A Theory of Legal Personhood
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Legal personhood is a foundational concept of Western legal thought. It has recently become highly topical, underpinning contemporary debates over the legal status of animals, corporations, foetuses, natural objects, and artificial intelligences. The notion is furthermore crucial in explaining the historical legal statuses of women and slaves. Rather than addressing who or what should be a legal person, this book examines the concept itself. The book consists of an Introduction and three parts. The Introduction presents the Western doctrine of legal personhood, the relevant terms and concepts, and the methodology employed in the book. Part I shows, first, how legal personhood came to be understood synonymously with the holding of legal rights and/or duties. It then subjects this understanding of legal personhood to a rigorous scrutiny, exposing numerous problems afflicting the view. Part II provides a completely new, general theory of legal personhood, arguing that legal personhood is best understood as a cluster property, consisting of distinct incidents. The final part applies the new theory to explain and structure the numerous debates surrounding legal personhood, explaining what is at stake in the animal legal personhood trials taking place in the US and elsewhere.
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Cites
Searle, J. R. (1980) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00005756 · Cited by 6,954
List, C., & Pettit, P. (2011) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591565.001.0001 · Cited by 1,344
Punishment in animal societies
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Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents
Tuomela, R. (2013) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199978267.001.0001 · Cited by 469
Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences
Solum, L. B. (2020) · Machine Ethics and Robot Ethics · doi:10.4324/9781003074991-37 · Cited by 296
Torture and Moral Integrity: A Philosophical Enquiry
Kramer, M. H. (2014) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714200.001.0001 · Cited by 98
Basl, J. (2014) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-013-0122-y · Cited by 51
Cited by
Al-Busaidi, A. S., Raman, R., Hughes, L., Albashrawi, M. A., Malik, T., Dwivedi, Y. K., Al- Alawi, T., AlRizeiqi, M., Davies, G., Fenwick, M., et al. (2024) · Journal of Innovation & Knowledge · doi:10.1016/j.jik.2024.100630 · Cited by 95
Mocanu, D. M. (2022) · Frontiers in Robotics and AI · doi:10.3389/frobt.2021.788179 · Cited by 27
Odontocetes (‘toothed whales’): cognitive science and moral standing–are dolphins persons?
Pettit, S. G., & McCulloch, S. P. (2023) · Journal of Applied Animal Ethics Research · doi:10.1163/25889567-bja10033 · Cited by 5
Algorithms in Public Administration: Legal Implications
Sjöberg, C. M. (2023) · The Rule of Law and Automated Decision-Making · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-30142-1_9 · Cited by 3
Metadata
- Authors
- Kurki, V. A.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2019-08-13
- OpenAlex
- W2971436342
- Cited by
- 239
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 46.42
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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