The DOI matches its Crossref record; 127 of the 127 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Neuroscience undermines the higher-order theorists' preferred solution to the targetless HOT problem
Abstract
The Higher-Order Theory (HOT) of consciousness holds that mental states become conscious when they are represented by another mental state. Most HOT theorists maintain that it is the higher-order, rather than the lower-order, state that supplies the content of conscious experience. This view entails that, for a state to become conscious, its content must be represented in the brain regions that produce higher-order states, which are widely thought to be in the Prefrontal Cortex (PFC). This article argues that this creates a challenge for HOT: current neuroimaging evidence and functional considerations suggest that, if PFC activity is constitutive of consciousness, it enables the consciousness of content represented in visual areas rather than supplying the content itself. The conclusion will be that HOT research should focus more on developing the version in which the first-order state supplies the content of visual experience.
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Cites
An Integrative Theory of Prefrontal Cortex Function
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Metadata
- Authors
- Kozuch, B.
- Affiliations
- University of Alabama (US)
- Corresponding author
- Kozuch, Benjamin
- ORCID
- Kozuch, Benjamin
- Venue
- Philosophical Psychology
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2026-02-15
- Pages
- 1-28
- ISSN
- 0951-5089 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-394X
- OpenAlex
- W7129008549
- Cited by
- 0
- References
- 119
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- doi.org/10.1080/policies-text-data-mining (tdm)
- Locations
- Philosophical Psychology (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
- Keywords
- higher-order theories, consciousness, prefrontal cortex, visual experience, neuroimaging findings, visual cortex
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