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Dual-Process Theories of Deductive Reasoning: Facts and Fallacies

Evans, Jonathan St. B. T. · 2012 · The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning
Cited by 107

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

The psychology of reasoning was dominated by the deduction paradigm from around 1960 to 2000, in which untrained participants are asked to assess the validity of logical arguments. As evidence of logical error and content-dependent thinking amassed, the paradigm has shifted recently with more emphasis on probabilistic and pragmatic processes. This chapter is focused particularly on the dual-process theories that arose from traditional studies of deductive reasoning but that now form part of a more general set of theories of higher cognition. It is argued that the “received” view of dual-process theory, which was established around 2000, actually incorporates a number of false beliefs and fallacies, which are discussed in this chapter. While dual-process theory rightly remains the focus of much current research, it is important to understand and avoid these fallacies.

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Metadata

Authors
Evans, J. S. B. T.
Venue
The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning
Published
2012-11-21
Pages
115-133
OpenAlex
W2635540590
Cited by
107
References
19
FWCI
12.91
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Dual-Process Theories of Deductive Reasoning: Facts and Fallacies. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199734689.013.0008
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Evans, J. S. B. T. (2012). Dual-Process Theories of Deductive Reasoning: Facts and Fallacies. The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199734689.013.0008

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