Cited by 265Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesGame Theory and Voting SystemsGame Theory and Applications

Intergroup conflict and Intra-Group punishment in an experimental contest game

Abbink, Klaus, Brandts, Jordi, Herrmann, Benedikt, Orzen, Henrik·2010·American Economic Review

Abstract

We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our motivation stems from the analysis of sociopolitical conflict. The theoretical prediction is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and of whether punishment is available. We find, first, that conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are above equilibrium. Second, allowing group members to punish each other leads to even larger conflict expenditures. These results contrast with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency. (JEL C72, D74, H41)

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Crossref · 10.1257/aer.100.1.420

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Authors
Abbink, K., Brandts, J., Herrmann, B., & Orzen, H.
Affiliations
  • CBESS, University of East Anglia, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, United Kingdom.
  • Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (ES)
  • University of Nottingham (GB)
  • University of Mannheim (DE)
Venue
American Economic Review
Published
2010-03-01
Volume
100
Issue
1
Pages
420-447
ISSN
0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2150340183
Cited by
264
References
72
Citations by year
2026: 6 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 15 · 2020: 18 · 2019: 14 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 17 · 2016: 11 · 2015: 32 · 2014: 25 · 2013: 16 · 2012: 12
FWCI
47.65
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • American Economic Review (publishedVersion)
  • UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • MADOC (University of Mannheim) (submittedVersion)
  • UEA Digital Repository (University of East Anglia) (submittedVersion)
  • Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
Keywords
intergroup conflict, group size, social dilemmas, public goods, socio-political conflict

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