The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Oxford Studies In Epistemology
Abstract
Oxford Studies in Epistemology is a major new biennial volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this important field. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board composed of leading philosophers in North America, Europe, and Australasia, it will publish exemplary papers in epistemology, broadly construed. Anyone wanting to understand the latest developments at the leading edge of the discipline can start here. Editorial board includes Stewart Cohen, Keith DeRose, Richard Fumerton, Alvin Goldman, Alan Hajek, Gilbert Harman, Frank Jackson, James Joyce, Scott Sturgeon, Jonathan Vogel, and Timothy Williamson.
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Citations
Cited by
White, R. (2005) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00069.x · Cited by 539
Pritchard, D. (2007) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9039-7 · Cited by 408
XIV*-MAKING SENSE OF RELATIVE TRUTH
MacFarlane, J. (2005) · Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2005.00178.x · Cited by 267
Moral Disagreement and Moral Semantics
Khoo, J., & Knobe, J. (2018) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12151 · Cited by 82
Pasquinelli, E., Farina, M., Bedel, A., & Casati, R. (2021) · Mind Brain and Education · doi:10.1111/mbe.12286 · Cited by 29
Metadata
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2005-12-01
- OpenAlex
- W2553687679
- Cited by
- 400
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 12.87
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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- Oxford Studies In Epistemology. (2005). https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199285891.001.0001
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.