The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability
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Abstract
This Handbook introduces philosophers, as well as other scholars in the humanities and social sciences, to one of the most dynamic new areas of philosophical inquiry. Disability raises some of the deepest conceptual and normative issues about human embodiment and well-being; dignity, respect, justice and equality; and personal and social identity. But it also raises pressing practical questions for educational, health, reproductive, and technology policy, and confronts controversial questions about the scope and direction of the human and civil rights movements. The Handbook addresses these issues and more, with contributions from some of the most prominent philosophers in the field. The clarity it brings to these discussions demonstrates fully the continued centrality and importance of philosophical inquiry.
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Citations
Cited by
Neurodiversity and the social ecology of mental functions
Chapman, R. (2021) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691620959833 · Cited by 267
Neurodiversity, epistemic injustice, and the good human life
Chapman, R., & Carel, H. (2022) · Journal of Social Philosophy · doi:10.1111/josp.12456 · Cited by 231
Moral Reasons Not to Posit Extended Cognitive Systems: a Reply to Farina and Lavazza
Cassinadri, G. (2022) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-022-00560-0 · Cited by 14
Can a MacIntyrian Care about Severely Disabled Strangers?
McCracken, G. (2022) · The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine · doi:10.1093/jmp/jhac029
Metadata
- Venue
- Oxford University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2018-05-08
- OpenAlex
- W3204508822
- Cited by
- 143
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 8.99
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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