micro-mechanisms do; a configuration does not 'fire', individual cells do.But the range of micro-physically caused events may be limited by being grouped into certain types of configuration and not others, which may be just as important a feature of neural events, especially if sensations or behavior supervene on the macro-types of configuration in which firings occur, and any higher order laws taking one macro-class of configurations to another macro-class. The opponent of macro-causation points out that configurations of micro-states are already included in a complete micro-causal description of events, so, if the causal powers of configurations are produced by a constellation of micro-factors, the factors and the combination are already included in the micro-description.This is true, the principle of the causal closure of the micro-physical covers all factors and all micro-configurations-configurations of things micro-physically described-in a blanket statement, but for that very reason it is not capable of specifying laws governing the formation of macro-types of configuration (see Banks, 2009).This for the familiar reason that macro-types of configuration may not be realized by a single recognizable type of micro-configuration.Micro-causation is a general physical description of all micro-states in all possible micro-configurations: all are causally closed, all are the result of micro-factors acting together in concert in configurations.Macro-causation, however, describes how some class of macro-configurations A either fosters, limits, or rules out another class of macro-configurations B. This is more specific information not contained in the micro-descriptions of either events or configurations micro-physically described, hence macro-causation is not redundant, or epiphenomenal.Instead, macro-physical configurations may be taken to instantiate legitimate higher-order natural dispositions which are not exhausted, or screened off, by the micro-physical dispositions that realize them case by individual case.Example: I can tell you that an individual configuration a has a probability of 1/2 of evolving into an individual configuration b, but that macro-configurations of type A, to which a individually belongs, evolve into macro-configurations of class B with a probability of 9/10.The higher order law may even be a stronger natural disposition.13 As this paper is not a study of wide causation per se, I will simply note in passing that this kind of ''two levels'' approach is relevant to, and works well with, Mach's language above about 'physical' versus 'psychical' variations of the self-same elements on causal maps.As illustrated below, a physical neural cluster (e) is a cluster or configuration of micro-physical dispositions (e 1 . . ..e n ) and appears to an external investigator as a population of separate cells in a snarl of complex connections to one another, any of which may be investigated separately.These are its 'physical' variations.The neural energy of this whole cluster in itself, however, has the psychical disposition to appear as the quality green (s/e) and to interact and interfere with, or inhibit other sensations as one provisional sensory quality among others (see Figure 1). Hence the causal map will represent both kinds of causal relation among elements some individual, some polyadic type relations, some micro, some macro, Philosophical Psychology 179 without preferring one over the other.Indeed Mach's flexible notion of causation-cum-functional relations allows this quite naturally.Of course we still need further proof that such macro-types really exist and then we need the laws that relate them.But it is best not to prejudge the question.Levels of explanation and modeling can be very important in the sciences and perhaps especially for biology and neuroscience.In specific, our sense organs are probably adapted to overall environmental macro-conditions, and very insensitive to micro-conditions or realizations.Lockwood (1989Lockwood ( , 2007) ) gives an interesting range of scientific examples from convection cells to quantum wave-functions.
Macro-physical configurations may instantiate legitimate higher-order natural dispositions that are not exhausted or screened off by the micro-physical dispositions that realize them case by case.
“Instead, macro-physical configurations may be taken to instantiate legitimate higher-order natural dispositions which are not exhausted, or screened off, by the micro-physical dispositions that realize them case by individual case.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 2. What are Elements? Four Theses
A sensation of green can be represented either as a sensation quality or as a physical element of nature participating in physical events and variations (s/e), depending on whether it is considered in its psychical or physical variations.
“We can thus represent the sensation of green as either a sensation quality or a physical element of nature in its own right participating in physical events and variations (e).In itself it may be considered either way (s/e) depending upon whether we want to talk about it in its psychical or its physical variations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Philosophical Psychology 177 Analysis of Sensations (1959), speaking as a physicist versed in the interpretation of physical laws (in his famous Mechanics for example): I cannot here refrain from expressing my surprise that the principle of the conservation of energy has so often been dragged in in connexion with the question of whether there is a special psychical agent.On the assumption that energy is constant, the course of physical processes is limited but not necessarily determined with perfect uniqueness.That the principle of conservation of energy is satisfied in all physiological cases merely tells us that the psyche neither uses up work, nor performs it.For all that, the psyche may still be a partly determinant factor.When a philosopher asks the question . . . he usually misses the point of the principle of the conservation of energy and the stock reply of the physicist has no intelligible meaning in a case so far removed from the scope of his ideas.(Mach, 1959, p. 55n) A principle like the conservation of energy is a general phenomenological law, a blanket statement, about the initial and final states of a process in a closed system.It is silent about mechanisms, does not say how the process runs, nor does it prevent us from interpolating another process between the initial and final states, so long as there is no net energy absorbed or contributed by it.Mach also addressed this point in his Principle of the Conservation of Energy (1911) remarking that the closure of a system says nothing about its specific transformations from state to state, configuration to configuration, only about the energy going in and going out. 12 He points out in the earlier book that little islets or closed systems of activity ''shut up in themselves'' might occur in an overall system (like the brain) and the conservation law says nothing about how closed systems form, or what effects such formations might have.If, for example, the sensations or behavior of an organism supervenes not on the energy per se but on these intermediary closed islets, configurations of neural energies, specific changes not predicted by, or described by, energy data, could make a recognizable difference to the behavior of the organism and still be in accord with the principle. But if by 'causal closure' we mean something other than a blanket conservation principle, this is where we can get into trouble, for there is really no agreed upon definition of cause (Hausman, 1998).'Cause' may refer to micro-causation only, effecting change according to fundamental laws of physics (Kim, 1998).Or 'cause' may also refer to 'wide' causation or macro-causation, i.e., the effect of macro-types of configuration on each other and on micro-events.Notions of macro-causation, variously defined, are available in Dretske (1993), Garfinkel (1990), Lockwood (2007), Rosenberg (2004), Yablo (1992Yablo ( , 2003Yablo ( , 2009)), and Yoo (2006).The effect of causation by macro-types is not to cause micro-events directly and one to one, but to limit micro-caused events in these configurations to other broad type-classes of configuration, or to exclude them.Properties of configurations of neurons could include macro-symmetry or asymmetry, spatio-temporal patterns or islets of firing bounded by inhibitory areas, anatomical location in the brain, and relations to neighboring islets of neural activity.An example of wide causation of individual neural events might be the way that structural features of a configuration constrain the firing of individual neurons by forcing them to accommodate the firing of neighboring cells in a pattern.Macro-causation does not make the effect happen in the same way that the micro-mechanisms do; a configuration does not 'fire', individual cells do.But the range of micro-physically caused events may be limited by being grouped into certain types of configuration and not others, which may be just as important a feature of neural events, especially if sensations or behavior supervene on the macro-types of configuration in which firings occur, and any higher order laws taking one macro-class of configurations to another macro-class. The opponent of macro-causation points out that configurations of micro-states are already included in a complete micro-causal description of events, so, if the causal powers of configurations are produced by a constellation of micro-factors, the factors and the combination are already included in the micro-description.This is true, the principle of the causal closure of the micro-physical covers all factors and all micro-configurations-configurations of things micro-physically described-in a blanket statement, but for that very reason it is not capable of specifying laws governing the formation of macro-types of configuration (see Banks, 2009).This for the familiar reason that macro-types of configuration may not be realized by a single recognizable type of micro-configuration.Micro-causation is a general physical description of all micro-states in all possible micro-configurations: all are causally closed, all are the result of micro-factors acting together in concert in configurations.Macro-causation, however, describes how some class of macro-configurations A either fosters, limits, or rules out another class of macro-configurations B. This is more specific information not contained in the micro-descriptions of either events or configurations micro-physically described, hence macro-causation is not redundant, or epiphenomenal.Instead, macro-physical configurations may be taken to instantiate legitimate higher-order natural dispositions which are not exhausted, or screened off, by the micro-physical dispositions that realize them case by individual case.Example: I can tell you that an individual configuration a has a probability of 1/2 of evolving into an individual configuration b, but that macro-configurations of type A, to which a individually belongs, evolve into macro-configurations of class B with a probability of 9/10.The higher order law may even be a stronger natural disposition.13 As this paper is not a study of wide causation per se, I will simply note in passing that this kind of ''two levels'' approach is relevant to, and works well with, Mach's language above about 'physical' versus 'psychical' variations of the self-same elements on causal maps.As illustrated below, a physical neural cluster (e) is a cluster or configuration of micro-physical dispositions (e 1 . . ..e n ) and appears to an external investigator as a population of separate cells in a snarl of complex connections to one another, any of which may be investigated separately.These are its 'physical' variations.The neural energy of this whole cluster in itself, however, has the psychical disposition to appear as the quality green (s/e) and to interact and interfere with, or inhibit other sensations as one provisional sensory quality among others (see Figure 1). Hence the causal map will represent both kinds of causal relation among elements some individual, some polyadic type relations, some micro, some macro, Philosophical Psychology 179 without preferring one over the other.Indeed Mach's flexible notion of causation-cum-functional relations allows this quite naturally.Of course we still need further proof that such macro-types really exist and then we need the laws that relate them.But it is best not to prejudge the question.Levels of explanation and modeling can be very important in the sciences and perhaps especially for biology and neuroscience.In specific, our sense organs are probably adapted to overall environmental macro-conditions, and very insensitive to micro-conditions or realizations.Lockwood (1989Lockwood ( , 2007) ) gives an interesting range of scientific examples from convection cells to quantum wave-functions.
The causal map represents both individual and polyadic, micro and macro causal relations among elements without preferring one over the other.
“Hence the causal map will represent both kinds of causal relation among elements some individual, some polyadic type relations, some micro, some macro, Philosophical Psychology 179 without preferring one over the other.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ 4. Russell Redux: Neo-Neutral Monism and Panpsychism Neutral monism never really disappeared in the twentieth century.After Russell, it was taken up in a problematic way by Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle, by Erwin Schro ¨dinger, by Herbert Feigl and many others (Carnap, 2003;Feigl, 1967;Schro ¨dinger, 2006).Recently, there has been a modest revival of the position deriving from a passage in Russell's (1927Russell's ( /1959) ) Analysis of Matter (see Banks, 2003Banks, , 2004;;Chalmers, 1996Chalmers, , 2003;;Holman, 2008;Lockwood, 1989;Maxwell, 1978;Rosenberg, 2004;Stoljar, 2001a;Strawson, 2006;and Unger, 1999, among others): Physics, in itself, is exceedingly abstract and reveals only certain mathematical characteristics of the material with which it deals.It does not tell us anything as to the intrinsic character of this material . . . .But by bringing physics and perception together, we are able to include psychical events in the material of physics and to give physics the greater concreteness which results from our more intimate acquaintance with the subject matter of our own experience . . . .As to intrinsic character, we do not know enough about it in the physical world to have a right to say that it is very different from that of percepts.(Russell, 1927/1959, pp.10; 400-401) 14 In other words, physics deals with the relational or dispositional characteristics of matter, which can enter into abstract mathematical laws.It does not deal with the intrinsic character of matter, or what concretely instantiates those dispositions.One option is to adopt a suitably enhanced physicalism, 15 in which these externally described dispositions are concretely instantiated by something with ''intrinsic character,'' presumably the same way our sensations concretely instantiate states of our physically described brains (as Russell held elsewhere; Russell, 1921). The mathematician Max Newman (1928) pointed out that Russell's preliminary definition of physics as purely relational would not suffice, since (according to Russell's own theory of relations!)given any cardinal number of objects, all of the abstract combinatorial relations between them simply come along for free.Which among all these abstract possibilities are concretely instantiated by physics, for example by genuine causal connections between objects?Russell readily admitted this criticism (Demopoulos & Friedman, 1989;Seager, 2006), but Newman is actually endorsing Russell's real proposal for an enhanced physicalism, in which causal dispositions are concretely instantiated by qualities and are not just abstract combinations of objects.It is this proposal for an enhanced physicalism that most authors have taken from the quote.Rather than canvass all of the different proposals cited above, I will make use of David Chalmer's (2003) concise summary in which he dubs the Neo-Russellian position 'Type-F monism'.According to Chalmers: Type F monism is the view that consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities: that is, by the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions.On this view, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are located at the fundamental level of physical reality and in a certain sense, underlie physical reality itself . . . .As a bonus this view is perfectly compatible with the causal closure of the microphysical, and indeed with existing physical laws.The view can retain the structure of physical theory as it already exists; it simply supplements this structure with an intrinsic nature . . .(proto)phenomenal properties serve as the ultimate categorical basis of all physical causation.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 265) These 'categorical properties' are, for Chalmers, the concrete instantiations of causal forces, and are themselves dispositions (see Banks, 2009).They have both an intrinsic, or concrete, aspect as real qualities, and they have also the relational or dispositional aspect as it is known in physics.Thesis number four above seems completely satisfied by Type F-Monism.On the other hand, these categorical properties are what Chalmers calls ''(proto) phenomenal properties'' inside of even the smallest parts of matter, a suggestion with disturbing panpsychist overtones.As the physical stuff combines, according to physical laws, into ever more complex structures like the brain, these tiny protophenomenal properties inside matter combine into conscious experience and sensation.Chalmers suggests that there must be principles for how these protophenomenal properties combine, which would run in parallel with, but be independent of, the way that the physical dispositions combine: This is . . . the combination problem for panpsychism.To answer it, it seems that we need a much better understanding of the compositional principles of phenomenology: that is, the principles by which phenomenal properties can be composed or constituted from underlying phenomenal properties, or from protophenomenal properties.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 266) Philosophical Psychology 181 Why would we need two completely different, parallel orders of composition if the protophenomenal properties are exactly the occupants of the known causal roles of physics?Won't the principles of combination be just the same?I can't see how there could be a second ordering besides that by which physical dispositions ordinarily configure by known physical laws.16 Moreover the idea that physical dispositions in matter are little ''proto-sensations'' seems wrong, much less proto-sensations in little ''proto-egos'' (Strawson, 2006).Elements are concrete instantiations of physical dispositions, but they are not all sensations, or even possible sensations, and they certainly don't depend on there being little egos to perceive them.So Type-F monism appears to lack features of classic neutral monism already. Instead, as outlined above, why not let the phenomenal properties (sensations) be the concrete instantiations of higher order dispositions, while the lower-level physical dispositions are concretely instantiated by physical elements in matter that are not anyone's sensations, nor related to them by a line of descent?Here, Chalmers explicitly rejects the notion that a sensation quality might be intrinsic ''to high level physical dispositions (e.g., those involved in neural states)'': If the low-level network is causally closed and the high level intrinsic properties are not constituted by low-level intrinsic properties, the high level intrinsic properties will be epiphenomenal.The only way to embrace this position would seem to be in combination with a denial of microphysical causal closure, holding that there are fundamental dispositions above the microphysical level which have phenomenal properties as their grounds.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 267) I give him credit for seeing the possibility, but he, too, has fallen for the one-size-fits-all notion of causation criticized above.This prevents him from seeing the appeal of making sensations the instantiation of higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Given that we are still owed a definition of causation, why is it impossible that a configuration of elements instantiating a cluster of micro-physical dispositions might not also collectively instantiate a disposition of the cluster as a whole?17 There is no need for a mysterious line of descent from conscious sensation to inorganic matter by which protophenomenal properties combine by a set of weird laws into conscious phenomenal properties; we can just stick with physics and its laws, complemented by further empirical laws describing the higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Lockwood (1993) addresses this point explicitly: Their [basic dispositions of matter] potential for generating awareness could be a matter of the application of certain currently unknown laws to their familiar physical attributes (in which laws, of course, there would be an essential reference to the emergent attributes).This fairly elementary point seems to have escaped those authors who have argued that, if we are made of electrons, quarks, gluons, and the like, then-given that we are conscious-electrons, quarks and so forth must themselves be possessed of some sort of primitive proto-consciousness.As I see it, this is a complete non-sequitur (p.281).
Neutral monism never really disappeared in the twentieth century; after Russell it was taken up by Carnap and the Vienna Circle, Schrödinger, Feigl, and many others.
“Neutral monism never really disappeared in the twentieth century.After Russell, it was taken up in a problematic way by Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle, by Erwin Schro ¨dinger, by Herbert Feigl and many others (Carnap, 2003;Feigl, 1967;Schro ¨dinger, 2006).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Carnap, 2003
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Feigl, 1967
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Schrödinger, 2006
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning§ 4. Russell Redux: Neo-Neutral Monism and Panpsychism Neutral monism never really disappeared in the twentieth century.After Russell, it was taken up in a problematic way by Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle, by Erwin Schro ¨dinger, by Herbert Feigl and many others (Carnap, 2003;Feigl, 1967;Schro ¨dinger, 2006).Recently, there has been a modest revival of the position deriving from a passage in Russell's (1927Russell's ( /1959) ) Analysis of Matter (see Banks, 2003Banks, , 2004;;Chalmers, 1996Chalmers, , 2003;;Holman, 2008;Lockwood, 1989;Maxwell, 1978;Rosenberg, 2004;Stoljar, 2001a;Strawson, 2006;and Unger, 1999, among others): Physics, in itself, is exceedingly abstract and reveals only certain mathematical characteristics of the material with which it deals.It does not tell us anything as to the intrinsic character of this material . . . .But by bringing physics and perception together, we are able to include psychical events in the material of physics and to give physics the greater concreteness which results from our more intimate acquaintance with the subject matter of our own experience . . . .As to intrinsic character, we do not know enough about it in the physical world to have a right to say that it is very different from that of percepts.(Russell, 1927/1959, pp.10; 400-401) 14 In other words, physics deals with the relational or dispositional characteristics of matter, which can enter into abstract mathematical laws.It does not deal with the intrinsic character of matter, or what concretely instantiates those dispositions.One option is to adopt a suitably enhanced physicalism, 15 in which these externally described dispositions are concretely instantiated by something with ''intrinsic character,'' presumably the same way our sensations concretely instantiate states of our physically described brains (as Russell held elsewhere; Russell, 1921). The mathematician Max Newman (1928) pointed out that Russell's preliminary definition of physics as purely relational would not suffice, since (according to Russell's own theory of relations!)given any cardinal number of objects, all of the abstract combinatorial relations between them simply come along for free.Which among all these abstract possibilities are concretely instantiated by physics, for example by genuine causal connections between objects?Russell readily admitted this criticism (Demopoulos & Friedman, 1989;Seager, 2006), but Newman is actually endorsing Russell's real proposal for an enhanced physicalism, in which causal dispositions are concretely instantiated by qualities and are not just abstract combinations of objects.It is this proposal for an enhanced physicalism that most authors have taken from the quote.Rather than canvass all of the different proposals cited above, I will make use of David Chalmer's (2003) concise summary in which he dubs the Neo-Russellian position 'Type-F monism'.According to Chalmers: Type F monism is the view that consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities: that is, by the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions.On this view, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are located at the fundamental level of physical reality and in a certain sense, underlie physical reality itself . . . .As a bonus this view is perfectly compatible with the causal closure of the microphysical, and indeed with existing physical laws.The view can retain the structure of physical theory as it already exists; it simply supplements this structure with an intrinsic nature . . .(proto)phenomenal properties serve as the ultimate categorical basis of all physical causation.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 265) These 'categorical properties' are, for Chalmers, the concrete instantiations of causal forces, and are themselves dispositions (see Banks, 2009).They have both an intrinsic, or concrete, aspect as real qualities, and they have also the relational or dispositional aspect as it is known in physics.Thesis number four above seems completely satisfied by Type F-Monism.On the other hand, these categorical properties are what Chalmers calls ''(proto) phenomenal properties'' inside of even the smallest parts of matter, a suggestion with disturbing panpsychist overtones.As the physical stuff combines, according to physical laws, into ever more complex structures like the brain, these tiny protophenomenal properties inside matter combine into conscious experience and sensation.Chalmers suggests that there must be principles for how these protophenomenal properties combine, which would run in parallel with, but be independent of, the way that the physical dispositions combine: This is . . . the combination problem for panpsychism.To answer it, it seems that we need a much better understanding of the compositional principles of phenomenology: that is, the principles by which phenomenal properties can be composed or constituted from underlying phenomenal properties, or from protophenomenal properties.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 266) Philosophical Psychology 181 Why would we need two completely different, parallel orders of composition if the protophenomenal properties are exactly the occupants of the known causal roles of physics?Won't the principles of combination be just the same?I can't see how there could be a second ordering besides that by which physical dispositions ordinarily configure by known physical laws.16 Moreover the idea that physical dispositions in matter are little ''proto-sensations'' seems wrong, much less proto-sensations in little ''proto-egos'' (Strawson, 2006).Elements are concrete instantiations of physical dispositions, but they are not all sensations, or even possible sensations, and they certainly don't depend on there being little egos to perceive them.So Type-F monism appears to lack features of classic neutral monism already. Instead, as outlined above, why not let the phenomenal properties (sensations) be the concrete instantiations of higher order dispositions, while the lower-level physical dispositions are concretely instantiated by physical elements in matter that are not anyone's sensations, nor related to them by a line of descent?Here, Chalmers explicitly rejects the notion that a sensation quality might be intrinsic ''to high level physical dispositions (e.g., those involved in neural states)'': If the low-level network is causally closed and the high level intrinsic properties are not constituted by low-level intrinsic properties, the high level intrinsic properties will be epiphenomenal.The only way to embrace this position would seem to be in combination with a denial of microphysical causal closure, holding that there are fundamental dispositions above the microphysical level which have phenomenal properties as their grounds.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 267) I give him credit for seeing the possibility, but he, too, has fallen for the one-size-fits-all notion of causation criticized above.This prevents him from seeing the appeal of making sensations the instantiation of higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Given that we are still owed a definition of causation, why is it impossible that a configuration of elements instantiating a cluster of micro-physical dispositions might not also collectively instantiate a disposition of the cluster as a whole?17 There is no need for a mysterious line of descent from conscious sensation to inorganic matter by which protophenomenal properties combine by a set of weird laws into conscious phenomenal properties; we can just stick with physics and its laws, complemented by further empirical laws describing the higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Lockwood (1993) addresses this point explicitly: Their [basic dispositions of matter] potential for generating awareness could be a matter of the application of certain currently unknown laws to their familiar physical attributes (in which laws, of course, there would be an essential reference to the emergent attributes).This fairly elementary point seems to have escaped those authors who have argued that, if we are made of electrons, quarks, gluons, and the like, then-given that we are conscious-electrons, quarks and so forth must themselves be possessed of some sort of primitive proto-consciousness.As I see it, this is a complete non-sequitur (p.281).
We can stick with physics and its laws, complemented by further empirical laws describing the higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.
“There is no need for a mysterious line of descent from conscious sensation to inorganic matter by which protophenomenal properties combine by a set of weird laws into conscious phenomenal properties; we can just stick with physics and its laws, complemented by further empirical laws describing the higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: There exist higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons that can be described by further empirical laws.
- Interpretationnone given§ 3. Causal Maps, Causal Closure, Micro-vs-Macro Causation
For all classic neutral monists, representing all the facts of perception requires a causal map of sensation/elements and of elements that are not anyone's sensations.
“For all of the classic neutral monists, if we are to represent all of the facts of perception, we employ a device which I will call a 'causal map' of the sensation/ elements as well as elements which are not anyone's sensations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 4. Russell Redux: Neo-Neutral Monism and Panpsychism Neutral monism never really disappeared in the twentieth century.After Russell, it was taken up in a problematic way by Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle, by Erwin Schro ¨dinger, by Herbert Feigl and many others (Carnap, 2003;Feigl, 1967;Schro ¨dinger, 2006).Recently, there has been a modest revival of the position deriving from a passage in Russell's (1927Russell's ( /1959) ) Analysis of Matter (see Banks, 2003Banks, , 2004;;Chalmers, 1996Chalmers, , 2003;;Holman, 2008;Lockwood, 1989;Maxwell, 1978;Rosenberg, 2004;Stoljar, 2001a;Strawson, 2006;and Unger, 1999, among others): Physics, in itself, is exceedingly abstract and reveals only certain mathematical characteristics of the material with which it deals.It does not tell us anything as to the intrinsic character of this material . . . .But by bringing physics and perception together, we are able to include psychical events in the material of physics and to give physics the greater concreteness which results from our more intimate acquaintance with the subject matter of our own experience . . . .As to intrinsic character, we do not know enough about it in the physical world to have a right to say that it is very different from that of percepts.(Russell, 1927/1959, pp.10; 400-401) 14 In other words, physics deals with the relational or dispositional characteristics of matter, which can enter into abstract mathematical laws.It does not deal with the intrinsic character of matter, or what concretely instantiates those dispositions.One option is to adopt a suitably enhanced physicalism, 15 in which these externally described dispositions are concretely instantiated by something with ''intrinsic character,'' presumably the same way our sensations concretely instantiate states of our physically described brains (as Russell held elsewhere; Russell, 1921). The mathematician Max Newman (1928) pointed out that Russell's preliminary definition of physics as purely relational would not suffice, since (according to Russell's own theory of relations!)given any cardinal number of objects, all of the abstract combinatorial relations between them simply come along for free.Which among all these abstract possibilities are concretely instantiated by physics, for example by genuine causal connections between objects?Russell readily admitted this criticism (Demopoulos & Friedman, 1989;Seager, 2006), but Newman is actually endorsing Russell's real proposal for an enhanced physicalism, in which causal dispositions are concretely instantiated by qualities and are not just abstract combinations of objects.It is this proposal for an enhanced physicalism that most authors have taken from the quote.Rather than canvass all of the different proposals cited above, I will make use of David Chalmer's (2003) concise summary in which he dubs the Neo-Russellian position 'Type-F monism'.According to Chalmers: Type F monism is the view that consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities: that is, by the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions.On this view, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are located at the fundamental level of physical reality and in a certain sense, underlie physical reality itself . . . .As a bonus this view is perfectly compatible with the causal closure of the microphysical, and indeed with existing physical laws.The view can retain the structure of physical theory as it already exists; it simply supplements this structure with an intrinsic nature . . .(proto)phenomenal properties serve as the ultimate categorical basis of all physical causation.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 265) These 'categorical properties' are, for Chalmers, the concrete instantiations of causal forces, and are themselves dispositions (see Banks, 2009).They have both an intrinsic, or concrete, aspect as real qualities, and they have also the relational or dispositional aspect as it is known in physics.Thesis number four above seems completely satisfied by Type F-Monism.On the other hand, these categorical properties are what Chalmers calls ''(proto) phenomenal properties'' inside of even the smallest parts of matter, a suggestion with disturbing panpsychist overtones.As the physical stuff combines, according to physical laws, into ever more complex structures like the brain, these tiny protophenomenal properties inside matter combine into conscious experience and sensation.Chalmers suggests that there must be principles for how these protophenomenal properties combine, which would run in parallel with, but be independent of, the way that the physical dispositions combine: This is . . . the combination problem for panpsychism.To answer it, it seems that we need a much better understanding of the compositional principles of phenomenology: that is, the principles by which phenomenal properties can be composed or constituted from underlying phenomenal properties, or from protophenomenal properties.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 266) Philosophical Psychology 181 Why would we need two completely different, parallel orders of composition if the protophenomenal properties are exactly the occupants of the known causal roles of physics?Won't the principles of combination be just the same?I can't see how there could be a second ordering besides that by which physical dispositions ordinarily configure by known physical laws.16 Moreover the idea that physical dispositions in matter are little ''proto-sensations'' seems wrong, much less proto-sensations in little ''proto-egos'' (Strawson, 2006).Elements are concrete instantiations of physical dispositions, but they are not all sensations, or even possible sensations, and they certainly don't depend on there being little egos to perceive them.So Type-F monism appears to lack features of classic neutral monism already. Instead, as outlined above, why not let the phenomenal properties (sensations) be the concrete instantiations of higher order dispositions, while the lower-level physical dispositions are concretely instantiated by physical elements in matter that are not anyone's sensations, nor related to them by a line of descent?Here, Chalmers explicitly rejects the notion that a sensation quality might be intrinsic ''to high level physical dispositions (e.g., those involved in neural states)'': If the low-level network is causally closed and the high level intrinsic properties are not constituted by low-level intrinsic properties, the high level intrinsic properties will be epiphenomenal.The only way to embrace this position would seem to be in combination with a denial of microphysical causal closure, holding that there are fundamental dispositions above the microphysical level which have phenomenal properties as their grounds.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 267) I give him credit for seeing the possibility, but he, too, has fallen for the one-size-fits-all notion of causation criticized above.This prevents him from seeing the appeal of making sensations the instantiation of higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Given that we are still owed a definition of causation, why is it impossible that a configuration of elements instantiating a cluster of micro-physical dispositions might not also collectively instantiate a disposition of the cluster as a whole?17 There is no need for a mysterious line of descent from conscious sensation to inorganic matter by which protophenomenal properties combine by a set of weird laws into conscious phenomenal properties; we can just stick with physics and its laws, complemented by further empirical laws describing the higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Lockwood (1993) addresses this point explicitly: Their [basic dispositions of matter] potential for generating awareness could be a matter of the application of certain currently unknown laws to their familiar physical attributes (in which laws, of course, there would be an essential reference to the emergent attributes).This fairly elementary point seems to have escaped those authors who have argued that, if we are made of electrons, quarks, gluons, and the like, then-given that we are conscious-electrons, quarks and so forth must themselves be possessed of some sort of primitive proto-consciousness.As I see it, this is a complete non-sequitur (p.281).
Elements do not depend on there being little egos to perceive them.
“Elements are concrete instantiations of physical dispositions, but they are not all sensations, or even possible sensations, and they certainly don't depend on there being little egos to perceive them.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 4. Russell Redux: Neo-Neutral Monism and Panpsychism Neutral monism never really disappeared in the twentieth century.After Russell, it was taken up in a problematic way by Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle, by Erwin Schro ¨dinger, by Herbert Feigl and many others (Carnap, 2003;Feigl, 1967;Schro ¨dinger, 2006).Recently, there has been a modest revival of the position deriving from a passage in Russell's (1927Russell's ( /1959) ) Analysis of Matter (see Banks, 2003Banks, , 2004;;Chalmers, 1996Chalmers, , 2003;;Holman, 2008;Lockwood, 1989;Maxwell, 1978;Rosenberg, 2004;Stoljar, 2001a;Strawson, 2006;and Unger, 1999, among others): Physics, in itself, is exceedingly abstract and reveals only certain mathematical characteristics of the material with which it deals.It does not tell us anything as to the intrinsic character of this material . . . .But by bringing physics and perception together, we are able to include psychical events in the material of physics and to give physics the greater concreteness which results from our more intimate acquaintance with the subject matter of our own experience . . . .As to intrinsic character, we do not know enough about it in the physical world to have a right to say that it is very different from that of percepts.(Russell, 1927/1959, pp.10; 400-401) 14 In other words, physics deals with the relational or dispositional characteristics of matter, which can enter into abstract mathematical laws.It does not deal with the intrinsic character of matter, or what concretely instantiates those dispositions.One option is to adopt a suitably enhanced physicalism, 15 in which these externally described dispositions are concretely instantiated by something with ''intrinsic character,'' presumably the same way our sensations concretely instantiate states of our physically described brains (as Russell held elsewhere; Russell, 1921). The mathematician Max Newman (1928) pointed out that Russell's preliminary definition of physics as purely relational would not suffice, since (according to Russell's own theory of relations!)given any cardinal number of objects, all of the abstract combinatorial relations between them simply come along for free.Which among all these abstract possibilities are concretely instantiated by physics, for example by genuine causal connections between objects?Russell readily admitted this criticism (Demopoulos & Friedman, 1989;Seager, 2006), but Newman is actually endorsing Russell's real proposal for an enhanced physicalism, in which causal dispositions are concretely instantiated by qualities and are not just abstract combinations of objects.It is this proposal for an enhanced physicalism that most authors have taken from the quote.Rather than canvass all of the different proposals cited above, I will make use of David Chalmer's (2003) concise summary in which he dubs the Neo-Russellian position 'Type-F monism'.According to Chalmers: Type F monism is the view that consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities: that is, by the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions.On this view, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are located at the fundamental level of physical reality and in a certain sense, underlie physical reality itself . . . .As a bonus this view is perfectly compatible with the causal closure of the microphysical, and indeed with existing physical laws.The view can retain the structure of physical theory as it already exists; it simply supplements this structure with an intrinsic nature . . .(proto)phenomenal properties serve as the ultimate categorical basis of all physical causation.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 265) These 'categorical properties' are, for Chalmers, the concrete instantiations of causal forces, and are themselves dispositions (see Banks, 2009).They have both an intrinsic, or concrete, aspect as real qualities, and they have also the relational or dispositional aspect as it is known in physics.Thesis number four above seems completely satisfied by Type F-Monism.On the other hand, these categorical properties are what Chalmers calls ''(proto) phenomenal properties'' inside of even the smallest parts of matter, a suggestion with disturbing panpsychist overtones.As the physical stuff combines, according to physical laws, into ever more complex structures like the brain, these tiny protophenomenal properties inside matter combine into conscious experience and sensation.Chalmers suggests that there must be principles for how these protophenomenal properties combine, which would run in parallel with, but be independent of, the way that the physical dispositions combine: This is . . . the combination problem for panpsychism.To answer it, it seems that we need a much better understanding of the compositional principles of phenomenology: that is, the principles by which phenomenal properties can be composed or constituted from underlying phenomenal properties, or from protophenomenal properties.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 266) Philosophical Psychology 181 Why would we need two completely different, parallel orders of composition if the protophenomenal properties are exactly the occupants of the known causal roles of physics?Won't the principles of combination be just the same?I can't see how there could be a second ordering besides that by which physical dispositions ordinarily configure by known physical laws.16 Moreover the idea that physical dispositions in matter are little ''proto-sensations'' seems wrong, much less proto-sensations in little ''proto-egos'' (Strawson, 2006).Elements are concrete instantiations of physical dispositions, but they are not all sensations, or even possible sensations, and they certainly don't depend on there being little egos to perceive them.So Type-F monism appears to lack features of classic neutral monism already. Instead, as outlined above, why not let the phenomenal properties (sensations) be the concrete instantiations of higher order dispositions, while the lower-level physical dispositions are concretely instantiated by physical elements in matter that are not anyone's sensations, nor related to them by a line of descent?Here, Chalmers explicitly rejects the notion that a sensation quality might be intrinsic ''to high level physical dispositions (e.g., those involved in neural states)'': If the low-level network is causally closed and the high level intrinsic properties are not constituted by low-level intrinsic properties, the high level intrinsic properties will be epiphenomenal.The only way to embrace this position would seem to be in combination with a denial of microphysical causal closure, holding that there are fundamental dispositions above the microphysical level which have phenomenal properties as their grounds.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 267) I give him credit for seeing the possibility, but he, too, has fallen for the one-size-fits-all notion of causation criticized above.This prevents him from seeing the appeal of making sensations the instantiation of higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Given that we are still owed a definition of causation, why is it impossible that a configuration of elements instantiating a cluster of micro-physical dispositions might not also collectively instantiate a disposition of the cluster as a whole?17 There is no need for a mysterious line of descent from conscious sensation to inorganic matter by which protophenomenal properties combine by a set of weird laws into conscious phenomenal properties; we can just stick with physics and its laws, complemented by further empirical laws describing the higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Lockwood (1993) addresses this point explicitly: Their [basic dispositions of matter] potential for generating awareness could be a matter of the application of certain currently unknown laws to their familiar physical attributes (in which laws, of course, there would be an essential reference to the emergent attributes).This fairly elementary point seems to have escaped those authors who have argued that, if we are made of electrons, quarks, gluons, and the like, then-given that we are conscious-electrons, quarks and so forth must themselves be possessed of some sort of primitive proto-consciousness.As I see it, this is a complete non-sequitur (p.281).
Type-F monism appears to lack features of classic neutral monism already.
“So Type-F monism appears to lack features of classic neutral monism already.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Philosophical Psychology 177 Analysis of Sensations (1959), speaking as a physicist versed in the interpretation of physical laws (in his famous Mechanics for example): I cannot here refrain from expressing my surprise that the principle of the conservation of energy has so often been dragged in in connexion with the question of whether there is a special psychical agent.On the assumption that energy is constant, the course of physical processes is limited but not necessarily determined with perfect uniqueness.That the principle of conservation of energy is satisfied in all physiological cases merely tells us that the psyche neither uses up work, nor performs it.For all that, the psyche may still be a partly determinant factor.When a philosopher asks the question . . . he usually misses the point of the principle of the conservation of energy and the stock reply of the physicist has no intelligible meaning in a case so far removed from the scope of his ideas.(Mach, 1959, p. 55n) A principle like the conservation of energy is a general phenomenological law, a blanket statement, about the initial and final states of a process in a closed system.It is silent about mechanisms, does not say how the process runs, nor does it prevent us from interpolating another process between the initial and final states, so long as there is no net energy absorbed or contributed by it.Mach also addressed this point in his Principle of the Conservation of Energy (1911) remarking that the closure of a system says nothing about its specific transformations from state to state, configuration to configuration, only about the energy going in and going out. 12 He points out in the earlier book that little islets or closed systems of activity ''shut up in themselves'' might occur in an overall system (like the brain) and the conservation law says nothing about how closed systems form, or what effects such formations might have.If, for example, the sensations or behavior of an organism supervenes not on the energy per se but on these intermediary closed islets, configurations of neural energies, specific changes not predicted by, or described by, energy data, could make a recognizable difference to the behavior of the organism and still be in accord with the principle. But if by 'causal closure' we mean something other than a blanket conservation principle, this is where we can get into trouble, for there is really no agreed upon definition of cause (Hausman, 1998).'Cause' may refer to micro-causation only, effecting change according to fundamental laws of physics (Kim, 1998).Or 'cause' may also refer to 'wide' causation or macro-causation, i.e., the effect of macro-types of configuration on each other and on micro-events.Notions of macro-causation, variously defined, are available in Dretske (1993), Garfinkel (1990), Lockwood (2007), Rosenberg (2004), Yablo (1992Yablo ( , 2003Yablo ( , 2009)), and Yoo (2006).The effect of causation by macro-types is not to cause micro-events directly and one to one, but to limit micro-caused events in these configurations to other broad type-classes of configuration, or to exclude them.Properties of configurations of neurons could include macro-symmetry or asymmetry, spatio-temporal patterns or islets of firing bounded by inhibitory areas, anatomical location in the brain, and relations to neighboring islets of neural activity.An example of wide causation of individual neural events might be the way that structural features of a configuration constrain the firing of individual neurons by forcing them to accommodate the firing of neighboring cells in a pattern.Macro-causation does not make the effect happen in the same way that the micro-mechanisms do; a configuration does not 'fire', individual cells do.But the range of micro-physically caused events may be limited by being grouped into certain types of configuration and not others, which may be just as important a feature of neural events, especially if sensations or behavior supervene on the macro-types of configuration in which firings occur, and any higher order laws taking one macro-class of configurations to another macro-class. The opponent of macro-causation points out that configurations of micro-states are already included in a complete micro-causal description of events, so, if the causal powers of configurations are produced by a constellation of micro-factors, the factors and the combination are already included in the micro-description.This is true, the principle of the causal closure of the micro-physical covers all factors and all micro-configurations-configurations of things micro-physically described-in a blanket statement, but for that very reason it is not capable of specifying laws governing the formation of macro-types of configuration (see Banks, 2009).This for the familiar reason that macro-types of configuration may not be realized by a single recognizable type of micro-configuration.Micro-causation is a general physical description of all micro-states in all possible micro-configurations: all are causally closed, all are the result of micro-factors acting together in concert in configurations.Macro-causation, however, describes how some class of macro-configurations A either fosters, limits, or rules out another class of macro-configurations B. This is more specific information not contained in the micro-descriptions of either events or configurations micro-physically described, hence macro-causation is not redundant, or epiphenomenal.Instead, macro-physical configurations may be taken to instantiate legitimate higher-order natural dispositions which are not exhausted, or screened off, by the micro-physical dispositions that realize them case by individual case.Example: I can tell you that an individual configuration a has a probability of 1/2 of evolving into an individual configuration b, but that macro-configurations of type A, to which a individually belongs, evolve into macro-configurations of class B with a probability of 9/10.The higher order law may even be a stronger natural disposition.13 As this paper is not a study of wide causation per se, I will simply note in passing that this kind of ''two levels'' approach is relevant to, and works well with, Mach's language above about 'physical' versus 'psychical' variations of the self-same elements on causal maps.As illustrated below, a physical neural cluster (e) is a cluster or configuration of micro-physical dispositions (e 1 . . ..e n ) and appears to an external investigator as a population of separate cells in a snarl of complex connections to one another, any of which may be investigated separately.These are its 'physical' variations.The neural energy of this whole cluster in itself, however, has the psychical disposition to appear as the quality green (s/e) and to interact and interfere with, or inhibit other sensations as one provisional sensory quality among others (see Figure 1). Hence the causal map will represent both kinds of causal relation among elements some individual, some polyadic type relations, some micro, some macro, Philosophical Psychology 179 without preferring one over the other.Indeed Mach's flexible notion of causation-cum-functional relations allows this quite naturally.Of course we still need further proof that such macro-types really exist and then we need the laws that relate them.But it is best not to prejudge the question.Levels of explanation and modeling can be very important in the sciences and perhaps especially for biology and neuroscience.In specific, our sense organs are probably adapted to overall environmental macro-conditions, and very insensitive to micro-conditions or realizations.Lockwood (1989Lockwood ( , 2007) ) gives an interesting range of scientific examples from convection cells to quantum wave-functions.
The effect of causation by macro-types is not to cause micro-events directly and one-to-one, but to limit micro-caused events in configurations to other broad type-classes of configuration, or to exclude them.
“The effect of causation by macro-types is not to cause micro-events directly and one to one, but to limit micro-caused events in these configurations to other broad type-classes of configuration, or to exclude them.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ Notes
It is a basic misunderstanding of neutral monism that it is a form of phenomenalism or idealism.
“This continues to be a basic misunderstanding of neutral monism, i.e., that it is a form of phenomenalism or idealism.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Mach (1959)
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- cites Banks (2003) source
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- cites Stubenberg (2005)
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Premisereasoning§ 1. IntroductionAs an empiricist, Mach regarded dispositional qualities as more fundamentally known and more fundamental in being than either the object or its so-called intrinsic properties.
“As an empiricist, however, Mach regarded the dispositional qualities as not only more fundamentally known, but also more fundamental in being than either the object or its so-called intrinsic properties.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 2. What are Elements? Four ThesesNeutral monist elements have causal powers, following from the idea that a natural quality is always a way of affecting or being affected by something.
“Neutral monist elements pack a punch, following from the idea that a natural quality is always a way of affecting or being affected by something”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ 1. IntroductionOn Russell's view, objects are sums of their effects or interactions with observers and other objects; an object is the sum of event-particulars in its causal history, not a substratum grounding intrinsic properties.
“On Russell's view, objects could be expressed as sums of their effects or interactions with observers and with other objects.The object is the sum of the event-particulars in its causal history, not a substratum in which intrinsic properties of the thing are grounded”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Russell, 1921
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Interpretationreasoning§ 2. What are Elements? Four ThesesNeutralism is implicit in classic neutral monism: elements are neither mental nor physical; minds and physical bodies are functionally related complexes of elements, and there is no underlying duality of variations.
“2. Neutralism: elements are neither mental nor physical; rather minds and physical bodies are functionally related complexes of elements.Certain functional variations of the elements are called 'mental' and others are called 'physical', but there is no underlying duality of variations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ 1. IntroductionFor Mach, there is no rift between the psychical and the physical, no inside and outside, and only one kind of element out of which the supposed inside and outside are formed.
“There is no rift between the psychical and the physical, no inside and outside, no ''sensation'' to which an external ''thing'' different from sensation, corresponds.There is but one kind of element, out of which this supposed inside and outside are formed.”
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Premisecitation§ 2. What are Elements? Four ThesesMach's elements push, pull and impede one another in dynamical complexes and can only be isolated from these complexes provisionally.
“Mach's elements Philosophical Psychology 175 push, pull and impede one another in dynamical complexes and can only be isolated from these complexes provisionally (Banks, 2003).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Banks, 2003 source
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Premisecitation§ 1. IntroductionNeutral monism is a position in metaphysics and philosophy of mind whose classic version was defended by Ernst Mach, William James, and Bertrand Russell.
“Neutral monism is a position in metaphysics and philosophy of mind, the classic version of which was defended by Ernst Mach, William James, and Bertrand Russell (Banks, 2003).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Banks, 2003 source
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Premisecitation§ 1. IntroductionFechner held that sensations and the physical brain are the inner and outer aspects of a single reality.
“Fechner had urged that sensations and the physical brain were to be taken as the ''inner'' and ''outer'' aspects of a single reality, like the mutually exclusive aspects of a penny”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 2. What are Elements? Four ThesesPowers is implicit in classic neutral monism: elements are powers with causal force, concrete qualities and dispositional ways of affecting things in causal or functional roles, and every element is naturally embedded in its functional role.
“4. Powers: elements are powers with causal force.They are concrete qualities and dispositional ways of affecting things in their various causal, or functional, roles.The concrete quality instantiates the dispositional, relational role.Every element is naturally embedded in its functional role.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ 1. IntroductionMach's original theory of elements was developed as part of a project to eliminate unnecessary metaphysical notions of mind versus body and to unite physics and psychology in a general scientific view.
“Mach's original theory of elements was developed as part of a project to eliminate unnecessary metaphysical notions of 'mind' vs. 'body' and to unite physics and psychology in a general scientific view which could then be applied in any field of inquiry.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Mach, 1959
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Premisereasoning§ 1. IntroductionMach objected to Fechner's lingering dualism of inner and outer aspects and was thereby led to one kind of elements.
“Mach, however, objected to this lingering dualism of ''inner'' and ''outer'' aspects and was thus led to one kind of elements:”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 2. What are Elements? Four ThesesPsychophysical Identity is implicit in classic neutral monism: every sensation, such as green, is also a physical element (s/e), a neural energy in the brain, though not every element is a sensation or even a possible sensation.
“3. Psychophysical Identity: every sensation, such as green, is also a physical element (s/e), a neural energy in the brain.Not every element is a sensation, or even a possible sensation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ 2. What are Elements? Four ThesesQualia have no powers, are identified by the subjective criterion of what it is like to experience them, and are grouped into similarity classes by the subject's ability to discriminate them.
“By contrast, qualia have no powers, are identified by the subjective criterion of ''what it's like'' to experience them, and are grouped into similarity classes by the subject's ability to discriminate them (see Clark, 1993).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Clark, 1993
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Interpretationreasoning§ 4. Russell Redux: Neo-Neutral Monism and Panpsychism Neutral monism never really disappeared in the twentieth century.After Russell, it was taken up in a problematic way by Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle, by Erwin Schro ¨dinger, by Herbert Feigl and many others (Carnap, 2003;Feigl, 1967;Schro ¨dinger, 2006).Recently, there has been a modest revival of the position deriving from a passage in Russell's (1927Russell's ( /1959) ) Analysis of Matter (see Banks, 2003Banks, , 2004;;Chalmers, 1996Chalmers, , 2003;;Holman, 2008;Lockwood, 1989;Maxwell, 1978;Rosenberg, 2004;Stoljar, 2001a;Strawson, 2006;and Unger, 1999, among others): Physics, in itself, is exceedingly abstract and reveals only certain mathematical characteristics of the material with which it deals.It does not tell us anything as to the intrinsic character of this material . . . .But by bringing physics and perception together, we are able to include psychical events in the material of physics and to give physics the greater concreteness which results from our more intimate acquaintance with the subject matter of our own experience . . . .As to intrinsic character, we do not know enough about it in the physical world to have a right to say that it is very different from that of percepts.(Russell, 1927/1959, pp.10; 400-401) 14 In other words, physics deals with the relational or dispositional characteristics of matter, which can enter into abstract mathematical laws.It does not deal with the intrinsic character of matter, or what concretely instantiates those dispositions.One option is to adopt a suitably enhanced physicalism, 15 in which these externally described dispositions are concretely instantiated by something with ''intrinsic character,'' presumably the same way our sensations concretely instantiate states of our physically described brains (as Russell held elsewhere; Russell, 1921). The mathematician Max Newman (1928) pointed out that Russell's preliminary definition of physics as purely relational would not suffice, since (according to Russell's own theory of relations!)given any cardinal number of objects, all of the abstract combinatorial relations between them simply come along for free.Which among all these abstract possibilities are concretely instantiated by physics, for example by genuine causal connections between objects?Russell readily admitted this criticism (Demopoulos & Friedman, 1989;Seager, 2006), but Newman is actually endorsing Russell's real proposal for an enhanced physicalism, in which causal dispositions are concretely instantiated by qualities and are not just abstract combinations of objects.It is this proposal for an enhanced physicalism that most authors have taken from the quote.Rather than canvass all of the different proposals cited above, I will make use of David Chalmer's (2003) concise summary in which he dubs the Neo-Russellian position 'Type-F monism'.According to Chalmers: Type F monism is the view that consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities: that is, by the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions.On this view, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are located at the fundamental level of physical reality and in a certain sense, underlie physical reality itself . . . .As a bonus this view is perfectly compatible with the causal closure of the microphysical, and indeed with existing physical laws.The view can retain the structure of physical theory as it already exists; it simply supplements this structure with an intrinsic nature . . .(proto)phenomenal properties serve as the ultimate categorical basis of all physical causation.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 265) These 'categorical properties' are, for Chalmers, the concrete instantiations of causal forces, and are themselves dispositions (see Banks, 2009).They have both an intrinsic, or concrete, aspect as real qualities, and they have also the relational or dispositional aspect as it is known in physics.Thesis number four above seems completely satisfied by Type F-Monism.On the other hand, these categorical properties are what Chalmers calls ''(proto) phenomenal properties'' inside of even the smallest parts of matter, a suggestion with disturbing panpsychist overtones.As the physical stuff combines, according to physical laws, into ever more complex structures like the brain, these tiny protophenomenal properties inside matter combine into conscious experience and sensation.Chalmers suggests that there must be principles for how these protophenomenal properties combine, which would run in parallel with, but be independent of, the way that the physical dispositions combine: This is . . . the combination problem for panpsychism.To answer it, it seems that we need a much better understanding of the compositional principles of phenomenology: that is, the principles by which phenomenal properties can be composed or constituted from underlying phenomenal properties, or from protophenomenal properties.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 266) Philosophical Psychology 181 Why would we need two completely different, parallel orders of composition if the protophenomenal properties are exactly the occupants of the known causal roles of physics?Won't the principles of combination be just the same?I can't see how there could be a second ordering besides that by which physical dispositions ordinarily configure by known physical laws.16 Moreover the idea that physical dispositions in matter are little ''proto-sensations'' seems wrong, much less proto-sensations in little ''proto-egos'' (Strawson, 2006).Elements are concrete instantiations of physical dispositions, but they are not all sensations, or even possible sensations, and they certainly don't depend on there being little egos to perceive them.So Type-F monism appears to lack features of classic neutral monism already. Instead, as outlined above, why not let the phenomenal properties (sensations) be the concrete instantiations of higher order dispositions, while the lower-level physical dispositions are concretely instantiated by physical elements in matter that are not anyone's sensations, nor related to them by a line of descent?Here, Chalmers explicitly rejects the notion that a sensation quality might be intrinsic ''to high level physical dispositions (e.g., those involved in neural states)'': If the low-level network is causally closed and the high level intrinsic properties are not constituted by low-level intrinsic properties, the high level intrinsic properties will be epiphenomenal.The only way to embrace this position would seem to be in combination with a denial of microphysical causal closure, holding that there are fundamental dispositions above the microphysical level which have phenomenal properties as their grounds.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 267) I give him credit for seeing the possibility, but he, too, has fallen for the one-size-fits-all notion of causation criticized above.This prevents him from seeing the appeal of making sensations the instantiation of higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Given that we are still owed a definition of causation, why is it impossible that a configuration of elements instantiating a cluster of micro-physical dispositions might not also collectively instantiate a disposition of the cluster as a whole?17 There is no need for a mysterious line of descent from conscious sensation to inorganic matter by which protophenomenal properties combine by a set of weird laws into conscious phenomenal properties; we can just stick with physics and its laws, complemented by further empirical laws describing the higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Lockwood (1993) addresses this point explicitly: Their [basic dispositions of matter] potential for generating awareness could be a matter of the application of certain currently unknown laws to their familiar physical attributes (in which laws, of course, there would be an essential reference to the emergent attributes).This fairly elementary point seems to have escaped those authors who have argued that, if we are made of electrons, quarks, gluons, and the like, then-given that we are conscious-electrons, quarks and so forth must themselves be possessed of some sort of primitive proto-consciousness.As I see it, this is a complete non-sequitur (p.281).Elements are not all sensations, or even possible sensations.
“Elements are concrete instantiations of physical dispositions, but they are not all sensations, or even possible sensations, and they certainly don't depend on there being little egos to perceive them.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Philosophical Psychology 177 Analysis of Sensations (1959), speaking as a physicist versed in the interpretation of physical laws (in his famous Mechanics for example): I cannot here refrain from expressing my surprise that the principle of the conservation of energy has so often been dragged in in connexion with the question of whether there is a special psychical agent.On the assumption that energy is constant, the course of physical processes is limited but not necessarily determined with perfect uniqueness.That the principle of conservation of energy is satisfied in all physiological cases merely tells us that the psyche neither uses up work, nor performs it.For all that, the psyche may still be a partly determinant factor.When a philosopher asks the question . . . he usually misses the point of the principle of the conservation of energy and the stock reply of the physicist has no intelligible meaning in a case so far removed from the scope of his ideas.(Mach, 1959, p. 55n) A principle like the conservation of energy is a general phenomenological law, a blanket statement, about the initial and final states of a process in a closed system.It is silent about mechanisms, does not say how the process runs, nor does it prevent us from interpolating another process between the initial and final states, so long as there is no net energy absorbed or contributed by it.Mach also addressed this point in his Principle of the Conservation of Energy (1911) remarking that the closure of a system says nothing about its specific transformations from state to state, configuration to configuration, only about the energy going in and going out. 12 He points out in the earlier book that little islets or closed systems of activity ''shut up in themselves'' might occur in an overall system (like the brain) and the conservation law says nothing about how closed systems form, or what effects such formations might have.If, for example, the sensations or behavior of an organism supervenes not on the energy per se but on these intermediary closed islets, configurations of neural energies, specific changes not predicted by, or described by, energy data, could make a recognizable difference to the behavior of the organism and still be in accord with the principle. But if by 'causal closure' we mean something other than a blanket conservation principle, this is where we can get into trouble, for there is really no agreed upon definition of cause (Hausman, 1998).'Cause' may refer to micro-causation only, effecting change according to fundamental laws of physics (Kim, 1998).Or 'cause' may also refer to 'wide' causation or macro-causation, i.e., the effect of macro-types of configuration on each other and on micro-events.Notions of macro-causation, variously defined, are available in Dretske (1993), Garfinkel (1990), Lockwood (2007), Rosenberg (2004), Yablo (1992Yablo ( , 2003Yablo ( , 2009)), and Yoo (2006).The effect of causation by macro-types is not to cause micro-events directly and one to one, but to limit micro-caused events in these configurations to other broad type-classes of configuration, or to exclude them.Properties of configurations of neurons could include macro-symmetry or asymmetry, spatio-temporal patterns or islets of firing bounded by inhibitory areas, anatomical location in the brain, and relations to neighboring islets of neural activity.An example of wide causation of individual neural events might be the way that structural features of a configuration constrain the firing of individual neurons by forcing them to accommodate the firing of neighboring cells in a pattern.Macro-causation does not make the effect happen in the same way that the micro-mechanisms do; a configuration does not 'fire', individual cells do.But the range of micro-physically caused events may be limited by being grouped into certain types of configuration and not others, which may be just as important a feature of neural events, especially if sensations or behavior supervene on the macro-types of configuration in which firings occur, and any higher order laws taking one macro-class of configurations to another macro-class. The opponent of macro-causation points out that configurations of micro-states are already included in a complete micro-causal description of events, so, if the causal powers of configurations are produced by a constellation of micro-factors, the factors and the combination are already included in the micro-description.This is true, the principle of the causal closure of the micro-physical covers all factors and all micro-configurations-configurations of things micro-physically described-in a blanket statement, but for that very reason it is not capable of specifying laws governing the formation of macro-types of configuration (see Banks, 2009).This for the familiar reason that macro-types of configuration may not be realized by a single recognizable type of micro-configuration.Micro-causation is a general physical description of all micro-states in all possible micro-configurations: all are causally closed, all are the result of micro-factors acting together in concert in configurations.Macro-causation, however, describes how some class of macro-configurations A either fosters, limits, or rules out another class of macro-configurations B. This is more specific information not contained in the micro-descriptions of either events or configurations micro-physically described, hence macro-causation is not redundant, or epiphenomenal.Instead, macro-physical configurations may be taken to instantiate legitimate higher-order natural dispositions which are not exhausted, or screened off, by the micro-physical dispositions that realize them case by individual case.Example: I can tell you that an individual configuration a has a probability of 1/2 of evolving into an individual configuration b, but that macro-configurations of type A, to which a individually belongs, evolve into macro-configurations of class B with a probability of 9/10.The higher order law may even be a stronger natural disposition.13 As this paper is not a study of wide causation per se, I will simply note in passing that this kind of ''two levels'' approach is relevant to, and works well with, Mach's language above about 'physical' versus 'psychical' variations of the self-same elements on causal maps.As illustrated below, a physical neural cluster (e) is a cluster or configuration of micro-physical dispositions (e 1 . . ..e n ) and appears to an external investigator as a population of separate cells in a snarl of complex connections to one another, any of which may be investigated separately.These are its 'physical' variations.The neural energy of this whole cluster in itself, however, has the psychical disposition to appear as the quality green (s/e) and to interact and interfere with, or inhibit other sensations as one provisional sensory quality among others (see Figure 1). Hence the causal map will represent both kinds of causal relation among elements some individual, some polyadic type relations, some micro, some macro, Philosophical Psychology 179 without preferring one over the other.Indeed Mach's flexible notion of causation-cum-functional relations allows this quite naturally.Of course we still need further proof that such macro-types really exist and then we need the laws that relate them.But it is best not to prejudge the question.Levels of explanation and modeling can be very important in the sciences and perhaps especially for biology and neuroscience.In specific, our sense organs are probably adapted to overall environmental macro-conditions, and very insensitive to micro-conditions or realizations.Lockwood (1989Lockwood ( , 2007) ) gives an interesting range of scientific examples from convection cells to quantum wave-functions.Macro-causation does not make the effect happen in the same way micro-mechanisms do; a configuration does not fire, individual cells do.
“Macro-causation does not make the effect happen in the same way that the micro-mechanisms do; a configuration does not 'fire', individual cells do.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationcitation§ Philosophical Psychology 177 Analysis of Sensations (1959), speaking as a physicist versed in the interpretation of physical laws (in his famous Mechanics for example): I cannot here refrain from expressing my surprise that the principle of the conservation of energy has so often been dragged in in connexion with the question of whether there is a special psychical agent.On the assumption that energy is constant, the course of physical processes is limited but not necessarily determined with perfect uniqueness.That the principle of conservation of energy is satisfied in all physiological cases merely tells us that the psyche neither uses up work, nor performs it.For all that, the psyche may still be a partly determinant factor.When a philosopher asks the question . . . he usually misses the point of the principle of the conservation of energy and the stock reply of the physicist has no intelligible meaning in a case so far removed from the scope of his ideas.(Mach, 1959, p. 55n) A principle like the conservation of energy is a general phenomenological law, a blanket statement, about the initial and final states of a process in a closed system.It is silent about mechanisms, does not say how the process runs, nor does it prevent us from interpolating another process between the initial and final states, so long as there is no net energy absorbed or contributed by it.Mach also addressed this point in his Principle of the Conservation of Energy (1911) remarking that the closure of a system says nothing about its specific transformations from state to state, configuration to configuration, only about the energy going in and going out. 12 He points out in the earlier book that little islets or closed systems of activity ''shut up in themselves'' might occur in an overall system (like the brain) and the conservation law says nothing about how closed systems form, or what effects such formations might have.If, for example, the sensations or behavior of an organism supervenes not on the energy per se but on these intermediary closed islets, configurations of neural energies, specific changes not predicted by, or described by, energy data, could make a recognizable difference to the behavior of the organism and still be in accord with the principle. But if by 'causal closure' we mean something other than a blanket conservation principle, this is where we can get into trouble, for there is really no agreed upon definition of cause (Hausman, 1998).'Cause' may refer to micro-causation only, effecting change according to fundamental laws of physics (Kim, 1998).Or 'cause' may also refer to 'wide' causation or macro-causation, i.e., the effect of macro-types of configuration on each other and on micro-events.Notions of macro-causation, variously defined, are available in Dretske (1993), Garfinkel (1990), Lockwood (2007), Rosenberg (2004), Yablo (1992Yablo ( , 2003Yablo ( , 2009)), and Yoo (2006).The effect of causation by macro-types is not to cause micro-events directly and one to one, but to limit micro-caused events in these configurations to other broad type-classes of configuration, or to exclude them.Properties of configurations of neurons could include macro-symmetry or asymmetry, spatio-temporal patterns or islets of firing bounded by inhibitory areas, anatomical location in the brain, and relations to neighboring islets of neural activity.An example of wide causation of individual neural events might be the way that structural features of a configuration constrain the firing of individual neurons by forcing them to accommodate the firing of neighboring cells in a pattern.Macro-causation does not make the effect happen in the same way that the micro-mechanisms do; a configuration does not 'fire', individual cells do.But the range of micro-physically caused events may be limited by being grouped into certain types of configuration and not others, which may be just as important a feature of neural events, especially if sensations or behavior supervene on the macro-types of configuration in which firings occur, and any higher order laws taking one macro-class of configurations to another macro-class. The opponent of macro-causation points out that configurations of micro-states are already included in a complete micro-causal description of events, so, if the causal powers of configurations are produced by a constellation of micro-factors, the factors and the combination are already included in the micro-description.This is true, the principle of the causal closure of the micro-physical covers all factors and all micro-configurations-configurations of things micro-physically described-in a blanket statement, but for that very reason it is not capable of specifying laws governing the formation of macro-types of configuration (see Banks, 2009).This for the familiar reason that macro-types of configuration may not be realized by a single recognizable type of micro-configuration.Micro-causation is a general physical description of all micro-states in all possible micro-configurations: all are causally closed, all are the result of micro-factors acting together in concert in configurations.Macro-causation, however, describes how some class of macro-configurations A either fosters, limits, or rules out another class of macro-configurations B. This is more specific information not contained in the micro-descriptions of either events or configurations micro-physically described, hence macro-causation is not redundant, or epiphenomenal.Instead, macro-physical configurations may be taken to instantiate legitimate higher-order natural dispositions which are not exhausted, or screened off, by the micro-physical dispositions that realize them case by individual case.Example: I can tell you that an individual configuration a has a probability of 1/2 of evolving into an individual configuration b, but that macro-configurations of type A, to which a individually belongs, evolve into macro-configurations of class B with a probability of 9/10.The higher order law may even be a stronger natural disposition.13 As this paper is not a study of wide causation per se, I will simply note in passing that this kind of ''two levels'' approach is relevant to, and works well with, Mach's language above about 'physical' versus 'psychical' variations of the self-same elements on causal maps.As illustrated below, a physical neural cluster (e) is a cluster or configuration of micro-physical dispositions (e 1 . . ..e n ) and appears to an external investigator as a population of separate cells in a snarl of complex connections to one another, any of which may be investigated separately.These are its 'physical' variations.The neural energy of this whole cluster in itself, however, has the psychical disposition to appear as the quality green (s/e) and to interact and interfere with, or inhibit other sensations as one provisional sensory quality among others (see Figure 1). Hence the causal map will represent both kinds of causal relation among elements some individual, some polyadic type relations, some micro, some macro, Philosophical Psychology 179 without preferring one over the other.Indeed Mach's flexible notion of causation-cum-functional relations allows this quite naturally.Of course we still need further proof that such macro-types really exist and then we need the laws that relate them.But it is best not to prejudge the question.Levels of explanation and modeling can be very important in the sciences and perhaps especially for biology and neuroscience.In specific, our sense organs are probably adapted to overall environmental macro-conditions, and very insensitive to micro-conditions or realizations.Lockwood (1989Lockwood ( , 2007) ) gives an interesting range of scientific examples from convection cells to quantum wave-functions.A principle like the conservation of energy is a general phenomenological law about the initial and final states of a process in a closed system; it is silent about mechanisms and does not prevent interpolating another process between initial and final states so long as there is no net energy absorbed or contributed.
“A principle like the conservation of energy is a general phenomenological law, a blanket statement, about the initial and final states of a process in a closed system.It is silent about mechanisms, does not say how the process runs, nor does it prevent us from interpolating another process between the initial and final states, so long as there is no net energy absorbed or contributed by it.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Mach, 1959
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Mach, 1911
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationreasoning§ Philosophical Psychology 177 Analysis of Sensations (1959), speaking as a physicist versed in the interpretation of physical laws (in his famous Mechanics for example): I cannot here refrain from expressing my surprise that the principle of the conservation of energy has so often been dragged in in connexion with the question of whether there is a special psychical agent.On the assumption that energy is constant, the course of physical processes is limited but not necessarily determined with perfect uniqueness.That the principle of conservation of energy is satisfied in all physiological cases merely tells us that the psyche neither uses up work, nor performs it.For all that, the psyche may still be a partly determinant factor.When a philosopher asks the question . . . he usually misses the point of the principle of the conservation of energy and the stock reply of the physicist has no intelligible meaning in a case so far removed from the scope of his ideas.(Mach, 1959, p. 55n) A principle like the conservation of energy is a general phenomenological law, a blanket statement, about the initial and final states of a process in a closed system.It is silent about mechanisms, does not say how the process runs, nor does it prevent us from interpolating another process between the initial and final states, so long as there is no net energy absorbed or contributed by it.Mach also addressed this point in his Principle of the Conservation of Energy (1911) remarking that the closure of a system says nothing about its specific transformations from state to state, configuration to configuration, only about the energy going in and going out. 12 He points out in the earlier book that little islets or closed systems of activity ''shut up in themselves'' might occur in an overall system (like the brain) and the conservation law says nothing about how closed systems form, or what effects such formations might have.If, for example, the sensations or behavior of an organism supervenes not on the energy per se but on these intermediary closed islets, configurations of neural energies, specific changes not predicted by, or described by, energy data, could make a recognizable difference to the behavior of the organism and still be in accord with the principle. But if by 'causal closure' we mean something other than a blanket conservation principle, this is where we can get into trouble, for there is really no agreed upon definition of cause (Hausman, 1998).'Cause' may refer to micro-causation only, effecting change according to fundamental laws of physics (Kim, 1998).Or 'cause' may also refer to 'wide' causation or macro-causation, i.e., the effect of macro-types of configuration on each other and on micro-events.Notions of macro-causation, variously defined, are available in Dretske (1993), Garfinkel (1990), Lockwood (2007), Rosenberg (2004), Yablo (1992Yablo ( , 2003Yablo ( , 2009)), and Yoo (2006).The effect of causation by macro-types is not to cause micro-events directly and one to one, but to limit micro-caused events in these configurations to other broad type-classes of configuration, or to exclude them.Properties of configurations of neurons could include macro-symmetry or asymmetry, spatio-temporal patterns or islets of firing bounded by inhibitory areas, anatomical location in the brain, and relations to neighboring islets of neural activity.An example of wide causation of individual neural events might be the way that structural features of a configuration constrain the firing of individual neurons by forcing them to accommodate the firing of neighboring cells in a pattern.Macro-causation does not make the effect happen in the same way that the micro-mechanisms do; a configuration does not 'fire', individual cells do.But the range of micro-physically caused events may be limited by being grouped into certain types of configuration and not others, which may be just as important a feature of neural events, especially if sensations or behavior supervene on the macro-types of configuration in which firings occur, and any higher order laws taking one macro-class of configurations to another macro-class. The opponent of macro-causation points out that configurations of micro-states are already included in a complete micro-causal description of events, so, if the causal powers of configurations are produced by a constellation of micro-factors, the factors and the combination are already included in the micro-description.This is true, the principle of the causal closure of the micro-physical covers all factors and all micro-configurations-configurations of things micro-physically described-in a blanket statement, but for that very reason it is not capable of specifying laws governing the formation of macro-types of configuration (see Banks, 2009).This for the familiar reason that macro-types of configuration may not be realized by a single recognizable type of micro-configuration.Micro-causation is a general physical description of all micro-states in all possible micro-configurations: all are causally closed, all are the result of micro-factors acting together in concert in configurations.Macro-causation, however, describes how some class of macro-configurations A either fosters, limits, or rules out another class of macro-configurations B. This is more specific information not contained in the micro-descriptions of either events or configurations micro-physically described, hence macro-causation is not redundant, or epiphenomenal.Instead, macro-physical configurations may be taken to instantiate legitimate higher-order natural dispositions which are not exhausted, or screened off, by the micro-physical dispositions that realize them case by individual case.Example: I can tell you that an individual configuration a has a probability of 1/2 of evolving into an individual configuration b, but that macro-configurations of type A, to which a individually belongs, evolve into macro-configurations of class B with a probability of 9/10.The higher order law may even be a stronger natural disposition.13 As this paper is not a study of wide causation per se, I will simply note in passing that this kind of ''two levels'' approach is relevant to, and works well with, Mach's language above about 'physical' versus 'psychical' variations of the self-same elements on causal maps.As illustrated below, a physical neural cluster (e) is a cluster or configuration of micro-physical dispositions (e 1 . . ..e n ) and appears to an external investigator as a population of separate cells in a snarl of complex connections to one another, any of which may be investigated separately.These are its 'physical' variations.The neural energy of this whole cluster in itself, however, has the psychical disposition to appear as the quality green (s/e) and to interact and interfere with, or inhibit other sensations as one provisional sensory quality among others (see Figure 1). Hence the causal map will represent both kinds of causal relation among elements some individual, some polyadic type relations, some micro, some macro, Philosophical Psychology 179 without preferring one over the other.Indeed Mach's flexible notion of causation-cum-functional relations allows this quite naturally.Of course we still need further proof that such macro-types really exist and then we need the laws that relate them.But it is best not to prejudge the question.Levels of explanation and modeling can be very important in the sciences and perhaps especially for biology and neuroscience.In specific, our sense organs are probably adapted to overall environmental macro-conditions, and very insensitive to micro-conditions or realizations.Lockwood (1989Lockwood ( , 2007) ) gives an interesting range of scientific examples from convection cells to quantum wave-functions.A physical neural cluster (e) is a configuration of micro-physical dispositions and appears to an external investigator as a population of separate cells in complex connections, any of which may be investigated separately.
“As illustrated below, a physical neural cluster (e) is a cluster or configuration of micro-physical dispositions (e 1 . . ..e n ) and appears to an external investigator as a population of separate cells in a snarl of complex connections to one another, any of which may be investigated separately.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisecitation§ 4. Russell Redux: Neo-Neutral Monism and Panpsychism Neutral monism never really disappeared in the twentieth century.After Russell, it was taken up in a problematic way by Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle, by Erwin Schro ¨dinger, by Herbert Feigl and many others (Carnap, 2003;Feigl, 1967;Schro ¨dinger, 2006).Recently, there has been a modest revival of the position deriving from a passage in Russell's (1927Russell's ( /1959) ) Analysis of Matter (see Banks, 2003Banks, , 2004;;Chalmers, 1996Chalmers, , 2003;;Holman, 2008;Lockwood, 1989;Maxwell, 1978;Rosenberg, 2004;Stoljar, 2001a;Strawson, 2006;and Unger, 1999, among others): Physics, in itself, is exceedingly abstract and reveals only certain mathematical characteristics of the material with which it deals.It does not tell us anything as to the intrinsic character of this material . . . .But by bringing physics and perception together, we are able to include psychical events in the material of physics and to give physics the greater concreteness which results from our more intimate acquaintance with the subject matter of our own experience . . . .As to intrinsic character, we do not know enough about it in the physical world to have a right to say that it is very different from that of percepts.(Russell, 1927/1959, pp.10; 400-401) 14 In other words, physics deals with the relational or dispositional characteristics of matter, which can enter into abstract mathematical laws.It does not deal with the intrinsic character of matter, or what concretely instantiates those dispositions.One option is to adopt a suitably enhanced physicalism, 15 in which these externally described dispositions are concretely instantiated by something with ''intrinsic character,'' presumably the same way our sensations concretely instantiate states of our physically described brains (as Russell held elsewhere; Russell, 1921). The mathematician Max Newman (1928) pointed out that Russell's preliminary definition of physics as purely relational would not suffice, since (according to Russell's own theory of relations!)given any cardinal number of objects, all of the abstract combinatorial relations between them simply come along for free.Which among all these abstract possibilities are concretely instantiated by physics, for example by genuine causal connections between objects?Russell readily admitted this criticism (Demopoulos & Friedman, 1989;Seager, 2006), but Newman is actually endorsing Russell's real proposal for an enhanced physicalism, in which causal dispositions are concretely instantiated by qualities and are not just abstract combinations of objects.It is this proposal for an enhanced physicalism that most authors have taken from the quote.Rather than canvass all of the different proposals cited above, I will make use of David Chalmer's (2003) concise summary in which he dubs the Neo-Russellian position 'Type-F monism'.According to Chalmers: Type F monism is the view that consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities: that is, by the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions.On this view, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are located at the fundamental level of physical reality and in a certain sense, underlie physical reality itself . . . .As a bonus this view is perfectly compatible with the causal closure of the microphysical, and indeed with existing physical laws.The view can retain the structure of physical theory as it already exists; it simply supplements this structure with an intrinsic nature . . .(proto)phenomenal properties serve as the ultimate categorical basis of all physical causation.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 265) These 'categorical properties' are, for Chalmers, the concrete instantiations of causal forces, and are themselves dispositions (see Banks, 2009).They have both an intrinsic, or concrete, aspect as real qualities, and they have also the relational or dispositional aspect as it is known in physics.Thesis number four above seems completely satisfied by Type F-Monism.On the other hand, these categorical properties are what Chalmers calls ''(proto) phenomenal properties'' inside of even the smallest parts of matter, a suggestion with disturbing panpsychist overtones.As the physical stuff combines, according to physical laws, into ever more complex structures like the brain, these tiny protophenomenal properties inside matter combine into conscious experience and sensation.Chalmers suggests that there must be principles for how these protophenomenal properties combine, which would run in parallel with, but be independent of, the way that the physical dispositions combine: This is . . . the combination problem for panpsychism.To answer it, it seems that we need a much better understanding of the compositional principles of phenomenology: that is, the principles by which phenomenal properties can be composed or constituted from underlying phenomenal properties, or from protophenomenal properties.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 266) Philosophical Psychology 181 Why would we need two completely different, parallel orders of composition if the protophenomenal properties are exactly the occupants of the known causal roles of physics?Won't the principles of combination be just the same?I can't see how there could be a second ordering besides that by which physical dispositions ordinarily configure by known physical laws.16 Moreover the idea that physical dispositions in matter are little ''proto-sensations'' seems wrong, much less proto-sensations in little ''proto-egos'' (Strawson, 2006).Elements are concrete instantiations of physical dispositions, but they are not all sensations, or even possible sensations, and they certainly don't depend on there being little egos to perceive them.So Type-F monism appears to lack features of classic neutral monism already. Instead, as outlined above, why not let the phenomenal properties (sensations) be the concrete instantiations of higher order dispositions, while the lower-level physical dispositions are concretely instantiated by physical elements in matter that are not anyone's sensations, nor related to them by a line of descent?Here, Chalmers explicitly rejects the notion that a sensation quality might be intrinsic ''to high level physical dispositions (e.g., those involved in neural states)'': If the low-level network is causally closed and the high level intrinsic properties are not constituted by low-level intrinsic properties, the high level intrinsic properties will be epiphenomenal.The only way to embrace this position would seem to be in combination with a denial of microphysical causal closure, holding that there are fundamental dispositions above the microphysical level which have phenomenal properties as their grounds.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 267) I give him credit for seeing the possibility, but he, too, has fallen for the one-size-fits-all notion of causation criticized above.This prevents him from seeing the appeal of making sensations the instantiation of higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Given that we are still owed a definition of causation, why is it impossible that a configuration of elements instantiating a cluster of micro-physical dispositions might not also collectively instantiate a disposition of the cluster as a whole?17 There is no need for a mysterious line of descent from conscious sensation to inorganic matter by which protophenomenal properties combine by a set of weird laws into conscious phenomenal properties; we can just stick with physics and its laws, complemented by further empirical laws describing the higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Lockwood (1993) addresses this point explicitly: Their [basic dispositions of matter] potential for generating awareness could be a matter of the application of certain currently unknown laws to their familiar physical attributes (in which laws, of course, there would be an essential reference to the emergent attributes).This fairly elementary point seems to have escaped those authors who have argued that, if we are made of electrons, quarks, gluons, and the like, then-given that we are conscious-electrons, quarks and so forth must themselves be possessed of some sort of primitive proto-consciousness.As I see it, this is a complete non-sequitur (p.281).Russell's preliminary definition of physics as purely relational does not suffice, because given any cardinal number of objects, all abstract combinatorial relations between them come along for free.
“The mathematician Max Newman (1928) pointed out that Russell's preliminary definition of physics as purely relational would not suffice, since (according to Russell's own theory of relations!)given any cardinal number of objects, all of the abstract combinatorial relations between them simply come along for free.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Newman (1928)
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 5. ConclusionThe concepts of neutral monism are estranged from those in use in the contemporary discussion.
“The concepts of neutral monism are estranged from those in use in the contemporary discussion, in particular notions of qualia, causation, and causal closure in particular are areas where misunderstandings could easily blossom.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisecitation§ 4. Russell Redux: Neo-Neutral Monism and Panpsychism Neutral monism never really disappeared in the twentieth century.After Russell, it was taken up in a problematic way by Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle, by Erwin Schro ¨dinger, by Herbert Feigl and many others (Carnap, 2003;Feigl, 1967;Schro ¨dinger, 2006).Recently, there has been a modest revival of the position deriving from a passage in Russell's (1927Russell's ( /1959) ) Analysis of Matter (see Banks, 2003Banks, , 2004;;Chalmers, 1996Chalmers, , 2003;;Holman, 2008;Lockwood, 1989;Maxwell, 1978;Rosenberg, 2004;Stoljar, 2001a;Strawson, 2006;and Unger, 1999, among others): Physics, in itself, is exceedingly abstract and reveals only certain mathematical characteristics of the material with which it deals.It does not tell us anything as to the intrinsic character of this material . . . .But by bringing physics and perception together, we are able to include psychical events in the material of physics and to give physics the greater concreteness which results from our more intimate acquaintance with the subject matter of our own experience . . . .As to intrinsic character, we do not know enough about it in the physical world to have a right to say that it is very different from that of percepts.(Russell, 1927/1959, pp.10; 400-401) 14 In other words, physics deals with the relational or dispositional characteristics of matter, which can enter into abstract mathematical laws.It does not deal with the intrinsic character of matter, or what concretely instantiates those dispositions.One option is to adopt a suitably enhanced physicalism, 15 in which these externally described dispositions are concretely instantiated by something with ''intrinsic character,'' presumably the same way our sensations concretely instantiate states of our physically described brains (as Russell held elsewhere; Russell, 1921). The mathematician Max Newman (1928) pointed out that Russell's preliminary definition of physics as purely relational would not suffice, since (according to Russell's own theory of relations!)given any cardinal number of objects, all of the abstract combinatorial relations between them simply come along for free.Which among all these abstract possibilities are concretely instantiated by physics, for example by genuine causal connections between objects?Russell readily admitted this criticism (Demopoulos & Friedman, 1989;Seager, 2006), but Newman is actually endorsing Russell's real proposal for an enhanced physicalism, in which causal dispositions are concretely instantiated by qualities and are not just abstract combinations of objects.It is this proposal for an enhanced physicalism that most authors have taken from the quote.Rather than canvass all of the different proposals cited above, I will make use of David Chalmer's (2003) concise summary in which he dubs the Neo-Russellian position 'Type-F monism'.According to Chalmers: Type F monism is the view that consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities: that is, by the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions.On this view, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are located at the fundamental level of physical reality and in a certain sense, underlie physical reality itself . . . .As a bonus this view is perfectly compatible with the causal closure of the microphysical, and indeed with existing physical laws.The view can retain the structure of physical theory as it already exists; it simply supplements this structure with an intrinsic nature . . .(proto)phenomenal properties serve as the ultimate categorical basis of all physical causation.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 265) These 'categorical properties' are, for Chalmers, the concrete instantiations of causal forces, and are themselves dispositions (see Banks, 2009).They have both an intrinsic, or concrete, aspect as real qualities, and they have also the relational or dispositional aspect as it is known in physics.Thesis number four above seems completely satisfied by Type F-Monism.On the other hand, these categorical properties are what Chalmers calls ''(proto) phenomenal properties'' inside of even the smallest parts of matter, a suggestion with disturbing panpsychist overtones.As the physical stuff combines, according to physical laws, into ever more complex structures like the brain, these tiny protophenomenal properties inside matter combine into conscious experience and sensation.Chalmers suggests that there must be principles for how these protophenomenal properties combine, which would run in parallel with, but be independent of, the way that the physical dispositions combine: This is . . . the combination problem for panpsychism.To answer it, it seems that we need a much better understanding of the compositional principles of phenomenology: that is, the principles by which phenomenal properties can be composed or constituted from underlying phenomenal properties, or from protophenomenal properties.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 266) Philosophical Psychology 181 Why would we need two completely different, parallel orders of composition if the protophenomenal properties are exactly the occupants of the known causal roles of physics?Won't the principles of combination be just the same?I can't see how there could be a second ordering besides that by which physical dispositions ordinarily configure by known physical laws.16 Moreover the idea that physical dispositions in matter are little ''proto-sensations'' seems wrong, much less proto-sensations in little ''proto-egos'' (Strawson, 2006).Elements are concrete instantiations of physical dispositions, but they are not all sensations, or even possible sensations, and they certainly don't depend on there being little egos to perceive them.So Type-F monism appears to lack features of classic neutral monism already. Instead, as outlined above, why not let the phenomenal properties (sensations) be the concrete instantiations of higher order dispositions, while the lower-level physical dispositions are concretely instantiated by physical elements in matter that are not anyone's sensations, nor related to them by a line of descent?Here, Chalmers explicitly rejects the notion that a sensation quality might be intrinsic ''to high level physical dispositions (e.g., those involved in neural states)'': If the low-level network is causally closed and the high level intrinsic properties are not constituted by low-level intrinsic properties, the high level intrinsic properties will be epiphenomenal.The only way to embrace this position would seem to be in combination with a denial of microphysical causal closure, holding that there are fundamental dispositions above the microphysical level which have phenomenal properties as their grounds.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 267) I give him credit for seeing the possibility, but he, too, has fallen for the one-size-fits-all notion of causation criticized above.This prevents him from seeing the appeal of making sensations the instantiation of higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Given that we are still owed a definition of causation, why is it impossible that a configuration of elements instantiating a cluster of micro-physical dispositions might not also collectively instantiate a disposition of the cluster as a whole?17 There is no need for a mysterious line of descent from conscious sensation to inorganic matter by which protophenomenal properties combine by a set of weird laws into conscious phenomenal properties; we can just stick with physics and its laws, complemented by further empirical laws describing the higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Lockwood (1993) addresses this point explicitly: Their [basic dispositions of matter] potential for generating awareness could be a matter of the application of certain currently unknown laws to their familiar physical attributes (in which laws, of course, there would be an essential reference to the emergent attributes).This fairly elementary point seems to have escaped those authors who have argued that, if we are made of electrons, quarks, gluons, and the like, then-given that we are conscious-electrons, quarks and so forth must themselves be possessed of some sort of primitive proto-consciousness.As I see it, this is a complete non-sequitur (p.281).The potential of basic dispositions of matter for generating awareness could be a matter of the application of certain currently unknown laws to their familiar physical attributes.
“Their [basic dispositions of matter] potential for generating awareness could be a matter of the application of certain currently unknown laws to their familiar physical attributes (in which laws, of course, there would be an essential reference to the emergent attributes).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Lockwood (1993) source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationreasoning§ 4. Russell Redux: Neo-Neutral Monism and Panpsychism Neutral monism never really disappeared in the twentieth century.After Russell, it was taken up in a problematic way by Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle, by Erwin Schro ¨dinger, by Herbert Feigl and many others (Carnap, 2003;Feigl, 1967;Schro ¨dinger, 2006).Recently, there has been a modest revival of the position deriving from a passage in Russell's (1927Russell's ( /1959) ) Analysis of Matter (see Banks, 2003Banks, , 2004;;Chalmers, 1996Chalmers, , 2003;;Holman, 2008;Lockwood, 1989;Maxwell, 1978;Rosenberg, 2004;Stoljar, 2001a;Strawson, 2006;and Unger, 1999, among others): Physics, in itself, is exceedingly abstract and reveals only certain mathematical characteristics of the material with which it deals.It does not tell us anything as to the intrinsic character of this material . . . .But by bringing physics and perception together, we are able to include psychical events in the material of physics and to give physics the greater concreteness which results from our more intimate acquaintance with the subject matter of our own experience . . . .As to intrinsic character, we do not know enough about it in the physical world to have a right to say that it is very different from that of percepts.(Russell, 1927/1959, pp.10; 400-401) 14 In other words, physics deals with the relational or dispositional characteristics of matter, which can enter into abstract mathematical laws.It does not deal with the intrinsic character of matter, or what concretely instantiates those dispositions.One option is to adopt a suitably enhanced physicalism, 15 in which these externally described dispositions are concretely instantiated by something with ''intrinsic character,'' presumably the same way our sensations concretely instantiate states of our physically described brains (as Russell held elsewhere; Russell, 1921). The mathematician Max Newman (1928) pointed out that Russell's preliminary definition of physics as purely relational would not suffice, since (according to Russell's own theory of relations!)given any cardinal number of objects, all of the abstract combinatorial relations between them simply come along for free.Which among all these abstract possibilities are concretely instantiated by physics, for example by genuine causal connections between objects?Russell readily admitted this criticism (Demopoulos & Friedman, 1989;Seager, 2006), but Newman is actually endorsing Russell's real proposal for an enhanced physicalism, in which causal dispositions are concretely instantiated by qualities and are not just abstract combinations of objects.It is this proposal for an enhanced physicalism that most authors have taken from the quote.Rather than canvass all of the different proposals cited above, I will make use of David Chalmer's (2003) concise summary in which he dubs the Neo-Russellian position 'Type-F monism'.According to Chalmers: Type F monism is the view that consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities: that is, by the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions.On this view, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are located at the fundamental level of physical reality and in a certain sense, underlie physical reality itself . . . .As a bonus this view is perfectly compatible with the causal closure of the microphysical, and indeed with existing physical laws.The view can retain the structure of physical theory as it already exists; it simply supplements this structure with an intrinsic nature . . .(proto)phenomenal properties serve as the ultimate categorical basis of all physical causation.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 265) These 'categorical properties' are, for Chalmers, the concrete instantiations of causal forces, and are themselves dispositions (see Banks, 2009).They have both an intrinsic, or concrete, aspect as real qualities, and they have also the relational or dispositional aspect as it is known in physics.Thesis number four above seems completely satisfied by Type F-Monism.On the other hand, these categorical properties are what Chalmers calls ''(proto) phenomenal properties'' inside of even the smallest parts of matter, a suggestion with disturbing panpsychist overtones.As the physical stuff combines, according to physical laws, into ever more complex structures like the brain, these tiny protophenomenal properties inside matter combine into conscious experience and sensation.Chalmers suggests that there must be principles for how these protophenomenal properties combine, which would run in parallel with, but be independent of, the way that the physical dispositions combine: This is . . . the combination problem for panpsychism.To answer it, it seems that we need a much better understanding of the compositional principles of phenomenology: that is, the principles by which phenomenal properties can be composed or constituted from underlying phenomenal properties, or from protophenomenal properties.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 266) Philosophical Psychology 181 Why would we need two completely different, parallel orders of composition if the protophenomenal properties are exactly the occupants of the known causal roles of physics?Won't the principles of combination be just the same?I can't see how there could be a second ordering besides that by which physical dispositions ordinarily configure by known physical laws.16 Moreover the idea that physical dispositions in matter are little ''proto-sensations'' seems wrong, much less proto-sensations in little ''proto-egos'' (Strawson, 2006).Elements are concrete instantiations of physical dispositions, but they are not all sensations, or even possible sensations, and they certainly don't depend on there being little egos to perceive them.So Type-F monism appears to lack features of classic neutral monism already. Instead, as outlined above, why not let the phenomenal properties (sensations) be the concrete instantiations of higher order dispositions, while the lower-level physical dispositions are concretely instantiated by physical elements in matter that are not anyone's sensations, nor related to them by a line of descent?Here, Chalmers explicitly rejects the notion that a sensation quality might be intrinsic ''to high level physical dispositions (e.g., those involved in neural states)'': If the low-level network is causally closed and the high level intrinsic properties are not constituted by low-level intrinsic properties, the high level intrinsic properties will be epiphenomenal.The only way to embrace this position would seem to be in combination with a denial of microphysical causal closure, holding that there are fundamental dispositions above the microphysical level which have phenomenal properties as their grounds.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 267) I give him credit for seeing the possibility, but he, too, has fallen for the one-size-fits-all notion of causation criticized above.This prevents him from seeing the appeal of making sensations the instantiation of higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Given that we are still owed a definition of causation, why is it impossible that a configuration of elements instantiating a cluster of micro-physical dispositions might not also collectively instantiate a disposition of the cluster as a whole?17 There is no need for a mysterious line of descent from conscious sensation to inorganic matter by which protophenomenal properties combine by a set of weird laws into conscious phenomenal properties; we can just stick with physics and its laws, complemented by further empirical laws describing the higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Lockwood (1993) addresses this point explicitly: Their [basic dispositions of matter] potential for generating awareness could be a matter of the application of certain currently unknown laws to their familiar physical attributes (in which laws, of course, there would be an essential reference to the emergent attributes).This fairly elementary point seems to have escaped those authors who have argued that, if we are made of electrons, quarks, gluons, and the like, then-given that we are conscious-electrons, quarks and so forth must themselves be possessed of some sort of primitive proto-consciousness.As I see it, this is a complete non-sequitur (p.281).It is possible that a configuration of elements instantiating a cluster of micro-physical dispositions also collectively instantiates a disposition of the cluster as a whole.
“Given that we are still owed a definition of causation, why is it impossible that a configuration of elements instantiating a cluster of micro-physical dispositions might not also collectively instantiate a disposition of the cluster as a whole?17”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 5. ConclusionNotions of qualia, causation, and causal closure are areas where misunderstandings could easily blossom.
“The concepts of neutral monism are estranged from those in use in the contemporary discussion, in particular notions of qualia, causation, and causal closure in particular are areas where misunderstandings could easily blossom.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Interpretationcitation§ 4. Russell Redux: Neo-Neutral Monism and Panpsychism Neutral monism never really disappeared in the twentieth century.After Russell, it was taken up in a problematic way by Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle, by Erwin Schro ¨dinger, by Herbert Feigl and many others (Carnap, 2003;Feigl, 1967;Schro ¨dinger, 2006).Recently, there has been a modest revival of the position deriving from a passage in Russell's (1927Russell's ( /1959) ) Analysis of Matter (see Banks, 2003Banks, , 2004;;Chalmers, 1996Chalmers, , 2003;;Holman, 2008;Lockwood, 1989;Maxwell, 1978;Rosenberg, 2004;Stoljar, 2001a;Strawson, 2006;and Unger, 1999, among others): Physics, in itself, is exceedingly abstract and reveals only certain mathematical characteristics of the material with which it deals.It does not tell us anything as to the intrinsic character of this material . . . .But by bringing physics and perception together, we are able to include psychical events in the material of physics and to give physics the greater concreteness which results from our more intimate acquaintance with the subject matter of our own experience . . . .As to intrinsic character, we do not know enough about it in the physical world to have a right to say that it is very different from that of percepts.(Russell, 1927/1959, pp.10; 400-401) 14 In other words, physics deals with the relational or dispositional characteristics of matter, which can enter into abstract mathematical laws.It does not deal with the intrinsic character of matter, or what concretely instantiates those dispositions.One option is to adopt a suitably enhanced physicalism, 15 in which these externally described dispositions are concretely instantiated by something with ''intrinsic character,'' presumably the same way our sensations concretely instantiate states of our physically described brains (as Russell held elsewhere; Russell, 1921). The mathematician Max Newman (1928) pointed out that Russell's preliminary definition of physics as purely relational would not suffice, since (according to Russell's own theory of relations!)given any cardinal number of objects, all of the abstract combinatorial relations between them simply come along for free.Which among all these abstract possibilities are concretely instantiated by physics, for example by genuine causal connections between objects?Russell readily admitted this criticism (Demopoulos & Friedman, 1989;Seager, 2006), but Newman is actually endorsing Russell's real proposal for an enhanced physicalism, in which causal dispositions are concretely instantiated by qualities and are not just abstract combinations of objects.It is this proposal for an enhanced physicalism that most authors have taken from the quote.Rather than canvass all of the different proposals cited above, I will make use of David Chalmer's (2003) concise summary in which he dubs the Neo-Russellian position 'Type-F monism'.According to Chalmers: Type F monism is the view that consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities: that is, by the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions.On this view, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are located at the fundamental level of physical reality and in a certain sense, underlie physical reality itself . . . .As a bonus this view is perfectly compatible with the causal closure of the microphysical, and indeed with existing physical laws.The view can retain the structure of physical theory as it already exists; it simply supplements this structure with an intrinsic nature . . .(proto)phenomenal properties serve as the ultimate categorical basis of all physical causation.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 265) These 'categorical properties' are, for Chalmers, the concrete instantiations of causal forces, and are themselves dispositions (see Banks, 2009).They have both an intrinsic, or concrete, aspect as real qualities, and they have also the relational or dispositional aspect as it is known in physics.Thesis number four above seems completely satisfied by Type F-Monism.On the other hand, these categorical properties are what Chalmers calls ''(proto) phenomenal properties'' inside of even the smallest parts of matter, a suggestion with disturbing panpsychist overtones.As the physical stuff combines, according to physical laws, into ever more complex structures like the brain, these tiny protophenomenal properties inside matter combine into conscious experience and sensation.Chalmers suggests that there must be principles for how these protophenomenal properties combine, which would run in parallel with, but be independent of, the way that the physical dispositions combine: This is . . . the combination problem for panpsychism.To answer it, it seems that we need a much better understanding of the compositional principles of phenomenology: that is, the principles by which phenomenal properties can be composed or constituted from underlying phenomenal properties, or from protophenomenal properties.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 266) Philosophical Psychology 181 Why would we need two completely different, parallel orders of composition if the protophenomenal properties are exactly the occupants of the known causal roles of physics?Won't the principles of combination be just the same?I can't see how there could be a second ordering besides that by which physical dispositions ordinarily configure by known physical laws.16 Moreover the idea that physical dispositions in matter are little ''proto-sensations'' seems wrong, much less proto-sensations in little ''proto-egos'' (Strawson, 2006).Elements are concrete instantiations of physical dispositions, but they are not all sensations, or even possible sensations, and they certainly don't depend on there being little egos to perceive them.So Type-F monism appears to lack features of classic neutral monism already. Instead, as outlined above, why not let the phenomenal properties (sensations) be the concrete instantiations of higher order dispositions, while the lower-level physical dispositions are concretely instantiated by physical elements in matter that are not anyone's sensations, nor related to them by a line of descent?Here, Chalmers explicitly rejects the notion that a sensation quality might be intrinsic ''to high level physical dispositions (e.g., those involved in neural states)'': If the low-level network is causally closed and the high level intrinsic properties are not constituted by low-level intrinsic properties, the high level intrinsic properties will be epiphenomenal.The only way to embrace this position would seem to be in combination with a denial of microphysical causal closure, holding that there are fundamental dispositions above the microphysical level which have phenomenal properties as their grounds.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 267) I give him credit for seeing the possibility, but he, too, has fallen for the one-size-fits-all notion of causation criticized above.This prevents him from seeing the appeal of making sensations the instantiation of higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Given that we are still owed a definition of causation, why is it impossible that a configuration of elements instantiating a cluster of micro-physical dispositions might not also collectively instantiate a disposition of the cluster as a whole?17 There is no need for a mysterious line of descent from conscious sensation to inorganic matter by which protophenomenal properties combine by a set of weird laws into conscious phenomenal properties; we can just stick with physics and its laws, complemented by further empirical laws describing the higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Lockwood (1993) addresses this point explicitly: Their [basic dispositions of matter] potential for generating awareness could be a matter of the application of certain currently unknown laws to their familiar physical attributes (in which laws, of course, there would be an essential reference to the emergent attributes).This fairly elementary point seems to have escaped those authors who have argued that, if we are made of electrons, quarks, gluons, and the like, then-given that we are conscious-electrons, quarks and so forth must themselves be possessed of some sort of primitive proto-consciousness.As I see it, this is a complete non-sequitur (p.281).Physics deals with the relational or dispositional characteristics of matter, which can enter into abstract mathematical laws, and does not deal with the intrinsic character of matter.
“In other words, physics deals with the relational or dispositional characteristics of matter, which can enter into abstract mathematical laws.It does not deal with the intrinsic”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Russell, 1927/1959
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted).
Premisecitation§ 4. Russell Redux: Neo-Neutral Monism and Panpsychism Neutral monism never really disappeared in the twentieth century.After Russell, it was taken up in a problematic way by Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle, by Erwin Schro ¨dinger, by Herbert Feigl and many others (Carnap, 2003;Feigl, 1967;Schro ¨dinger, 2006).Recently, there has been a modest revival of the position deriving from a passage in Russell's (1927Russell's ( /1959) ) Analysis of Matter (see Banks, 2003Banks, , 2004;;Chalmers, 1996Chalmers, , 2003;;Holman, 2008;Lockwood, 1989;Maxwell, 1978;Rosenberg, 2004;Stoljar, 2001a;Strawson, 2006;and Unger, 1999, among others): Physics, in itself, is exceedingly abstract and reveals only certain mathematical characteristics of the material with which it deals.It does not tell us anything as to the intrinsic character of this material . . . .But by bringing physics and perception together, we are able to include psychical events in the material of physics and to give physics the greater concreteness which results from our more intimate acquaintance with the subject matter of our own experience . . . .As to intrinsic character, we do not know enough about it in the physical world to have a right to say that it is very different from that of percepts.(Russell, 1927/1959, pp.10; 400-401) 14 In other words, physics deals with the relational or dispositional characteristics of matter, which can enter into abstract mathematical laws.It does not deal with the intrinsic character of matter, or what concretely instantiates those dispositions.One option is to adopt a suitably enhanced physicalism, 15 in which these externally described dispositions are concretely instantiated by something with ''intrinsic character,'' presumably the same way our sensations concretely instantiate states of our physically described brains (as Russell held elsewhere; Russell, 1921). The mathematician Max Newman (1928) pointed out that Russell's preliminary definition of physics as purely relational would not suffice, since (according to Russell's own theory of relations!)given any cardinal number of objects, all of the abstract combinatorial relations between them simply come along for free.Which among all these abstract possibilities are concretely instantiated by physics, for example by genuine causal connections between objects?Russell readily admitted this criticism (Demopoulos & Friedman, 1989;Seager, 2006), but Newman is actually endorsing Russell's real proposal for an enhanced physicalism, in which causal dispositions are concretely instantiated by qualities and are not just abstract combinations of objects.It is this proposal for an enhanced physicalism that most authors have taken from the quote.Rather than canvass all of the different proposals cited above, I will make use of David Chalmer's (2003) concise summary in which he dubs the Neo-Russellian position 'Type-F monism'.According to Chalmers: Type F monism is the view that consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities: that is, by the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions.On this view, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are located at the fundamental level of physical reality and in a certain sense, underlie physical reality itself . . . .As a bonus this view is perfectly compatible with the causal closure of the microphysical, and indeed with existing physical laws.The view can retain the structure of physical theory as it already exists; it simply supplements this structure with an intrinsic nature . . .(proto)phenomenal properties serve as the ultimate categorical basis of all physical causation.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 265) These 'categorical properties' are, for Chalmers, the concrete instantiations of causal forces, and are themselves dispositions (see Banks, 2009).They have both an intrinsic, or concrete, aspect as real qualities, and they have also the relational or dispositional aspect as it is known in physics.Thesis number four above seems completely satisfied by Type F-Monism.On the other hand, these categorical properties are what Chalmers calls ''(proto) phenomenal properties'' inside of even the smallest parts of matter, a suggestion with disturbing panpsychist overtones.As the physical stuff combines, according to physical laws, into ever more complex structures like the brain, these tiny protophenomenal properties inside matter combine into conscious experience and sensation.Chalmers suggests that there must be principles for how these protophenomenal properties combine, which would run in parallel with, but be independent of, the way that the physical dispositions combine: This is . . . the combination problem for panpsychism.To answer it, it seems that we need a much better understanding of the compositional principles of phenomenology: that is, the principles by which phenomenal properties can be composed or constituted from underlying phenomenal properties, or from protophenomenal properties.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 266) Philosophical Psychology 181 Why would we need two completely different, parallel orders of composition if the protophenomenal properties are exactly the occupants of the known causal roles of physics?Won't the principles of combination be just the same?I can't see how there could be a second ordering besides that by which physical dispositions ordinarily configure by known physical laws.16 Moreover the idea that physical dispositions in matter are little ''proto-sensations'' seems wrong, much less proto-sensations in little ''proto-egos'' (Strawson, 2006).Elements are concrete instantiations of physical dispositions, but they are not all sensations, or even possible sensations, and they certainly don't depend on there being little egos to perceive them.So Type-F monism appears to lack features of classic neutral monism already. Instead, as outlined above, why not let the phenomenal properties (sensations) be the concrete instantiations of higher order dispositions, while the lower-level physical dispositions are concretely instantiated by physical elements in matter that are not anyone's sensations, nor related to them by a line of descent?Here, Chalmers explicitly rejects the notion that a sensation quality might be intrinsic ''to high level physical dispositions (e.g., those involved in neural states)'': If the low-level network is causally closed and the high level intrinsic properties are not constituted by low-level intrinsic properties, the high level intrinsic properties will be epiphenomenal.The only way to embrace this position would seem to be in combination with a denial of microphysical causal closure, holding that there are fundamental dispositions above the microphysical level which have phenomenal properties as their grounds.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 267) I give him credit for seeing the possibility, but he, too, has fallen for the one-size-fits-all notion of causation criticized above.This prevents him from seeing the appeal of making sensations the instantiation of higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Given that we are still owed a definition of causation, why is it impossible that a configuration of elements instantiating a cluster of micro-physical dispositions might not also collectively instantiate a disposition of the cluster as a whole?17 There is no need for a mysterious line of descent from conscious sensation to inorganic matter by which protophenomenal properties combine by a set of weird laws into conscious phenomenal properties; we can just stick with physics and its laws, complemented by further empirical laws describing the higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Lockwood (1993) addresses this point explicitly: Their [basic dispositions of matter] potential for generating awareness could be a matter of the application of certain currently unknown laws to their familiar physical attributes (in which laws, of course, there would be an essential reference to the emergent attributes).This fairly elementary point seems to have escaped those authors who have argued that, if we are made of electrons, quarks, gluons, and the like, then-given that we are conscious-electrons, quarks and so forth must themselves be possessed of some sort of primitive proto-consciousness.As I see it, this is a complete non-sequitur (p.281).(Proto)phenomenal properties serve as the ultimate categorical basis of all physical causation.
“(proto)phenomenal properties serve as the ultimate categorical basis of all physical causation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Chalmers (2003) source
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationreasoning§ 2. What are Elements? Four ThesesThe look of an agglomeration of neurons and their collective neural energy to the brain's possessor is the sensation quality.
“The look of this agglomeration of neurons, and their collective neural energy, to the brain's possessor is the sensation quality.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 4. Russell Redux: Neo-Neutral Monism and Panpsychism Neutral monism never really disappeared in the twentieth century.After Russell, it was taken up in a problematic way by Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle, by Erwin Schro ¨dinger, by Herbert Feigl and many others (Carnap, 2003;Feigl, 1967;Schro ¨dinger, 2006).Recently, there has been a modest revival of the position deriving from a passage in Russell's (1927Russell's ( /1959) ) Analysis of Matter (see Banks, 2003Banks, , 2004;;Chalmers, 1996Chalmers, , 2003;;Holman, 2008;Lockwood, 1989;Maxwell, 1978;Rosenberg, 2004;Stoljar, 2001a;Strawson, 2006;and Unger, 1999, among others): Physics, in itself, is exceedingly abstract and reveals only certain mathematical characteristics of the material with which it deals.It does not tell us anything as to the intrinsic character of this material . . . .But by bringing physics and perception together, we are able to include psychical events in the material of physics and to give physics the greater concreteness which results from our more intimate acquaintance with the subject matter of our own experience . . . .As to intrinsic character, we do not know enough about it in the physical world to have a right to say that it is very different from that of percepts.(Russell, 1927/1959, pp.10; 400-401) 14 In other words, physics deals with the relational or dispositional characteristics of matter, which can enter into abstract mathematical laws.It does not deal with the intrinsic character of matter, or what concretely instantiates those dispositions.One option is to adopt a suitably enhanced physicalism, 15 in which these externally described dispositions are concretely instantiated by something with ''intrinsic character,'' presumably the same way our sensations concretely instantiate states of our physically described brains (as Russell held elsewhere; Russell, 1921). The mathematician Max Newman (1928) pointed out that Russell's preliminary definition of physics as purely relational would not suffice, since (according to Russell's own theory of relations!)given any cardinal number of objects, all of the abstract combinatorial relations between them simply come along for free.Which among all these abstract possibilities are concretely instantiated by physics, for example by genuine causal connections between objects?Russell readily admitted this criticism (Demopoulos & Friedman, 1989;Seager, 2006), but Newman is actually endorsing Russell's real proposal for an enhanced physicalism, in which causal dispositions are concretely instantiated by qualities and are not just abstract combinations of objects.It is this proposal for an enhanced physicalism that most authors have taken from the quote.Rather than canvass all of the different proposals cited above, I will make use of David Chalmer's (2003) concise summary in which he dubs the Neo-Russellian position 'Type-F monism'.According to Chalmers: Type F monism is the view that consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities: that is, by the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions.On this view, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are located at the fundamental level of physical reality and in a certain sense, underlie physical reality itself . . . .As a bonus this view is perfectly compatible with the causal closure of the microphysical, and indeed with existing physical laws.The view can retain the structure of physical theory as it already exists; it simply supplements this structure with an intrinsic nature . . .(proto)phenomenal properties serve as the ultimate categorical basis of all physical causation.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 265) These 'categorical properties' are, for Chalmers, the concrete instantiations of causal forces, and are themselves dispositions (see Banks, 2009).They have both an intrinsic, or concrete, aspect as real qualities, and they have also the relational or dispositional aspect as it is known in physics.Thesis number four above seems completely satisfied by Type F-Monism.On the other hand, these categorical properties are what Chalmers calls ''(proto) phenomenal properties'' inside of even the smallest parts of matter, a suggestion with disturbing panpsychist overtones.As the physical stuff combines, according to physical laws, into ever more complex structures like the brain, these tiny protophenomenal properties inside matter combine into conscious experience and sensation.Chalmers suggests that there must be principles for how these protophenomenal properties combine, which would run in parallel with, but be independent of, the way that the physical dispositions combine: This is . . . the combination problem for panpsychism.To answer it, it seems that we need a much better understanding of the compositional principles of phenomenology: that is, the principles by which phenomenal properties can be composed or constituted from underlying phenomenal properties, or from protophenomenal properties.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 266) Philosophical Psychology 181 Why would we need two completely different, parallel orders of composition if the protophenomenal properties are exactly the occupants of the known causal roles of physics?Won't the principles of combination be just the same?I can't see how there could be a second ordering besides that by which physical dispositions ordinarily configure by known physical laws.16 Moreover the idea that physical dispositions in matter are little ''proto-sensations'' seems wrong, much less proto-sensations in little ''proto-egos'' (Strawson, 2006).Elements are concrete instantiations of physical dispositions, but they are not all sensations, or even possible sensations, and they certainly don't depend on there being little egos to perceive them.So Type-F monism appears to lack features of classic neutral monism already. Instead, as outlined above, why not let the phenomenal properties (sensations) be the concrete instantiations of higher order dispositions, while the lower-level physical dispositions are concretely instantiated by physical elements in matter that are not anyone's sensations, nor related to them by a line of descent?Here, Chalmers explicitly rejects the notion that a sensation quality might be intrinsic ''to high level physical dispositions (e.g., those involved in neural states)'': If the low-level network is causally closed and the high level intrinsic properties are not constituted by low-level intrinsic properties, the high level intrinsic properties will be epiphenomenal.The only way to embrace this position would seem to be in combination with a denial of microphysical causal closure, holding that there are fundamental dispositions above the microphysical level which have phenomenal properties as their grounds.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 267) I give him credit for seeing the possibility, but he, too, has fallen for the one-size-fits-all notion of causation criticized above.This prevents him from seeing the appeal of making sensations the instantiation of higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Given that we are still owed a definition of causation, why is it impossible that a configuration of elements instantiating a cluster of micro-physical dispositions might not also collectively instantiate a disposition of the cluster as a whole?17 There is no need for a mysterious line of descent from conscious sensation to inorganic matter by which protophenomenal properties combine by a set of weird laws into conscious phenomenal properties; we can just stick with physics and its laws, complemented by further empirical laws describing the higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Lockwood (1993) addresses this point explicitly: Their [basic dispositions of matter] potential for generating awareness could be a matter of the application of certain currently unknown laws to their familiar physical attributes (in which laws, of course, there would be an essential reference to the emergent attributes).This fairly elementary point seems to have escaped those authors who have argued that, if we are made of electrons, quarks, gluons, and the like, then-given that we are conscious-electrons, quarks and so forth must themselves be possessed of some sort of primitive proto-consciousness.As I see it, this is a complete non-sequitur (p.281).The real problem for neutral monism is the principle of causal closure and the lack of any nuanced definition of 'cause', not a bogus 'composition problem'.
“I would say that instead of a bogus 'composition problem' for neutral monism, the principle of causal closure and the lack of any nuanced definition of 'cause' seems to be the real problem.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The principle of causal closure is a genuine constraint on theories of mind.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 5. ConclusionNeo-monist views veer increasingly panpsychist.
“Classic, or the neo-monist views which veer increasingly panpsychist, a much less interesting and probably false view.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted). May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ 4. Russell Redux: Neo-Neutral Monism and Panpsychism Neutral monism never really disappeared in the twentieth century.After Russell, it was taken up in a problematic way by Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle, by Erwin Schro ¨dinger, by Herbert Feigl and many others (Carnap, 2003;Feigl, 1967;Schro ¨dinger, 2006).Recently, there has been a modest revival of the position deriving from a passage in Russell's (1927Russell's ( /1959) ) Analysis of Matter (see Banks, 2003Banks, , 2004;;Chalmers, 1996Chalmers, , 2003;;Holman, 2008;Lockwood, 1989;Maxwell, 1978;Rosenberg, 2004;Stoljar, 2001a;Strawson, 2006;and Unger, 1999, among others): Physics, in itself, is exceedingly abstract and reveals only certain mathematical characteristics of the material with which it deals.It does not tell us anything as to the intrinsic character of this material . . . .But by bringing physics and perception together, we are able to include psychical events in the material of physics and to give physics the greater concreteness which results from our more intimate acquaintance with the subject matter of our own experience . . . .As to intrinsic character, we do not know enough about it in the physical world to have a right to say that it is very different from that of percepts.(Russell, 1927/1959, pp.10; 400-401) 14 In other words, physics deals with the relational or dispositional characteristics of matter, which can enter into abstract mathematical laws.It does not deal with the intrinsic character of matter, or what concretely instantiates those dispositions.One option is to adopt a suitably enhanced physicalism, 15 in which these externally described dispositions are concretely instantiated by something with ''intrinsic character,'' presumably the same way our sensations concretely instantiate states of our physically described brains (as Russell held elsewhere; Russell, 1921). The mathematician Max Newman (1928) pointed out that Russell's preliminary definition of physics as purely relational would not suffice, since (according to Russell's own theory of relations!)given any cardinal number of objects, all of the abstract combinatorial relations between them simply come along for free.Which among all these abstract possibilities are concretely instantiated by physics, for example by genuine causal connections between objects?Russell readily admitted this criticism (Demopoulos & Friedman, 1989;Seager, 2006), but Newman is actually endorsing Russell's real proposal for an enhanced physicalism, in which causal dispositions are concretely instantiated by qualities and are not just abstract combinations of objects.It is this proposal for an enhanced physicalism that most authors have taken from the quote.Rather than canvass all of the different proposals cited above, I will make use of David Chalmer's (2003) concise summary in which he dubs the Neo-Russellian position 'Type-F monism'.According to Chalmers: Type F monism is the view that consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities: that is, by the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions.On this view, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are located at the fundamental level of physical reality and in a certain sense, underlie physical reality itself . . . .As a bonus this view is perfectly compatible with the causal closure of the microphysical, and indeed with existing physical laws.The view can retain the structure of physical theory as it already exists; it simply supplements this structure with an intrinsic nature . . .(proto)phenomenal properties serve as the ultimate categorical basis of all physical causation.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 265) These 'categorical properties' are, for Chalmers, the concrete instantiations of causal forces, and are themselves dispositions (see Banks, 2009).They have both an intrinsic, or concrete, aspect as real qualities, and they have also the relational or dispositional aspect as it is known in physics.Thesis number four above seems completely satisfied by Type F-Monism.On the other hand, these categorical properties are what Chalmers calls ''(proto) phenomenal properties'' inside of even the smallest parts of matter, a suggestion with disturbing panpsychist overtones.As the physical stuff combines, according to physical laws, into ever more complex structures like the brain, these tiny protophenomenal properties inside matter combine into conscious experience and sensation.Chalmers suggests that there must be principles for how these protophenomenal properties combine, which would run in parallel with, but be independent of, the way that the physical dispositions combine: This is . . . the combination problem for panpsychism.To answer it, it seems that we need a much better understanding of the compositional principles of phenomenology: that is, the principles by which phenomenal properties can be composed or constituted from underlying phenomenal properties, or from protophenomenal properties.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 266) Philosophical Psychology 181 Why would we need two completely different, parallel orders of composition if the protophenomenal properties are exactly the occupants of the known causal roles of physics?Won't the principles of combination be just the same?I can't see how there could be a second ordering besides that by which physical dispositions ordinarily configure by known physical laws.16 Moreover the idea that physical dispositions in matter are little ''proto-sensations'' seems wrong, much less proto-sensations in little ''proto-egos'' (Strawson, 2006).Elements are concrete instantiations of physical dispositions, but they are not all sensations, or even possible sensations, and they certainly don't depend on there being little egos to perceive them.So Type-F monism appears to lack features of classic neutral monism already. Instead, as outlined above, why not let the phenomenal properties (sensations) be the concrete instantiations of higher order dispositions, while the lower-level physical dispositions are concretely instantiated by physical elements in matter that are not anyone's sensations, nor related to them by a line of descent?Here, Chalmers explicitly rejects the notion that a sensation quality might be intrinsic ''to high level physical dispositions (e.g., those involved in neural states)'': If the low-level network is causally closed and the high level intrinsic properties are not constituted by low-level intrinsic properties, the high level intrinsic properties will be epiphenomenal.The only way to embrace this position would seem to be in combination with a denial of microphysical causal closure, holding that there are fundamental dispositions above the microphysical level which have phenomenal properties as their grounds.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 267) I give him credit for seeing the possibility, but he, too, has fallen for the one-size-fits-all notion of causation criticized above.This prevents him from seeing the appeal of making sensations the instantiation of higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Given that we are still owed a definition of causation, why is it impossible that a configuration of elements instantiating a cluster of micro-physical dispositions might not also collectively instantiate a disposition of the cluster as a whole?17 There is no need for a mysterious line of descent from conscious sensation to inorganic matter by which protophenomenal properties combine by a set of weird laws into conscious phenomenal properties; we can just stick with physics and its laws, complemented by further empirical laws describing the higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Lockwood (1993) addresses this point explicitly: Their [basic dispositions of matter] potential for generating awareness could be a matter of the application of certain currently unknown laws to their familiar physical attributes (in which laws, of course, there would be an essential reference to the emergent attributes).This fairly elementary point seems to have escaped those authors who have argued that, if we are made of electrons, quarks, gluons, and the like, then-given that we are conscious-electrons, quarks and so forth must themselves be possessed of some sort of primitive proto-consciousness.As I see it, this is a complete non-sequitur (p.281).Type-F monism is perfectly compatible with the causal closure of the microphysical and with existing physical laws.
“As a bonus this view is perfectly compatible with the causal closure of the microphysical, and indeed with existing physical laws.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Chalmers (2003) source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted).
Premisecitation§ 4. Russell Redux: Neo-Neutral Monism and Panpsychism Neutral monism never really disappeared in the twentieth century.After Russell, it was taken up in a problematic way by Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle, by Erwin Schro ¨dinger, by Herbert Feigl and many others (Carnap, 2003;Feigl, 1967;Schro ¨dinger, 2006).Recently, there has been a modest revival of the position deriving from a passage in Russell's (1927Russell's ( /1959) ) Analysis of Matter (see Banks, 2003Banks, , 2004;;Chalmers, 1996Chalmers, , 2003;;Holman, 2008;Lockwood, 1989;Maxwell, 1978;Rosenberg, 2004;Stoljar, 2001a;Strawson, 2006;and Unger, 1999, among others): Physics, in itself, is exceedingly abstract and reveals only certain mathematical characteristics of the material with which it deals.It does not tell us anything as to the intrinsic character of this material . . . .But by bringing physics and perception together, we are able to include psychical events in the material of physics and to give physics the greater concreteness which results from our more intimate acquaintance with the subject matter of our own experience . . . .As to intrinsic character, we do not know enough about it in the physical world to have a right to say that it is very different from that of percepts.(Russell, 1927/1959, pp.10; 400-401) 14 In other words, physics deals with the relational or dispositional characteristics of matter, which can enter into abstract mathematical laws.It does not deal with the intrinsic character of matter, or what concretely instantiates those dispositions.One option is to adopt a suitably enhanced physicalism, 15 in which these externally described dispositions are concretely instantiated by something with ''intrinsic character,'' presumably the same way our sensations concretely instantiate states of our physically described brains (as Russell held elsewhere; Russell, 1921). The mathematician Max Newman (1928) pointed out that Russell's preliminary definition of physics as purely relational would not suffice, since (according to Russell's own theory of relations!)given any cardinal number of objects, all of the abstract combinatorial relations between them simply come along for free.Which among all these abstract possibilities are concretely instantiated by physics, for example by genuine causal connections between objects?Russell readily admitted this criticism (Demopoulos & Friedman, 1989;Seager, 2006), but Newman is actually endorsing Russell's real proposal for an enhanced physicalism, in which causal dispositions are concretely instantiated by qualities and are not just abstract combinations of objects.It is this proposal for an enhanced physicalism that most authors have taken from the quote.Rather than canvass all of the different proposals cited above, I will make use of David Chalmer's (2003) concise summary in which he dubs the Neo-Russellian position 'Type-F monism'.According to Chalmers: Type F monism is the view that consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities: that is, by the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions.On this view, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are located at the fundamental level of physical reality and in a certain sense, underlie physical reality itself . . . .As a bonus this view is perfectly compatible with the causal closure of the microphysical, and indeed with existing physical laws.The view can retain the structure of physical theory as it already exists; it simply supplements this structure with an intrinsic nature . . .(proto)phenomenal properties serve as the ultimate categorical basis of all physical causation.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 265) These 'categorical properties' are, for Chalmers, the concrete instantiations of causal forces, and are themselves dispositions (see Banks, 2009).They have both an intrinsic, or concrete, aspect as real qualities, and they have also the relational or dispositional aspect as it is known in physics.Thesis number four above seems completely satisfied by Type F-Monism.On the other hand, these categorical properties are what Chalmers calls ''(proto) phenomenal properties'' inside of even the smallest parts of matter, a suggestion with disturbing panpsychist overtones.As the physical stuff combines, according to physical laws, into ever more complex structures like the brain, these tiny protophenomenal properties inside matter combine into conscious experience and sensation.Chalmers suggests that there must be principles for how these protophenomenal properties combine, which would run in parallel with, but be independent of, the way that the physical dispositions combine: This is . . . the combination problem for panpsychism.To answer it, it seems that we need a much better understanding of the compositional principles of phenomenology: that is, the principles by which phenomenal properties can be composed or constituted from underlying phenomenal properties, or from protophenomenal properties.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 266) Philosophical Psychology 181 Why would we need two completely different, parallel orders of composition if the protophenomenal properties are exactly the occupants of the known causal roles of physics?Won't the principles of combination be just the same?I can't see how there could be a second ordering besides that by which physical dispositions ordinarily configure by known physical laws.16 Moreover the idea that physical dispositions in matter are little ''proto-sensations'' seems wrong, much less proto-sensations in little ''proto-egos'' (Strawson, 2006).Elements are concrete instantiations of physical dispositions, but they are not all sensations, or even possible sensations, and they certainly don't depend on there being little egos to perceive them.So Type-F monism appears to lack features of classic neutral monism already. Instead, as outlined above, why not let the phenomenal properties (sensations) be the concrete instantiations of higher order dispositions, while the lower-level physical dispositions are concretely instantiated by physical elements in matter that are not anyone's sensations, nor related to them by a line of descent?Here, Chalmers explicitly rejects the notion that a sensation quality might be intrinsic ''to high level physical dispositions (e.g., those involved in neural states)'': If the low-level network is causally closed and the high level intrinsic properties are not constituted by low-level intrinsic properties, the high level intrinsic properties will be epiphenomenal.The only way to embrace this position would seem to be in combination with a denial of microphysical causal closure, holding that there are fundamental dispositions above the microphysical level which have phenomenal properties as their grounds.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 267) I give him credit for seeing the possibility, but he, too, has fallen for the one-size-fits-all notion of causation criticized above.This prevents him from seeing the appeal of making sensations the instantiation of higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Given that we are still owed a definition of causation, why is it impossible that a configuration of elements instantiating a cluster of micro-physical dispositions might not also collectively instantiate a disposition of the cluster as a whole?17 There is no need for a mysterious line of descent from conscious sensation to inorganic matter by which protophenomenal properties combine by a set of weird laws into conscious phenomenal properties; we can just stick with physics and its laws, complemented by further empirical laws describing the higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Lockwood (1993) addresses this point explicitly: Their [basic dispositions of matter] potential for generating awareness could be a matter of the application of certain currently unknown laws to their familiar physical attributes (in which laws, of course, there would be an essential reference to the emergent attributes).This fairly elementary point seems to have escaped those authors who have argued that, if we are made of electrons, quarks, gluons, and the like, then-given that we are conscious-electrons, quarks and so forth must themselves be possessed of some sort of primitive proto-consciousness.As I see it, this is a complete non-sequitur (p.281).Type-F monism is the view that consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities, that is, by the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions.
“Type F monism is the view that consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities: that is, by the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Chalmers (2003) source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 3. Causal Maps, Causal Closure, Micro-vs-Macro CausationA causal map does not prejudge the exact causal connection between external brain-process elements and sensation/elements; the connection could be one-to-one or polyadic, and given what is known about the physiology of sensation, a polyadic configuration seems more likely.
“This depends upon experiment, but given what is known about the physiology of sensation, it seems more likely that a polyadic configuration of neurons would correspond better to what we call a given sensation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationreasoning§ 2. What are Elements? Four ThesesA complex is simply a function of its elements and their variations.
“Reciprocally, a complex is simply a function of its elements and their variations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Philosophical Psychology 177 Analysis of Sensations (1959), speaking as a physicist versed in the interpretation of physical laws (in his famous Mechanics for example): I cannot here refrain from expressing my surprise that the principle of the conservation of energy has so often been dragged in in connexion with the question of whether there is a special psychical agent.On the assumption that energy is constant, the course of physical processes is limited but not necessarily determined with perfect uniqueness.That the principle of conservation of energy is satisfied in all physiological cases merely tells us that the psyche neither uses up work, nor performs it.For all that, the psyche may still be a partly determinant factor.When a philosopher asks the question . . . he usually misses the point of the principle of the conservation of energy and the stock reply of the physicist has no intelligible meaning in a case so far removed from the scope of his ideas.(Mach, 1959, p. 55n) A principle like the conservation of energy is a general phenomenological law, a blanket statement, about the initial and final states of a process in a closed system.It is silent about mechanisms, does not say how the process runs, nor does it prevent us from interpolating another process between the initial and final states, so long as there is no net energy absorbed or contributed by it.Mach also addressed this point in his Principle of the Conservation of Energy (1911) remarking that the closure of a system says nothing about its specific transformations from state to state, configuration to configuration, only about the energy going in and going out. 12 He points out in the earlier book that little islets or closed systems of activity ''shut up in themselves'' might occur in an overall system (like the brain) and the conservation law says nothing about how closed systems form, or what effects such formations might have.If, for example, the sensations or behavior of an organism supervenes not on the energy per se but on these intermediary closed islets, configurations of neural energies, specific changes not predicted by, or described by, energy data, could make a recognizable difference to the behavior of the organism and still be in accord with the principle. But if by 'causal closure' we mean something other than a blanket conservation principle, this is where we can get into trouble, for there is really no agreed upon definition of cause (Hausman, 1998).'Cause' may refer to micro-causation only, effecting change according to fundamental laws of physics (Kim, 1998).Or 'cause' may also refer to 'wide' causation or macro-causation, i.e., the effect of macro-types of configuration on each other and on micro-events.Notions of macro-causation, variously defined, are available in Dretske (1993), Garfinkel (1990), Lockwood (2007), Rosenberg (2004), Yablo (1992Yablo ( , 2003Yablo ( , 2009)), and Yoo (2006).The effect of causation by macro-types is not to cause micro-events directly and one to one, but to limit micro-caused events in these configurations to other broad type-classes of configuration, or to exclude them.Properties of configurations of neurons could include macro-symmetry or asymmetry, spatio-temporal patterns or islets of firing bounded by inhibitory areas, anatomical location in the brain, and relations to neighboring islets of neural activity.An example of wide causation of individual neural events might be the way that structural features of a configuration constrain the firing of individual neurons by forcing them to accommodate the firing of neighboring cells in a pattern.Macro-causation does not make the effect happen in the same way that the micro-mechanisms do; a configuration does not 'fire', individual cells do.But the range of micro-physically caused events may be limited by being grouped into certain types of configuration and not others, which may be just as important a feature of neural events, especially if sensations or behavior supervene on the macro-types of configuration in which firings occur, and any higher order laws taking one macro-class of configurations to another macro-class. The opponent of macro-causation points out that configurations of micro-states are already included in a complete micro-causal description of events, so, if the causal powers of configurations are produced by a constellation of micro-factors, the factors and the combination are already included in the micro-description.This is true, the principle of the causal closure of the micro-physical covers all factors and all micro-configurations-configurations of things micro-physically described-in a blanket statement, but for that very reason it is not capable of specifying laws governing the formation of macro-types of configuration (see Banks, 2009).This for the familiar reason that macro-types of configuration may not be realized by a single recognizable type of micro-configuration.Micro-causation is a general physical description of all micro-states in all possible micro-configurations: all are causally closed, all are the result of micro-factors acting together in concert in configurations.Macro-causation, however, describes how some class of macro-configurations A either fosters, limits, or rules out another class of macro-configurations B. This is more specific information not contained in the micro-descriptions of either events or configurations micro-physically described, hence macro-causation is not redundant, or epiphenomenal.Instead, macro-physical configurations may be taken to instantiate legitimate higher-order natural dispositions which are not exhausted, or screened off, by the micro-physical dispositions that realize them case by individual case.Example: I can tell you that an individual configuration a has a probability of 1/2 of evolving into an individual configuration b, but that macro-configurations of type A, to which a individually belongs, evolve into macro-configurations of class B with a probability of 9/10.The higher order law may even be a stronger natural disposition.13 As this paper is not a study of wide causation per se, I will simply note in passing that this kind of ''two levels'' approach is relevant to, and works well with, Mach's language above about 'physical' versus 'psychical' variations of the self-same elements on causal maps.As illustrated below, a physical neural cluster (e) is a cluster or configuration of micro-physical dispositions (e 1 . . ..e n ) and appears to an external investigator as a population of separate cells in a snarl of complex connections to one another, any of which may be investigated separately.These are its 'physical' variations.The neural energy of this whole cluster in itself, however, has the psychical disposition to appear as the quality green (s/e) and to interact and interfere with, or inhibit other sensations as one provisional sensory quality among others (see Figure 1). Hence the causal map will represent both kinds of causal relation among elements some individual, some polyadic type relations, some micro, some macro, Philosophical Psychology 179 without preferring one over the other.Indeed Mach's flexible notion of causation-cum-functional relations allows this quite naturally.Of course we still need further proof that such macro-types really exist and then we need the laws that relate them.But it is best not to prejudge the question.Levels of explanation and modeling can be very important in the sciences and perhaps especially for biology and neuroscience.In specific, our sense organs are probably adapted to overall environmental macro-conditions, and very insensitive to micro-conditions or realizations.Lockwood (1989Lockwood ( , 2007) ) gives an interesting range of scientific examples from convection cells to quantum wave-functions.Macro-causation describes how some class of macro-configurations A fosters, limits, or rules out another class of macro-configurations B, which is more specific information not contained in micro-descriptions; hence macro-causation is not redundant or epiphenomenal.
“Macro-causation, however, describes how some class of macro-configurations A either fosters, limits, or rules out another class of macro-configurations B. This is more specific information not contained in the micro-descriptions of either events or configurations micro-physically described, hence macro-causation is not redundant, or epiphenomenal.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Macro-types of configuration may not be realized by a single recognizable type of micro-configuration.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisecitation§ Philosophical Psychology 177 Analysis of Sensations (1959), speaking as a physicist versed in the interpretation of physical laws (in his famous Mechanics for example): I cannot here refrain from expressing my surprise that the principle of the conservation of energy has so often been dragged in in connexion with the question of whether there is a special psychical agent.On the assumption that energy is constant, the course of physical processes is limited but not necessarily determined with perfect uniqueness.That the principle of conservation of energy is satisfied in all physiological cases merely tells us that the psyche neither uses up work, nor performs it.For all that, the psyche may still be a partly determinant factor.When a philosopher asks the question . . . he usually misses the point of the principle of the conservation of energy and the stock reply of the physicist has no intelligible meaning in a case so far removed from the scope of his ideas.(Mach, 1959, p. 55n) A principle like the conservation of energy is a general phenomenological law, a blanket statement, about the initial and final states of a process in a closed system.It is silent about mechanisms, does not say how the process runs, nor does it prevent us from interpolating another process between the initial and final states, so long as there is no net energy absorbed or contributed by it.Mach also addressed this point in his Principle of the Conservation of Energy (1911) remarking that the closure of a system says nothing about its specific transformations from state to state, configuration to configuration, only about the energy going in and going out. 12 He points out in the earlier book that little islets or closed systems of activity ''shut up in themselves'' might occur in an overall system (like the brain) and the conservation law says nothing about how closed systems form, or what effects such formations might have.If, for example, the sensations or behavior of an organism supervenes not on the energy per se but on these intermediary closed islets, configurations of neural energies, specific changes not predicted by, or described by, energy data, could make a recognizable difference to the behavior of the organism and still be in accord with the principle. But if by 'causal closure' we mean something other than a blanket conservation principle, this is where we can get into trouble, for there is really no agreed upon definition of cause (Hausman, 1998).'Cause' may refer to micro-causation only, effecting change according to fundamental laws of physics (Kim, 1998).Or 'cause' may also refer to 'wide' causation or macro-causation, i.e., the effect of macro-types of configuration on each other and on micro-events.Notions of macro-causation, variously defined, are available in Dretske (1993), Garfinkel (1990), Lockwood (2007), Rosenberg (2004), Yablo (1992Yablo ( , 2003Yablo ( , 2009)), and Yoo (2006).The effect of causation by macro-types is not to cause micro-events directly and one to one, but to limit micro-caused events in these configurations to other broad type-classes of configuration, or to exclude them.Properties of configurations of neurons could include macro-symmetry or asymmetry, spatio-temporal patterns or islets of firing bounded by inhibitory areas, anatomical location in the brain, and relations to neighboring islets of neural activity.An example of wide causation of individual neural events might be the way that structural features of a configuration constrain the firing of individual neurons by forcing them to accommodate the firing of neighboring cells in a pattern.Macro-causation does not make the effect happen in the same way that the micro-mechanisms do; a configuration does not 'fire', individual cells do.But the range of micro-physically caused events may be limited by being grouped into certain types of configuration and not others, which may be just as important a feature of neural events, especially if sensations or behavior supervene on the macro-types of configuration in which firings occur, and any higher order laws taking one macro-class of configurations to another macro-class. The opponent of macro-causation points out that configurations of micro-states are already included in a complete micro-causal description of events, so, if the causal powers of configurations are produced by a constellation of micro-factors, the factors and the combination are already included in the micro-description.This is true, the principle of the causal closure of the micro-physical covers all factors and all micro-configurations-configurations of things micro-physically described-in a blanket statement, but for that very reason it is not capable of specifying laws governing the formation of macro-types of configuration (see Banks, 2009).This for the familiar reason that macro-types of configuration may not be realized by a single recognizable type of micro-configuration.Micro-causation is a general physical description of all micro-states in all possible micro-configurations: all are causally closed, all are the result of micro-factors acting together in concert in configurations.Macro-causation, however, describes how some class of macro-configurations A either fosters, limits, or rules out another class of macro-configurations B. This is more specific information not contained in the micro-descriptions of either events or configurations micro-physically described, hence macro-causation is not redundant, or epiphenomenal.Instead, macro-physical configurations may be taken to instantiate legitimate higher-order natural dispositions which are not exhausted, or screened off, by the micro-physical dispositions that realize them case by individual case.Example: I can tell you that an individual configuration a has a probability of 1/2 of evolving into an individual configuration b, but that macro-configurations of type A, to which a individually belongs, evolve into macro-configurations of class B with a probability of 9/10.The higher order law may even be a stronger natural disposition.13 As this paper is not a study of wide causation per se, I will simply note in passing that this kind of ''two levels'' approach is relevant to, and works well with, Mach's language above about 'physical' versus 'psychical' variations of the self-same elements on causal maps.As illustrated below, a physical neural cluster (e) is a cluster or configuration of micro-physical dispositions (e 1 . . ..e n ) and appears to an external investigator as a population of separate cells in a snarl of complex connections to one another, any of which may be investigated separately.These are its 'physical' variations.The neural energy of this whole cluster in itself, however, has the psychical disposition to appear as the quality green (s/e) and to interact and interfere with, or inhibit other sensations as one provisional sensory quality among others (see Figure 1). Hence the causal map will represent both kinds of causal relation among elements some individual, some polyadic type relations, some micro, some macro, Philosophical Psychology 179 without preferring one over the other.Indeed Mach's flexible notion of causation-cum-functional relations allows this quite naturally.Of course we still need further proof that such macro-types really exist and then we need the laws that relate them.But it is best not to prejudge the question.Levels of explanation and modeling can be very important in the sciences and perhaps especially for biology and neuroscience.In specific, our sense organs are probably adapted to overall environmental macro-conditions, and very insensitive to micro-conditions or realizations.Lockwood (1989Lockwood ( , 2007) ) gives an interesting range of scientific examples from convection cells to quantum wave-functions.There is no agreed upon definition of cause.
“But if by 'causal closure' we mean something other than a blanket conservation principle, this is where we can get into trouble, for there is really no agreed upon definition of cause (Hausman, 1998).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Hausman, 1998
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ 4. Russell Redux: Neo-Neutral Monism and Panpsychism Neutral monism never really disappeared in the twentieth century.After Russell, it was taken up in a problematic way by Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle, by Erwin Schro ¨dinger, by Herbert Feigl and many others (Carnap, 2003;Feigl, 1967;Schro ¨dinger, 2006).Recently, there has been a modest revival of the position deriving from a passage in Russell's (1927Russell's ( /1959) ) Analysis of Matter (see Banks, 2003Banks, , 2004;;Chalmers, 1996Chalmers, , 2003;;Holman, 2008;Lockwood, 1989;Maxwell, 1978;Rosenberg, 2004;Stoljar, 2001a;Strawson, 2006;and Unger, 1999, among others): Physics, in itself, is exceedingly abstract and reveals only certain mathematical characteristics of the material with which it deals.It does not tell us anything as to the intrinsic character of this material . . . .But by bringing physics and perception together, we are able to include psychical events in the material of physics and to give physics the greater concreteness which results from our more intimate acquaintance with the subject matter of our own experience . . . .As to intrinsic character, we do not know enough about it in the physical world to have a right to say that it is very different from that of percepts.(Russell, 1927/1959, pp.10; 400-401) 14 In other words, physics deals with the relational or dispositional characteristics of matter, which can enter into abstract mathematical laws.It does not deal with the intrinsic character of matter, or what concretely instantiates those dispositions.One option is to adopt a suitably enhanced physicalism, 15 in which these externally described dispositions are concretely instantiated by something with ''intrinsic character,'' presumably the same way our sensations concretely instantiate states of our physically described brains (as Russell held elsewhere; Russell, 1921). The mathematician Max Newman (1928) pointed out that Russell's preliminary definition of physics as purely relational would not suffice, since (according to Russell's own theory of relations!)given any cardinal number of objects, all of the abstract combinatorial relations between them simply come along for free.Which among all these abstract possibilities are concretely instantiated by physics, for example by genuine causal connections between objects?Russell readily admitted this criticism (Demopoulos & Friedman, 1989;Seager, 2006), but Newman is actually endorsing Russell's real proposal for an enhanced physicalism, in which causal dispositions are concretely instantiated by qualities and are not just abstract combinations of objects.It is this proposal for an enhanced physicalism that most authors have taken from the quote.Rather than canvass all of the different proposals cited above, I will make use of David Chalmer's (2003) concise summary in which he dubs the Neo-Russellian position 'Type-F monism'.According to Chalmers: Type F monism is the view that consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities: that is, by the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions.On this view, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are located at the fundamental level of physical reality and in a certain sense, underlie physical reality itself . . . .As a bonus this view is perfectly compatible with the causal closure of the microphysical, and indeed with existing physical laws.The view can retain the structure of physical theory as it already exists; it simply supplements this structure with an intrinsic nature . . .(proto)phenomenal properties serve as the ultimate categorical basis of all physical causation.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 265) These 'categorical properties' are, for Chalmers, the concrete instantiations of causal forces, and are themselves dispositions (see Banks, 2009).They have both an intrinsic, or concrete, aspect as real qualities, and they have also the relational or dispositional aspect as it is known in physics.Thesis number four above seems completely satisfied by Type F-Monism.On the other hand, these categorical properties are what Chalmers calls ''(proto) phenomenal properties'' inside of even the smallest parts of matter, a suggestion with disturbing panpsychist overtones.As the physical stuff combines, according to physical laws, into ever more complex structures like the brain, these tiny protophenomenal properties inside matter combine into conscious experience and sensation.Chalmers suggests that there must be principles for how these protophenomenal properties combine, which would run in parallel with, but be independent of, the way that the physical dispositions combine: This is . . . the combination problem for panpsychism.To answer it, it seems that we need a much better understanding of the compositional principles of phenomenology: that is, the principles by which phenomenal properties can be composed or constituted from underlying phenomenal properties, or from protophenomenal properties.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 266) Philosophical Psychology 181 Why would we need two completely different, parallel orders of composition if the protophenomenal properties are exactly the occupants of the known causal roles of physics?Won't the principles of combination be just the same?I can't see how there could be a second ordering besides that by which physical dispositions ordinarily configure by known physical laws.16 Moreover the idea that physical dispositions in matter are little ''proto-sensations'' seems wrong, much less proto-sensations in little ''proto-egos'' (Strawson, 2006).Elements are concrete instantiations of physical dispositions, but they are not all sensations, or even possible sensations, and they certainly don't depend on there being little egos to perceive them.So Type-F monism appears to lack features of classic neutral monism already. Instead, as outlined above, why not let the phenomenal properties (sensations) be the concrete instantiations of higher order dispositions, while the lower-level physical dispositions are concretely instantiated by physical elements in matter that are not anyone's sensations, nor related to them by a line of descent?Here, Chalmers explicitly rejects the notion that a sensation quality might be intrinsic ''to high level physical dispositions (e.g., those involved in neural states)'': If the low-level network is causally closed and the high level intrinsic properties are not constituted by low-level intrinsic properties, the high level intrinsic properties will be epiphenomenal.The only way to embrace this position would seem to be in combination with a denial of microphysical causal closure, holding that there are fundamental dispositions above the microphysical level which have phenomenal properties as their grounds.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 267) I give him credit for seeing the possibility, but he, too, has fallen for the one-size-fits-all notion of causation criticized above.This prevents him from seeing the appeal of making sensations the instantiation of higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Given that we are still owed a definition of causation, why is it impossible that a configuration of elements instantiating a cluster of micro-physical dispositions might not also collectively instantiate a disposition of the cluster as a whole?17 There is no need for a mysterious line of descent from conscious sensation to inorganic matter by which protophenomenal properties combine by a set of weird laws into conscious phenomenal properties; we can just stick with physics and its laws, complemented by further empirical laws describing the higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Lockwood (1993) addresses this point explicitly: Their [basic dispositions of matter] potential for generating awareness could be a matter of the application of certain currently unknown laws to their familiar physical attributes (in which laws, of course, there would be an essential reference to the emergent attributes).This fairly elementary point seems to have escaped those authors who have argued that, if we are made of electrons, quarks, gluons, and the like, then-given that we are conscious-electrons, quarks and so forth must themselves be possessed of some sort of primitive proto-consciousness.As I see it, this is a complete non-sequitur (p.281).Categorical properties are, for Chalmers, the concrete instantiations of causal forces, and are themselves dispositions.
“These 'categorical properties' are, for Chalmers, the concrete instantiations of causal forces, and are themselves dispositions (see Banks, 2009).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Chalmers (2003) source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Banks (2009)
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationreasoning§ 4. Russell Redux: Neo-Neutral Monism and Panpsychism Neutral monism never really disappeared in the twentieth century.After Russell, it was taken up in a problematic way by Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle, by Erwin Schro ¨dinger, by Herbert Feigl and many others (Carnap, 2003;Feigl, 1967;Schro ¨dinger, 2006).Recently, there has been a modest revival of the position deriving from a passage in Russell's (1927Russell's ( /1959) ) Analysis of Matter (see Banks, 2003Banks, , 2004;;Chalmers, 1996Chalmers, , 2003;;Holman, 2008;Lockwood, 1989;Maxwell, 1978;Rosenberg, 2004;Stoljar, 2001a;Strawson, 2006;and Unger, 1999, among others): Physics, in itself, is exceedingly abstract and reveals only certain mathematical characteristics of the material with which it deals.It does not tell us anything as to the intrinsic character of this material . . . .But by bringing physics and perception together, we are able to include psychical events in the material of physics and to give physics the greater concreteness which results from our more intimate acquaintance with the subject matter of our own experience . . . .As to intrinsic character, we do not know enough about it in the physical world to have a right to say that it is very different from that of percepts.(Russell, 1927/1959, pp.10; 400-401) 14 In other words, physics deals with the relational or dispositional characteristics of matter, which can enter into abstract mathematical laws.It does not deal with the intrinsic character of matter, or what concretely instantiates those dispositions.One option is to adopt a suitably enhanced physicalism, 15 in which these externally described dispositions are concretely instantiated by something with ''intrinsic character,'' presumably the same way our sensations concretely instantiate states of our physically described brains (as Russell held elsewhere; Russell, 1921). The mathematician Max Newman (1928) pointed out that Russell's preliminary definition of physics as purely relational would not suffice, since (according to Russell's own theory of relations!)given any cardinal number of objects, all of the abstract combinatorial relations between them simply come along for free.Which among all these abstract possibilities are concretely instantiated by physics, for example by genuine causal connections between objects?Russell readily admitted this criticism (Demopoulos & Friedman, 1989;Seager, 2006), but Newman is actually endorsing Russell's real proposal for an enhanced physicalism, in which causal dispositions are concretely instantiated by qualities and are not just abstract combinations of objects.It is this proposal for an enhanced physicalism that most authors have taken from the quote.Rather than canvass all of the different proposals cited above, I will make use of David Chalmer's (2003) concise summary in which he dubs the Neo-Russellian position 'Type-F monism'.According to Chalmers: Type F monism is the view that consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities: that is, by the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions.On this view, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are located at the fundamental level of physical reality and in a certain sense, underlie physical reality itself . . . .As a bonus this view is perfectly compatible with the causal closure of the microphysical, and indeed with existing physical laws.The view can retain the structure of physical theory as it already exists; it simply supplements this structure with an intrinsic nature . . .(proto)phenomenal properties serve as the ultimate categorical basis of all physical causation.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 265) These 'categorical properties' are, for Chalmers, the concrete instantiations of causal forces, and are themselves dispositions (see Banks, 2009).They have both an intrinsic, or concrete, aspect as real qualities, and they have also the relational or dispositional aspect as it is known in physics.Thesis number four above seems completely satisfied by Type F-Monism.On the other hand, these categorical properties are what Chalmers calls ''(proto) phenomenal properties'' inside of even the smallest parts of matter, a suggestion with disturbing panpsychist overtones.As the physical stuff combines, according to physical laws, into ever more complex structures like the brain, these tiny protophenomenal properties inside matter combine into conscious experience and sensation.Chalmers suggests that there must be principles for how these protophenomenal properties combine, which would run in parallel with, but be independent of, the way that the physical dispositions combine: This is . . . the combination problem for panpsychism.To answer it, it seems that we need a much better understanding of the compositional principles of phenomenology: that is, the principles by which phenomenal properties can be composed or constituted from underlying phenomenal properties, or from protophenomenal properties.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 266) Philosophical Psychology 181 Why would we need two completely different, parallel orders of composition if the protophenomenal properties are exactly the occupants of the known causal roles of physics?Won't the principles of combination be just the same?I can't see how there could be a second ordering besides that by which physical dispositions ordinarily configure by known physical laws.16 Moreover the idea that physical dispositions in matter are little ''proto-sensations'' seems wrong, much less proto-sensations in little ''proto-egos'' (Strawson, 2006).Elements are concrete instantiations of physical dispositions, but they are not all sensations, or even possible sensations, and they certainly don't depend on there being little egos to perceive them.So Type-F monism appears to lack features of classic neutral monism already. Instead, as outlined above, why not let the phenomenal properties (sensations) be the concrete instantiations of higher order dispositions, while the lower-level physical dispositions are concretely instantiated by physical elements in matter that are not anyone's sensations, nor related to them by a line of descent?Here, Chalmers explicitly rejects the notion that a sensation quality might be intrinsic ''to high level physical dispositions (e.g., those involved in neural states)'': If the low-level network is causally closed and the high level intrinsic properties are not constituted by low-level intrinsic properties, the high level intrinsic properties will be epiphenomenal.The only way to embrace this position would seem to be in combination with a denial of microphysical causal closure, holding that there are fundamental dispositions above the microphysical level which have phenomenal properties as their grounds.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 267) I give him credit for seeing the possibility, but he, too, has fallen for the one-size-fits-all notion of causation criticized above.This prevents him from seeing the appeal of making sensations the instantiation of higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Given that we are still owed a definition of causation, why is it impossible that a configuration of elements instantiating a cluster of micro-physical dispositions might not also collectively instantiate a disposition of the cluster as a whole?17 There is no need for a mysterious line of descent from conscious sensation to inorganic matter by which protophenomenal properties combine by a set of weird laws into conscious phenomenal properties; we can just stick with physics and its laws, complemented by further empirical laws describing the higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Lockwood (1993) addresses this point explicitly: Their [basic dispositions of matter] potential for generating awareness could be a matter of the application of certain currently unknown laws to their familiar physical attributes (in which laws, of course, there would be an essential reference to the emergent attributes).This fairly elementary point seems to have escaped those authors who have argued that, if we are made of electrons, quarks, gluons, and the like, then-given that we are conscious-electrons, quarks and so forth must themselves be possessed of some sort of primitive proto-consciousness.As I see it, this is a complete non-sequitur (p.281).Thesis number four above seems completely satisfied by Type-F monism.
“Thesis number four above seems completely satisfied by Type F-Monism.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 2. What are Elements? Four ThesesIf sensation qualities were identical with neural energies, they would have causal powers and participate fully in physical events and cause physical changes.
“One might also note in passing that sensation qualities would certainly pack a punch if they were identical with neural energies, which participate fully in physical events and cause physical changes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted).
Premisecitation§ 4. Russell Redux: Neo-Neutral Monism and Panpsychism Neutral monism never really disappeared in the twentieth century.After Russell, it was taken up in a problematic way by Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle, by Erwin Schro ¨dinger, by Herbert Feigl and many others (Carnap, 2003;Feigl, 1967;Schro ¨dinger, 2006).Recently, there has been a modest revival of the position deriving from a passage in Russell's (1927Russell's ( /1959) ) Analysis of Matter (see Banks, 2003Banks, , 2004;;Chalmers, 1996Chalmers, , 2003;;Holman, 2008;Lockwood, 1989;Maxwell, 1978;Rosenberg, 2004;Stoljar, 2001a;Strawson, 2006;and Unger, 1999, among others): Physics, in itself, is exceedingly abstract and reveals only certain mathematical characteristics of the material with which it deals.It does not tell us anything as to the intrinsic character of this material . . . .But by bringing physics and perception together, we are able to include psychical events in the material of physics and to give physics the greater concreteness which results from our more intimate acquaintance with the subject matter of our own experience . . . .As to intrinsic character, we do not know enough about it in the physical world to have a right to say that it is very different from that of percepts.(Russell, 1927/1959, pp.10; 400-401) 14 In other words, physics deals with the relational or dispositional characteristics of matter, which can enter into abstract mathematical laws.It does not deal with the intrinsic character of matter, or what concretely instantiates those dispositions.One option is to adopt a suitably enhanced physicalism, 15 in which these externally described dispositions are concretely instantiated by something with ''intrinsic character,'' presumably the same way our sensations concretely instantiate states of our physically described brains (as Russell held elsewhere; Russell, 1921). The mathematician Max Newman (1928) pointed out that Russell's preliminary definition of physics as purely relational would not suffice, since (according to Russell's own theory of relations!)given any cardinal number of objects, all of the abstract combinatorial relations between them simply come along for free.Which among all these abstract possibilities are concretely instantiated by physics, for example by genuine causal connections between objects?Russell readily admitted this criticism (Demopoulos & Friedman, 1989;Seager, 2006), but Newman is actually endorsing Russell's real proposal for an enhanced physicalism, in which causal dispositions are concretely instantiated by qualities and are not just abstract combinations of objects.It is this proposal for an enhanced physicalism that most authors have taken from the quote.Rather than canvass all of the different proposals cited above, I will make use of David Chalmer's (2003) concise summary in which he dubs the Neo-Russellian position 'Type-F monism'.According to Chalmers: Type F monism is the view that consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities: that is, by the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions.On this view, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are located at the fundamental level of physical reality and in a certain sense, underlie physical reality itself . . . .As a bonus this view is perfectly compatible with the causal closure of the microphysical, and indeed with existing physical laws.The view can retain the structure of physical theory as it already exists; it simply supplements this structure with an intrinsic nature . . .(proto)phenomenal properties serve as the ultimate categorical basis of all physical causation.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 265) These 'categorical properties' are, for Chalmers, the concrete instantiations of causal forces, and are themselves dispositions (see Banks, 2009).They have both an intrinsic, or concrete, aspect as real qualities, and they have also the relational or dispositional aspect as it is known in physics.Thesis number four above seems completely satisfied by Type F-Monism.On the other hand, these categorical properties are what Chalmers calls ''(proto) phenomenal properties'' inside of even the smallest parts of matter, a suggestion with disturbing panpsychist overtones.As the physical stuff combines, according to physical laws, into ever more complex structures like the brain, these tiny protophenomenal properties inside matter combine into conscious experience and sensation.Chalmers suggests that there must be principles for how these protophenomenal properties combine, which would run in parallel with, but be independent of, the way that the physical dispositions combine: This is . . . the combination problem for panpsychism.To answer it, it seems that we need a much better understanding of the compositional principles of phenomenology: that is, the principles by which phenomenal properties can be composed or constituted from underlying phenomenal properties, or from protophenomenal properties.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 266) Philosophical Psychology 181 Why would we need two completely different, parallel orders of composition if the protophenomenal properties are exactly the occupants of the known causal roles of physics?Won't the principles of combination be just the same?I can't see how there could be a second ordering besides that by which physical dispositions ordinarily configure by known physical laws.16 Moreover the idea that physical dispositions in matter are little ''proto-sensations'' seems wrong, much less proto-sensations in little ''proto-egos'' (Strawson, 2006).Elements are concrete instantiations of physical dispositions, but they are not all sensations, or even possible sensations, and they certainly don't depend on there being little egos to perceive them.So Type-F monism appears to lack features of classic neutral monism already. Instead, as outlined above, why not let the phenomenal properties (sensations) be the concrete instantiations of higher order dispositions, while the lower-level physical dispositions are concretely instantiated by physical elements in matter that are not anyone's sensations, nor related to them by a line of descent?Here, Chalmers explicitly rejects the notion that a sensation quality might be intrinsic ''to high level physical dispositions (e.g., those involved in neural states)'': If the low-level network is causally closed and the high level intrinsic properties are not constituted by low-level intrinsic properties, the high level intrinsic properties will be epiphenomenal.The only way to embrace this position would seem to be in combination with a denial of microphysical causal closure, holding that there are fundamental dispositions above the microphysical level which have phenomenal properties as their grounds.(Chalmers, 2003, p. 267) I give him credit for seeing the possibility, but he, too, has fallen for the one-size-fits-all notion of causation criticized above.This prevents him from seeing the appeal of making sensations the instantiation of higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Given that we are still owed a definition of causation, why is it impossible that a configuration of elements instantiating a cluster of micro-physical dispositions might not also collectively instantiate a disposition of the cluster as a whole?17 There is no need for a mysterious line of descent from conscious sensation to inorganic matter by which protophenomenal properties combine by a set of weird laws into conscious phenomenal properties; we can just stick with physics and its laws, complemented by further empirical laws describing the higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.Lockwood (1993) addresses this point explicitly: Their [basic dispositions of matter] potential for generating awareness could be a matter of the application of certain currently unknown laws to their familiar physical attributes (in which laws, of course, there would be an essential reference to the emergent attributes).This fairly elementary point seems to have escaped those authors who have argued that, if we are made of electrons, quarks, gluons, and the like, then-given that we are conscious-electrons, quarks and so forth must themselves be possessed of some sort of primitive proto-consciousness.As I see it, this is a complete non-sequitur (p.281).On Type-F monism, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are located at the fundamental level of physical reality and underlie physical reality itself.
“On this view, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are located at the fundamental level of physical reality and in a certain sense, underlie physical reality itself . . . .”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Chalmers (2003) source
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationnone given§ 3. Causal Maps, Causal Closure, Micro-vs-Macro CausationA causal map assigns each element and element-sensation a place in a multidimensional graph and represents functional/causal relations as arrows connecting elements at the vertices.
“We assign each element and each element-sensation a place in a multidimensional graph.We then represent all functional/causal relations as arrows on a graph connecting elements at the vertices.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ NotesMathematical functions allow for flexibility in modeling causal relations and a model, or causal map, can be tested by experience for robustness and to screen off illusory correlations.
“Mathematical functions allow for flexibility in modeling causal relations (for example in causal maps below) and a model, or causal map, can be tested by experience for robustness and to screen off illusory correlations; see Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (2002).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (2002)
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 5. ConclusionNeo-monist views are a much less interesting and probably false view.
“Classic, or the neo-monist views which veer increasingly panpsychist, a much less interesting and probably false view.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Interpretationcitation§ NotesOur concepts might be deeply flawed due to our ignorance, and thus thought experiments based upon them may be binding on thoughts and arguments using these concepts, but not on reality.
“Of course our concepts might be deeply flawed due to our ignorance, and thus thought experiments based upon them may be binding on thoughts and arguments using these concepts, but not on reality (Stoljar, 2007).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Stoljar (2007)
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ NotesEpiphenomenal qualia are a gross violation of the spirit of evolutionary theory and natural selection.
“To my mind, epiphenomenal qualia are a gross violation of the spirit of evolutionary theory and natural selection.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ NotesBoth Mach and Russell were skeptical of the notion of cause, with good reason, and preferred to express the notion of causal law by means of mathematical functions.
“Both Mach and Russell were skeptical of the notion of cause, with good reason, and preferred to express the notion of causal law by means of mathematical functions (solutions to differential equations).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Mach
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Russell
Not checked in the free run.
43 of 43
The paper relies on this without support.
When we investigate the brain, we find complexly specialized and cross-wired cells with electro-chemical connections, but nothing that looks like green.
“When we investigate the brain we find very complexly specialized and cross wired cells with their electro-chemical connections, but nothing that looks at all like green.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Our sense organs are probably adapted to overall environmental macro-conditions and are very insensitive to micro-conditions or realizations.
“In specific, our sense organs are probably adapted to overall environmental macro-conditions, and very insensitive to micro-conditions or realizations.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Macro-types of configuration may not be realized by a single recognizable type of micro-configuration.
“This for the familiar reason that macro-types of configuration may not be realized by a single recognizable type of micro-configuration.”
The paper relies on this without support.
It does not seem possible that a cluster of cells carrying out complex electrochemical signaling could look like green even from the inside.
“It doesn't seem possible that a cluster of cells carrying out complex electrochemical signaling could look like green even from the inside, so this is where explanations should start, not finish.”
The paper relies on this without support.
There exist higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons that can be described by further empirical laws.
“we can just stick with physics and its laws, complemented by further empirical laws describing the higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The principle of causal closure is a genuine constraint on theories of mind.
“the principle of causal closure and the lack of any nuanced definition of 'cause' seems to be the real problem.”
6 of 6
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Spirtes citation disagrees with its reference entry
MinorThe note cites a 2002 work by Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines, while the corresponding reference gives 2001 and spells the third author's name Sheines.
“see Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (2002).”
“51. Spirtes, P., Glymour, C., & Sheines, R. (2001). Causation, prediction and search. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.”
Chalmers citation falls outside the listed chapter pages
MinorThe text cites page 265 of Chalmers's 2003 chapter, but the reference lists that chapter as pages 102-142. The other citations to pages 266 and 267 have the same problem.
“(Chalmers, 2003, p. 265)”
“9. Chalmers, D. (2003). The place of consciousness in nature. In S. Stich & F. Warfield (Eds.), Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind (pp. 102-142). Malden, MA: Blackwell.”
2 of 2
The citation lists haven’t been fetched yet
References 71 · Cited by 44
Research works printed but not linked: 15
- Blackburn SW, 1992, Analysis, 52, 62
- Clark A, 1993, Sensory qualities
- Garfinkel A, 1990, The philosophy of science, 443
- Hatfield G, 2002, Principia, 6, 203
- Heidelberger M, 2007, Fechner Day 2007, 33
- Lockwood M, 2007, The labyrinth of time
- Richardson A, 1990, Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1, 3
- Russell B, 1921, The analysis of mind
- Russell B, 1959, The analysis of matter
- Russell B, 1984, The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell (Vol. 2)
- Seager W, 2006, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13, 129
- Stoljar D, 2007, Ignorance and imagination
- Strawson G, 2006, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13, 3
- Wackermann J, 2007, Fechner Day 2007, 51
- Yablo S, 2009, Thoughts
- Authors
- Banks, E. C.
- Affiliations
- Wright State University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Banks, Erik C.
- Venue
- Philosophical Psychology
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2010-04
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 173-187
- ISSN
- 0951-5089 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-394X
- OpenAlex
- W2129013720
- Cited by
- 44
- References
- 71
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 1 · 2014: 1 · 2013: 2 · 2012: 1
- FWCI
- 1.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- philpapers.org
- Locations
- Philosophical Psychology (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy, Science, and History
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
- Keywords
- neutral monism, mind-body problem, William James, Ernst Mach, Bertrand Russell, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, causality, philosophy of science
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