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Neuroscience undermines the higher-order theorists' preferred solution to the targetless HOT problem

Kozuch, Benjamin · 2026 · Philosophical Psychology

Abstract

The Higher-Order Theory (HOT) of consciousness holds that mental states become conscious when they are represented by another mental state. Most HOT theorists maintain that it is the higher-order, rather than the lower-order, state that supplies the content of conscious experience. This view entails that, for a state to become conscious, its content must be represented in the brain regions that produce higher-order states, which are widely thought to be in the Prefrontal Cortex (PFC). This article argues that this creates a challenge for HOT: current neuroimaging evidence and functional considerations suggest that, if PFC activity is constitutive of consciousness, it enables the consciousness of content represented in visual areas rather than supplying the content itself. The conclusion will be that HOT research should focus more on developing the version in which the first-order state supplies the content of visual experience.

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Crossref · 10.1080/09515089.2026.2629514

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127 of 127 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Show all 119 references

Research works printed but not linked: 18

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Metadata

Authors
Kozuch, B.
Affiliations
University of Alabama (US)
Corresponding author
Kozuch, Benjamin
Venue
Philosophical Psychology
Published
2026-02-15
Pages
1-28
ISSN
  • 0951-5089 (ISSN-L)
  • 1465-394X
OpenAlex
W7129008549
Cited by
0
References
119
FWCI
0.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
doi.org/10.1080/policies-text-data-mining (tdm)
Locations
Philosophical Psychology (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
Keywords
higher-order theories, consciousness, prefrontal cortex, visual experience, neuroimaging findings, visual cortex

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Neuroscience undermines the higher-order theorists' preferred solution to the targetless HOT problem. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1080/09515089.2026.2629514
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Kozuch, B. (2026). Neuroscience undermines the higher-order theorists' preferred solution to the targetless HOT problem. Philosophical Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2026.2629514

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