The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracts Approach
Abstract
This article develops a model of a privatization using an incomplete contracts approach. We argue that different allocations of ownership rights lead to different allocations of inside information about the firm, which in turn affect both allocative and productive effieciency. Privatization is seen as a commitment device of the government to credibly threaten to cut back subsidies if costs are high in order to give managers better cost-saving incentives (a “harder budget constraint”). The cost of privatization is that allocative efficiency is distorted.
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Cites
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism
Dugger, W. M. (1987) · Journal of Economic Issues · doi:10.1080/00213624.1987.11504638 · Cited by 14,786
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261404 · Cited by 9,352
Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
Baron, D. P., & Myerson, R. B. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912769 · Cited by 1,721
Boardman, A. E., & Vining, A. R. (1989) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467167 · Cited by 1,132
Resource-Constrained versus Demand-Constrained Systems
Kornai, J. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914132 · Cited by 839
Privatization, Information and Incentives
Sappington, D. E. M., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1987) · Journal of Policy Analysis and Management · doi:10.2307/3323510 · Cited by 589
Economic Rationales for the Scope of Privatization
Shapiro, C., & Willig, R. D. (2019) · The Political Economy of Public Sector Reform and Privatization · doi:10.4324/9780429313707-3 · Cited by 285
Government Intervention in Production and Incentives Theory: A Review of Recent Contributions
Caillaud, B., Guesnerie, R., Rey, P., & Tirole, J. (1988) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555394 · Cited by 169
Cited by
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons
Hart, O., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555448 · Cited by 1,763
Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives
Qian, Y., & Weingast, B. R. (1997) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.11.4.83 · Cited by 1,495
Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
Tirole, J. (1999) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00052 · Cited by 1,193
Golman, R., Hagmann, D., & Loewenstein, G. (2017) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20151245 · Cited by 831
Metadata
- Authors
- Schmidt, K. M.
- Venue
- Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1996-04-01
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-24
- ISSN
- 1465-7341 (ISSN-L)
- 8756-6222
- OpenAlex
- W2174491421
- Cited by
- 350
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 38.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Schmidt, K. M. (1996). The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracts Approach. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023354
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.