The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 9 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.
Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem
Abstract
In his very influential book, The Conscious Mind, David Chalmers argues that if physicalism is true then every positive truth is a priori entailed by the full physical description – this is called “the a priori entailment thesis – but ascriptions of phenomenal consciousness are not so entailed and he concludes that Physicalism is false. As he puts it, “zombies” are metaphysically possible. I show that his argument can be refuted by considering an analogous argument in the mouth of a zombie. The conclusion of this argument is false so one of the premises is false. I argue at length that this shows that the original conceivability argument also has a false premise and so is unsound.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
Balog argues that Jackson’s and Chalmers’s Conceivability Arguments against physicalism fail because the A Priori Entailment Thesis linking conceivability to metaphysical possibility is false. She uses a “Zombie Refutation” and analogues to show the problem lies in the nature of phenomenal concepts, not in phenomenal consciousness itself.
Key findings
- Balog grants that zombies are conceivable but denies that this establishes their metaphysical possibility; the Conceivability Arguments rely on the A Priori Entailment Thesis, which she argues is mistaken.
- The Zombie Refutation shows that if zombie-Jackson’s word-for-word argument is meaningful and valid, its premises parallel Jackson’s, yet its dualist conclusion is false in the stipulated physicalistic zombie-world; therefore one premise must be false, and the obvious candidate is the A Priori Entailment Thesis.
- The Yogi Refutation constructs a concept that directly refers to a physical brain state without being a priori derivable from the full physical description, showing that the conceivability of zombies arises from a peculiarity of phenomenal concepts rather than from nonphysical consciousness.
- Balog concludes that the Conceivability Arguments do not refute physicalism; physicalists can accept an explanatory gap and the conceivability of zombies, while dualism remains implausible because of problems such as epiphenomenalism and causal closure.
Methods
- Philosophical argument and reductio, not empirical research; no data or sample are used.
- The paper analyzes Jackson’s and Chalmers’s formulations of physicalism, including the minimal physical duplicate definition and the principle (E) that for any true statement T, K ⊃ T, then attacks the A Priori Entailment Thesis.
- It constructs the Zombie Refutation, plus partial-zombie and Yogi analogues, and defends auxiliary assumptions about zombie intentional states, reference of phenomenal⁺ terms, and a prioricity supervening on conceptual role.
Limitations
- The paper states that it grants zombies are conceivable and does not rely on the private language argument or analytic functionalism/behaviorism about qualia; it aims to show the Conceivability Arguments fail, not to establish physicalism.
- The paper says it does not fully treat how exceptions to the A Priori Entailment Thesis should be handled, and it sets aside full treatment of Jackson’s semantics and some objections.
- Evident from the text: the argument depends on contested auxiliary assumptions—that zombies have intentional states, that zombie phenomenal⁺ terms refer to physical states, and that a prioricity supervenes on conceptual role—which Balog defends but acknowledges as objectionable.
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Claims the paper makes
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In the paper
“While their arguments are my particular focus, my criticisms extend to the other Conceivability Arguments as well, since I will be attacking the link between conceivability and metaphysical possibility that they all presuppose.”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“I think that it can be explained by the intuitive pull of the Transparency Thesis, roughly, the thesis that if we have two concepts, both of which refer via an essential reference fixer, then we must be able to tell whether they co-refer.”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“The only assumption needed to explain E is that metaphysical reductionism is true; that is, the only explanation needed is the assumption that there is some appropriate metaphysical relationship (identity, or the realization relation, or perhaps some other, yet unknown relationship) between the referents of higher-level and basic physical concepts.”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“However, my aim here is to consider the new Conceivability Arguments due to Frank Jackson and David Chalmers and show that the very principle connecting conceivability and possibility they rely on is mistaken.”
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- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
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In the paper
“But among its premises the only contentious one is the A Priori Entailment Thesis.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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Citations
Cites
Nagel, T. (1974) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183914 · Cited by 7,440
Kripke, S. A. (1972) · Semantics of Natural Language · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7_9 · Cited by 7,028
Ryle, G. (2006) · Theories of Mind · doi:10.5040/9798216413257.ch-2 · Cited by 6,809
(1960) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 5,851
Searle, J. R. (1992) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/5834.001.0001 · Cited by 3,595
Jackson, F. (1982) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2960077 · Cited by 2,477
The Philosophical Writings of Descartes
Descartes, R. (1985) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511818998 · Cited by 2,164
“Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap
Levine, J. (1983) · Pacific Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.1983.tb00207.x · Cited by 2,150
The Philosophical Writings of Descartes
Descartes, R. (1985) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511805042 · Cited by 2,122
Chalmers, D. J. (1996) · Cited by 1,998
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- –. 1998. From Metaphysics to Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.
- -. 1983. "New Work for a Theory of Universals." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61:343–77.
Cited by
Papineau, D. (2002) · doi:10.1093/0199243824.001.0001 · Cited by 884
Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation
Chalmers, D. J., & Jackson, F. (2001) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-110-3-315 · Cited by 691
“31 Among type-B materialists, Balog 1999 and Loar 1997 (and possibly others) accept that psychophysical necessities may be sui generis in this way. Balog 1999 argues that reasoning from an epistemic gap to an ontological gap is invalid, since a zombie (a physical duplicate of a conscious being, without consciousness)…”
ResultPurple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness
Levine, J. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0195132351.001.0001 · Cited by 470
The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief
Chalmers, D. J. (2003) · Consciousness · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199241286.003.0009 · Cited by 383
Why the Exclusion Problem Seems Intractable, and How, Just Maybe, to Tract It
Bennett, K. (2003) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/1468-0068.00447 · Cited by 273
Metadata
- Authors
- Balog, K.
- Corresponding author
- Balog, Katalin
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1999-10
- Volume
- 108
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 497
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1989084433
- Cited by
- 242
- References
- 25
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 23 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 34 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 5 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 4
- FWCI
- 17.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Philosophical Review (publishedVersion)
- Rutgers University Community Repository (Rutgers University) (submittedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- conceivability argument, zombie argument, physicalism, phenomenal consciousness, David Chalmers, mind-body problem, conceivability, possibility
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
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