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In Consciousness we Trust: The Cognitive Neuroscience of Subjective Experience
Open accessAbstract
This book puts forward a mechanistic account of subjective experience based on a review of the current cognitive neuroscience literature on conscious perception, attention, and metacognition. It is argued that current empirical studies are often misinterpreted. An undue focus has been placed on perceptual capacity rather than subjective experience per se. Null findings are often overemphasized despite the limited sensitivity of the methods used. A synthesis is proposed to combine the advantages and intuitions of both global and local theories of consciousness. This will be discussed in the context of our understanding of the sense of agency, emotion, rationality, culture, philosophical theories, and clinical applications. Taking insights from both physiology and current research in artificial intelligence, the resulting view directly addresses the qualitative nature of subjective experience.
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There are various potential confounds in consciousness science, but researchers can combine evidence from studies of different kinds to reduce the force of methodological objections.
“There are various potential confounds in consciousness science, but researchers can combine evidence from studies of different kinds to reduce the force of methodological objections (Lau 2022).”
From Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness (2023) · cites this paper as Lau 2022
Since experiments seem to show that performance and consciousness are dissociable, it is possible that ignition is neither necessary nor sufficient for consciousness.
“But since experiments seem to show that performance and consciousness are dissociable, it is possible that ignition is neither necessary nor sufficient for consciousness (Fleming 2020, Lau 2022).”
From Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness (2023) · cites this paper as Lau 2022
PRM advocates claim that current AI systems do not meet the conditions of their theory.
“However, PRM advocates claim that current AI systems do not meet the conditions of their theory (Michel & Lau 2021, Lau 2022).”
From Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness (2023) · cites this paper as Lau 2022
Lau (2022) suggests that generative adversarial networks (GANs) may possess HOT-1 and HOT-2.
“Lau (2022) suggests that generative adversarial networks (GANs) may possess these two indicators, a possibility which we discuss further in section 3.1.3.”
From Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness (2023) · cites this paper as Lau 2022
The discriminator in GANs is comparable to the higher-order monitoring mechanism posited by PRM.
“The discriminator in GANs is comparable to the higher-order monitoring mechanism posited by PRM (Lau 2022).”
From Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness (2023) · cites this paper as Lau 2022
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Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness
Butlin, P., Long, R., Elmoznino, E., Bengio, Y., Birch, J., Constant, A., Deane, G., Fleming, S. M., Frith, C., Ji, X., et al. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2308.08708 · Cited by 196
Negro, N. (2024) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niae012 · Cited by 21
Birch, J. (2024) · The Edge of Sentience · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.003.0003 · Cited by 1
Neuroscience undermines the higher-order theorists' preferred solution to the targetless HOT problem
Kozuch, B. (2026) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2026.2629514
Metadata
- Authors
- Lau, H.
- Affiliations
- RIKEN Center for Brain Science (JP)
- Corresponding author
- Lau, Hakwan
- ORCID
- Lau, Hakwan
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2022-02-10
- OpenAlex
- W4220787089
- Cited by
- 131
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 37 · 2025: 33 · 2024: 45 · 2023: 13 · 2022: 3
- FWCI
- 31.14
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Directory of Open access Books (OAPEN Foundation) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- OAPEN (The OAPEN Foundation) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
- Keywords
- subjective experience, consciousness, conscious perception, attention, metacognition, global workspace theory, sense of agency, emotions, rationality, culture, artificial intelligence, qualia, negative results
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