Cited by 159Electoral Systems and Political ParticipationGame Theory and Voting SystemsSpatial and Panel Data Analysis

Estimating Legislators' Preferred Points

Open access
Londregan, John·1999·Political Analysis

Abstract

This paper shows that agnostic spatial models that simultaneously attempt to estimate legislators' preferred points and ideological locations for the proposals on which they vote, such as the well-known NOMINATE model of Poole and Rosenthal, are not identified. The problem arises because the agnostic estimators inherit the granularity of the voting data and, so, cannot recapture the underlying continuous parameter space. I propose an alternative estimator that achieves identification by modeling the agenda.

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1093/oxfordjournals.pan.a029804

Cites

1 of 1 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Any constant can be added to all ideal point parameters without changing the model's predictions.

    “any constant can be added to all the parameters i and j without changing the predictions of the model”

    From Birds of the Same Feather Tweet Together: Bayesian Ideal Point Estimation Using Twitter Data (2015) · cites this paper as Londregan 1999

    Section 3.2, “First-Order” Identifying Restrictions (page unavailable), treats the location of the ideological scale as arbitrary and normalizes one legislator’s position to zero. But Eq. (10) in Section 2.2 shows that voting depends on the difference between a legislator’s ideal point and a proposal’s midpoint. Adding a constant to legislators’ ideal points alone would change that difference; the prediction is unchanged if the proposal locations shift with them. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • These indeterminacies are common to item-response theory models and are called additive aliasing and scaling invariance.

    “These indeterminacies, which are common to item-response theory models, are sometimes called "additive aliasing" and "scaling invariance" (see, e.g., Bafumi et al. 2005; Londregan 1999).”

    From Birds of the Same Feather Tweet Together: Bayesian Ideal Point Estimation Using Twitter Data (2015) · cites this paper as Londregan 1999

    Section 3, “Issues in Model Identification” (page unavailable), says spatial voting models and their psychometric cousins, Rasch models, are not identified without further restrictions. Section 2.2 equates a spatial-model voting condition with one from an educational-testing model. The copy does not identify the indeterminacies as “additive aliasing” and “scaling invariance,” so it supports the shared identification problem but not those specific characterizations. (LLM, conf=0.82)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Ideal points can be multiplied by any nonzero constant, with the normalizing constant divided by its square, leaving the model predictions unchanged.

    “similarly i or j can be multiplied by any nonzero constant, with divided by its square, leaving the model predictions unchanged.”

    From Birds of the Same Feather Tweet Together: Bayesian Ideal Point Estimation Using Twitter Data (2015) · cites this paper as Londregan 1999

    Section 3.2 (“First-Order” Identifying Restrictions; page not provided) supports the need to normalize the scale of legislators’ ideal points in the Ladha and linear-probability models. It does not state that dividing a normalizing constant by the square of any nonzero multiplier leaves predictions unchanged; for the Poole–Rosenthal model, it instead says β can be pinned down. (LLM, conf=0.82)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Existing studies on ideal point estimation use two strategies to identify the model: applying two linearly independent restrictions on ideal point parameters, or applying a unit variance restriction.

    “Existing studies on ideal point estimation employ two different strategies to identify the model.One is to apply two linearly independent restrictions on the ideal point parameters, u or f in this case.”

    From Birds of the Same Feather Tweet Together: Bayesian Ideal Point Estimation Using Twitter Data (2015) · cites this paper as Londregan 1999

    Section 3.2 (“First-Order” Identifying Restrictions; page not provided) describes identifying models by imposing two restrictions on legislators’ preferred-point locations, including setting one location to zero and another to one in the Ladha and linear-probability models. The passages do not describe a unit-variance restriction as a second strategy, so that part of the attributed claim is unsupported. (LLM, conf=0.82)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • The model described by equation (1) is unidentified.

    “The model described by equation ( 1) is unidentified: any constant can be added to all the parameters i and j without changing the predictions of the model; and similarly i or j can be multiplied by any nonzero constant, with divided by its square, leaving the model predictions unchanged.”

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 11

  1. Birnbaum, A. 1968. "Some Latent Trait Models and Their Use in Inferring an Examinee's Ability." In Statistical Theories of Mental Test Scores, eds. F. M. Lord and M. R. Novick. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.pan.a029804 Published online by Cambridge University Press
  2. Gerhard H. Fischer. New York: Springer Verlag.
  3. Haberman, S. J. 1977. "Maximum Likelihood Estimates in Exponential Response Models." Annals of Statistics 5:815-841.
  4. Hinich, Melvin J., Lawerence Cahoon, and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1978. "A Statistical Multidimensional Scaling Method Based on the Spatial Theory of Voting." In Graphical Representation of Multivariate Data, ed. P. C. Wang. New York: Harwood, pp. 243-279.
  5. Londregan, John B. 2000. Legislative Institutions and Ideology in Chile's Democratic Transition. New York: Cambridge University Press.
  6. Maddala, G. S. 1986. Limited Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics. New York: Cambridge.
  7. Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1991. "Patterns of Congressional Voting." American Journal of Political Science 35:228-278.
  8. Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1996. Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting. New York: Oxford University Press.
  9. Rasch, Georg. 1961. "On General Laws and the Meaning of Measurement in Psychology." Proceedings of the IV Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability 4:321-333.
  10. Stokes, Donald. 1963. "Spatial Models of Party Competition." American Political Science Review 57:368-377.
  11. Thurstone, L. L. 1925. "A Method of Scaling Psychological and Educational Tests." Journal of Educational Psychology 16:433-451.

Cited by

Authors
Londregan, J.
Affiliations
University of California, Los Angeles (US)
Corresponding author
Londregan, John
Venue
Political Analysis
Published
1999
Volume
8
Issue
1
Pages
35-56
ISSN
  • 1047-1987 (ISSN-L)
  • 1476-4989
OpenAlex
W2053720373
Cited by
159
References
1
Citations by year
2025: 2 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 4 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 6 · 2012: 10
FWCI
34.66
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Political Analysis (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Funders
University of Cambridge
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Spatial and Panel Data Analysis
Keywords
legislator preferences, ideological positions, spatial modeling, identification problem, legislative voting

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review