The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Conceivability and Possibility
Abstract
The capacity to represent things to ourselves as possible plays a crucial role both in everyday thinking and in philosophical reasoning; this volume offers much-needed philosophical illumination of conceivability, possibility, and the relations between them.
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Citations
Cites
Kant, I. (1998) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511804649 · Cited by 4,141
A formulation of the simple theory of types
Church, A. (1940) · Journal of Symbolic Logic · doi:10.2307/2266170 · Cited by 1,903
Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense; Revised and Enlarged Edition
Allison, H. E. (2004) · Yale University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctt1cc2kjc · Cited by 912
Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?
Yablo, S. (1993) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2108052 · Cited by 782
Imagining as a Guide to Possibility
KUNG, P. (2010) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00377.x · Cited by 310
Lewis, D. (1970) · Noûs · doi:10.2307/2214320 · Cited by 273
(1998) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1023/a:1017159501073 · Cited by 228
New work for a theory of universals
Lewis, D. (1999) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625343.002 · Cited by 156
Kretzmann, N. (1966) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2023849 · Cited by 138
McDaniel, K. (2004) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/713659792 · Cited by 106
Cited by
Consciousness and its Place in Nature
Chalmers, D. J. (2003) · The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind · doi:10.1002/9780470998762.ch5 · Cited by 574
The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First Person versus Third Person Approaches
LUDWIG, K. (2007) · Midwest Studies in Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.2007.00160.x · Cited by 384
THE RISE AND FALL OF EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY
Kauppinen, A. (2007) · Philosophical Explorations · doi:10.1080/13869790701305871 · Cited by 324
Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers
Fine, K. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199278709.001.0001 · Cited by 299
How to Challenge Intuitions Empirically Without Risking Skepticism
WEINBERG, J. M. (2007) · Midwest Studies in Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.2007.00157.x · Cited by 292
Metadata
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2002-07-25
- OpenAlex
- W2922175947
- Cited by
- 647
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 13.41
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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