Explanation Beyond Causation
Abstract
Explanations are very important to us in many contexts: in science, mathematics, philosophy, and also in everyday and juridical contexts. But what is an explanation? In the philosophical study of explanation, there is long-standing, influential tradition that links explanation intimately to causation: we often explain by providing accurate information about the causes of the phenomenon to be explained. Such causal accounts have been the received view of the nature of explanation, particularly in philosophy of science, since the 1980s. However, philosophers have recently begun to break with this causal tradition by shifting their focus to kinds of explanation that do not turn on causal information. The increasing recognition of the importance of such non-causal explanations in the sciences and elsewhere raises pressing questions for philosophers of explanation. What is the nature of non-causal explanations—and which theory best captures it? How do non-causal explanations relate to causal ones? How are non-causal explanations in the sciences related to those in mathematics and metaphysics? This volume of new essays explores answers to these and other questions at the heart of contemporary philosophy of explanation. The essays address these questions from a variety of perspectives, including general accounts of non-causal and causal explanations, as well as a wide range of detailed case studies of non-causal explanations from the sciences, mathematics and metaphysics.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Visual input data are explained by contrastive patterns between the given data example and that of an opposing class in one iteration or a series thereof.
“or explained by contrastive patterns between the given data example and that of an opposing class in one iteration [130], [144] or a series thereof [49]”
From A Survey of Contrastive and Counterfactual Explanation Generation Methods for Explainable Artificial Intelligence (2021) · cites this paper as [130]
Cited by
Sorted by citations
The Theory Crisis in Psychology: How to Move Forward
Eronen, M. I., & Bringmann, L. F. (2021) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691620970586 · Cited by 459 · see citing works
Stepin, I., Alonso, J. M., Catala, A., & Pereira-Farina, M. (2021) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2021.3051315 · Cited by 376 · see citing works
Explanation in Computational Neuroscience: Causal and Non-causal
Chirimuuta, M. (2018) · British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axw034 · Cited by 66 · see citing works
Explanation beyond causation? New directions in the philosophy of scientific explanation
Reutlinger, A. (2017) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12395 · Cited by 87 · see citing works
Post-Hoc Explanations Fail to Achieve their Purpose in Adversarial Contexts
Bordt, S., Finck, M., Raidl, E., & von Luxburg, U. (2022) · 2022 ACM Conference on Fairness Accountability and Transparency · doi:10.1145/3531146.3533153 · Cited by 89 · see citing works
Fine's Fragmentalist Interpretation of Special Relativity
Hofweber, T., & Lange, M. (2016) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12150 · Cited by 71 · see citing works
McKenzie, K. (2022) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108657617 · Cited by 54 · see citing works
There Are No Mathematical Explanations
Kuorikoski, J. (2020) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/711479 · Cited by 43 · see citing works
The landscape and the multiverse: What’s the problem?
Read, J. A. M., & Bihan, B. L. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03137-0 · Cited by 40 · see citing works
Mathematical Explanation by Law
Baron, S. (2017) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axx062 · Cited by 35 · see citing works
What Can Global Pragmatists Say About Ordinary Objects?
Thomasson, A. L. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316612897.012 · Cited by 32 · see citing works
Pincock, C. (2023) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009039154 · Cited by 31 · see citing works
The Nature of Ordinary Objects
(2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316612897 · Cited by 28 · see citing works
Prediction versus understanding in computationally enhanced neuroscience
Chirimuuta, M. (2020) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02713-0 · Cited by 28 · see citing works
Between Factualism and Substantialism: Structuralism as a Third Way
French, S. (2018) · International Journal of Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1080/09672559.2018.1542275 · Cited by 27 · see citing works
Defending eliminative structuralism and a whole lot more (or less)
French, S. (2018) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A · doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.12.007 · Cited by 26 · see citing works
How to Reconcile a Unified Account of Explanation with Explanatory Diversity
Rice, C. C., & Rohwer, Y. (2020) · Foundations of Science · doi:10.1007/s10699-019-09647-y · Cited by 25 · see citing works
“…that there are mathematical and causal explanations that can be distinguished by the scope of the law(s) invoked in the explanation.2 In contrast, Reutlinger (2016, 2018) adopts the second horn of the dilemma by arguing that causal and noncausal explanations can be unified under a single theory…”
BackgroundInfluentialThe directionality of topological explanations
Kostić, D., & Khalifa, K. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03414-y · Cited by 25 · see citing works
“It is also similar in spirit to the other non-ontic counterfactual accounts of explanation mentioned above (Jansson & Saatsi, 2017; Reutlinger, 2016, 2018; Woodward, 2018), but is more precisely tailored to topological explanation.”
BackgroundResultMathematics and Explanatory Generality: Nothing but Cognitive Salience
Knowles, R., & Saatsi, J. T. (2019) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-019-00146-x · Cited by 24 · see citing works
Read, J. A. M. (2020) · International Studies in the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1080/02698595.2020.1813530 · Cited by 23 · see citing works
Non-causal understanding with economic models: the case of general equilibrium
Verreault-Julien, P. (2017) · Journal of Economic Methodology · doi:10.1080/1350178x.2017.1335424 · Cited by 23 · see citing works
Metaphysical explanations and the counterfactual theory of explanation
Roski, S. (2020) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-020-01518-8 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
“25 Cf. Reutlinger (2018, 79). reflecting on the second example mentioned above: the explanation of a conjunction in terms of its conjuncts.”
BackgroundInfluentialWhat could mathematics be for it to function in distinctively mathematical scientific explanations?
Lange, M. (2021) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A · doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.02.002 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
How Are Biology Concepts Used and Transformed?
Brigandt, I. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108648981.006 · Cited by 23 · see citing works
Objects, Ordinary and Otherwise
Heil, J. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316612897.005 · Cited by 20 · see citing works
Is It Possible to Scientifically Reconstruct the History of Life on Earth?
Cleland, C. E. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108648981.011 · Cited by 19 · see citing works
Empirical Evidence and the Metaphysics of Ordinary Objects
Hofweber, T. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316612897.003 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
Understanding does not depend on (causal) explanation
Verreault-Julien, P. (2019) · European Journal for Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s13194-018-0240-6 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
Understanding Deep Learning with Statistical Relevance
Räz, T. (2022) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1017/psa.2021.12 · Cited by 17 · see citing works
Elber‐Dorozko, L. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-01901-3 · Cited by 15 · see citing works
Philosophy of Science for Biologists
Kampourakis, K., & Uller, T. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108648981 · Cited by 16 · see citing works
The Prospects for a Monist Theory of Non-causal Explanation in Science and Mathematics
Reutlinger, A., Colyvan, M., & Krzyżanowska, K. (2020) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-020-00273-w · Cited by 15 · see citing works
“We will set aside the issue of explanations by constraint, since French and Saatsi (2018) and Reutlinger (2018) have already argued how to apply the CTE to such cases.”
MethodExplanatory Relevance and Contrastive Explanation
Pincock, C. (2018) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/699715 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
Distinctively mathematical explanation and the problem of directionality: A quasi-erotetic solution
Holmes, T. L. (2021) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A · doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.02.005 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
Structural explanations: impossibilities vs failures
Barrantes, M. (2023) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-023-04121-6 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
““[N]o one… ever succeeded in the attempt to cross all of the bridges exactly once” (Reutlinger 2018, 83).”
InfluentialAssessing deep learning: a work program for the humanities in the age of artificial intelligence
Segessenmann, J., Stadelmann, T., Davison, A., & Dürr, O. M. (2023) · AI and Ethics · doi:10.1007/s43681-023-00408-z · Cited by 13 · see citing works
Is Verstehen Scientific Understanding?
Khalifa, K. (2019) · Philosophy of the Social Sciences · doi:10.1177/0048393119847104 · Cited by 15 · see citing works
“…various points, required laws and causation, it is highly doubtful that the life sciences traffic in the nomological (Mitchell 1997; Woodward 2001) and there has been a profusion of philosophical discussions about noncausal explanations throughout the natural sciences (Reutlinger and Saatsi 2018).”
BackgroundKistler, M. (2025) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009260800 · Cited by 12 · see citing works
Non-causal Explanations in the Humanities: Some Examples
den Boef, R., & van Woudenberg, R. (2023) · Foundations of Science · doi:10.1007/s10699-023-09910-3 · Cited by 12 · see citing works
“…use the so-called ‘Russellian’ criteria that have also been used by others for purposes of distinguishing between causal and non-causal explanations (Reutlinger, 2018): 1. asymmetry: if A causes B, then B does not cause A, 2. time asymmetry: effects never precede their causes in time, 3.…”
Explanation and the Right to Explanation
Taylor, E. (2023) · Journal of the American Philosophical Association · doi:10.1017/apa.2023.7 · Cited by 12 · see citing works
What Constitutes an Explanation in Biology?
Potochnik, A. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108648981.003 · Cited by 13 · see citing works
McKenzie, K. (2017) · dialectica · doi:10.1111/1746-8361.12189 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
Objectivity in Mathematics, Without Mathematical Objects†
Pantsar, M. (2021) · Philosophia Mathematica · doi:10.1093/philmat/nkab010 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
“Volumes have been written about mathematical explanations in science and it is not possible to go into the full range of details of the topic here (for overviews, see [Colyvan, 2001; Lange, 2017; Pincock, 2012; Reutlinger and Saatsi, 2018; Pantsar, 2018b]).”
Marr, Mayr, and MR: What functionalism should now be about
Chirimuuta, M. (2018) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2017.1381679 · Cited by 16 · see citing works
Sensemaking of causality in agent-based models
Antosz, P., Szczepanska, T., Bouman, L., Polhill, G. J., & Jager, W. (2022) · International Journal of Social Research Methodology · doi:10.1080/13645579.2022.2049510 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
Causal and non-causal explanations in code biology
Zámečník, L. (2021) · Biosystems · doi:10.1016/j.biosystems.2021.104499 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
Mathematical Explanations: An Analysis Via Formal Proofs and Conceptual Complexity
Poggiolesi, F. (2023) · Philosophia Mathematica · doi:10.1093/philmat/nkad023 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Benardete paradoxes, patchwork principles, and the infinite past
Schmid, J. C. (2024) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-023-04481-z · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Why Does It Matter That Many Biology Concepts Are Metaphors?
Kampourakis, K. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108648981.007 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
The general-relativistic case for super-substantivalism
Duerr, P. M., & Calosi, C. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03398-9 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
A Justification of Legitimate Teleological Explanations in Physics Education
Brock, R., & Kampourakis, K. (2022) · Science & Education · doi:10.1007/s11191-022-00358-8 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
In Defence of Ordinary Objects and a Naturalistic Answer to the Special Composition Question
Waechter, J., & Ladyman, J. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316612897.006 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
A Philosophy of the Humanities
Grimm, S. R., Peels, R., & van Woudenberg, R. (2025) · doi:10.1093/9780197749647.001.0001 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Lawful Humean explanations are not circular
Duguid, C. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03058-y · Cited by 6 · see citing works
“Instead, something more is required, whether that be the unification of phenomena under a set of more basic 25 A further example of this is the counterfactual account of explanation, which has been rising in popularity (Woodward 2003; Saatsi and Pexton 2013; Reutlinger 2018).”
BackgroundA Defence of Manipulationist Noncausal Explanation: The Case for Intervention Liberalism
Emmerson, N. (2021) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-021-00497-4 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Challenges Facing Counterfactual Accounts of Explanation in Mathematics
Lange, M. (2021) · Philosophia Mathematica · doi:10.1093/philmat/nkab023 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
What Is the Nature of Scientific Controversies in the Biological Sciences?
Dietrich, M. R. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108648981.013 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Idealization and the Ontic Conception: A Reply to Bokulich
Craver, C. F. (2019) · The Monist · doi:10.1093/monist/onz023 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Evnine, S. J. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316612897.010 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Explanatory Particularism in Scientific Practice
Fagan, M. B. (2025) · doi:10.1093/9780191998874.001.0001 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Plumbing metaphysical explanatory depth
Emmerson, N. (2022) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-022-01886-3 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
How Can Conceptual Analysis Contribute to Scientific Practice?
Lewens, T. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108648981.009 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Cognitive dynamical models as minimal models
Holmes, T. L. (2020) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02888-6 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Mathematical Explanations in Evolutionary Biology or Naturalism? A Challenge for the Statisticalist
Sterpetti, F. (2021) · Foundations of Science · doi:10.1007/s10699-021-09818-w · Cited by 3 · see citing works
“Other philosophers 1 3 share Lange’s view (see, e.g., Reutlinger, 2017), so the point is that it seems fair to say that many philosophers nowadays think that if a statistical explanation is non-causal, then it is a MENP.”
BackgroundInfluentialToy models, dispositions, and the power to explain
Verreault-Julien, P. (2023) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-023-04084-8 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Scientific explanation as a guide to ground
Kortabarria, M., & Giannotti, J. (2024) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-024-04492-4 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
“For recent work on counterfactuals in science focusing on non-causal explanation, see Reutlinger (2016, 2018); French and Saatsi (2018); Woodward (2018, 2022); and Hicks (2022). grounding dependency between Romeo+Juliet’s composite state and their individual non-separability the wrong way.”
Höhl, A. E. (2024) · Philosophie - Aufklärung - Kritik · doi:10.14361/9783839472620 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Cause and effect in biology, culture, and the (extended) mind: a coevolutionary approach
de Felipe, Í. O. (2024) · Review of Evolutionary Political Economy · doi:10.1007/s43253-024-00127-z · Cited by 3 · see citing works
A noetic account of explanation in mathematics
D’Alessandro, W., & Lehet, E. (2024) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqae137 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
What Is the Relation between Facts and Values in Biological Science?
Friese, C., & Prainsack, B. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108648981.014 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Physics’ Contribution to Causation
Kistler, M. (2021) · Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1515/krt-2021-0003 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Non-Causal Explanations in Physics
Saatsi, J. T. (2021) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315623818-43 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
What Is the Nature of Theories and Models in Biology?
Parke, E. C., & Plutynski, A. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108648981.005 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Assessing Deep Learning: A Work Program for the Humanities in the Age of Artificial IntelligencePreprint
Segessenmann, J., Stadelmann, T., Davison, A., & Dürr, O. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4554234 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Constraints and Selection: How Higher-Level Causal Eliminativism Leads to Superdeterminism
García-Valdecasas, M., & Cañizares, J. S. (2025) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-025-01039-y · Cited by 2 · see citing works
How Can Thought Select Between Coincident Material Things?
Madden, R. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316612897.008 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
An epistemological challenge to ontological bruteness
Brown, J. M. (2021) · International Journal for Philosophy of Religion · doi:10.1007/s11153-021-09805-y · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“6 By way of example, among philosophers of science, there has recently been an explosion of interest in ‘noncausal’ scientific explanations; see Lange (2016) and Reutlinger and Saatsi (2018).”
BackgroundPrasetya, Y. A. (2022) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2022.2041058 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Smid, J. (2022) · Journal of the American Philosophical Association · doi:10.1017/apa.2022.27 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Are Mathematical Explanations Causal Explanations in Disguise?
Jha, A. K., Campbell, D. I., Montelle, C., et al. (2024) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1017/psa.2024.8 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
What Is the Basis of Biological Classification?
Reydon, T. A. C. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108648981.012 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Reckoning with Continuum Idealizations: Some Lessons from Soil Hydrology
Holmes, T. L. (2022) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1017/psa.2021.30 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Mathematical Explanations and Mathematical Applications
Pantsar, M. (2018) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-70658-0_30-1 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
There Are No Such Things As Ordinary Objects
French, S. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316612897.013 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Explanation, Abstraction, and Difference‐Making
Strevens, M. (2019) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12650 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
McCain, K. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108648981.004 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
On the Role of Erotetic Constraints in Noncausal Explanations
Kostić, D. (2023) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1017/psa.2023.114 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
How Do Concepts Contribute to Scientific Advancement?
Depew, D. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108648981.008 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
A Philosopher in the Age of Creationism
Ruse, M. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108648981.015 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Uncertainties about link uncertainty: ML models as phenomenological models
Jensen, S. P. (2026) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-026-05509-w · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Disentangling scientific and scientists’ understanding
Boge, F. J., Schuster, A., & Stoll, F. (2026) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-026-05627-5 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Not so distinctively mathematical explanations: topology and dynamical systems
Jha, A. K., Campbell, D. I., Montelle, C., et al. (2022) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03697-9 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Causation in Science, by Yemima Ben-Menahem
Farr, M. (2021) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/fzab078 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Explanatory Asymmetry in Non-Causal Explanation
Wayne, A. (2022) · Journal for General Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s10838-021-09596-w · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“According to these accounts, elements of models, including non‐causal dependencies, can explain phenomena in a target system (Bokulich 2011; Batterman and Rice 2014; Saatsi 2016; Reutlinger 2016; Reutlinger 2018; Woodward 2018).”
InfluentialShades of Grey: Granularity, Pragmatics, and Non-Causal Explanation
Desmond, H. (2019) · Perspectives on Science · doi:10.1162/posc_a_00300 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Replies to Heron and Knox, Morrison, and Strevens
Lange, M. (2019) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12648 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Why Should Biologists Care about the Philosophy of Science?
Uller, T., & Kampourakis, K. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108648981.002 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
What Methods Do Life Scientists Use?
Peterson, E. L. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108648981.010 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
¿Es necesaria la verdad? Una noción pragmática y deflacionaria de comprensión
Martín-Villuendas, M. (2021) · ArtefaCToS Revista de estudios sobre la ciencia y la tecnología · doi:10.14201/art2021102175201 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Anomalous Monism and Mental Causation: A Husserlian Reflection
Liu, C. (2022) · Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology · doi:10.1080/00071773.2022.2122728 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
- Venue
- Oxford Scholarship Online
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2018-06-21
- OpenAlex
- W2604760132
- Cited by
- 174
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 15 · 2025: 31 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 18 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 27 · 2019: 23 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 2
- FWCI
- 29.35
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy, Science, and History
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- philosophy of explanation, non-causal explanation, causal explanation, nature of explanation, scientific explanation
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
