Dual-Process Theories of Deductive Reasoning: Facts and Fallacies
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The psychology of reasoning was dominated by the deduction paradigm from around 1960 to 2000, in which untrained participants are asked to assess the validity of logical arguments. As evidence of logical error and content-dependent thinking amassed, the paradigm has shifted recently with more emphasis on probabilistic and pragmatic processes. This chapter is focused particularly on the dual-process theories that arose from traditional studies of deductive reasoning but that now form part of a more general set of theories of higher cognition. It is argued that the “received” view of dual-process theory, which was established around 2000, actually incorporates a number of false beliefs and fallacies, which are discussed in this chapter. While dual-process theory rightly remains the focus of much current research, it is important to understand and avoid these fallacies.
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Cites
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Cited by
Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate
Evans, J. S. B. T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691612460685 · Cited by 4,271
Self-citationPlanning chemical syntheses with deep neural networks and symbolic AI
Segler, M. H. S., Preuss, M., & Waller, M. P. (2018) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature25978 · Cited by 1,847
“This can be due to steric or electronic effects, an incomplete understanding of the reaction mechanism, or conflicting reactivity in (1)In cognitive science, this can is explained via “System 1” and “System 2” in dual process theory.[6]”
BackgroundIntuition and Reasoning: A Dual-Process Perspective
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2010) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/1047840x.2010.521057 · Cited by 385
Self-citationCultural Schemas: What They Are, How to Find Them, and What to Do Once You’ve Caught One
Boutyline, A., & Soter, L. K. (2021) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.1177/00031224211024525 · Cited by 216
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BackgroundInfluentialExintaris, B., Karunaratne, N., & Yuriev, E. (2023) · Journal of Chemical Education · doi:10.1021/acs.jchemed.3c00481 · Cited by 123
Metadata
- Authors
- Evans, J. S. B. T.
- Venue
- The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2012-11-21
- Pages
- 115-133
- OpenAlex
- W2635540590
- Cited by
- 107
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 12.91
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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