The Response of Drug Expenditure to Nonlinear Contract Design: Evidence from Medicare Part D *
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 46 of the 46 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We study the demand response to nonlinear price schedules using data on insurance contracts and prescription drug purchases in Medicare Part D. We exploit the kink in individuals’ budgets set created by the famous “donut hole,” where insurance becomes discontinuously much less generous on the margin, to provide descriptive evidence of the drug purchase response to a price increase. We then specify and estimate a simple dynamic model of drug use that allows us to quantify the spending response along the entire nonlinear budget set. We use the model for counterfactual analysis of the increase in spending from “filling” the donut hole, as will be required by 2020 under the Affordable Care Act. In our baseline model, which considers spending decisions within a single year, we estimate that filling the donut hole will increase annual drug spending by about $150, or about 8 percent. About one-quarter of this spending increase reflects anticipatory behavior, coming from beneficiaries whose spending prior to the policy change would leave them short of reaching the donut hole. We also present descriptive evidence of cross-year substitution of spending by individuals who reach the kink, which motivates a simple extension to our baseline model that allows—in a highly stylized way—for individuals to engage in such cross-year substitution. Our estimates from this extension suggest that a large share of the $150 drug spending increase could be attributed to cross-year substitution, and the net increase could be as little as $45 a year.
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BackgroundMethodInfluentialEvaluating the CMA Evolution Strategy on Multimodal Test Functions
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Adverse Selection and Inertia in Health Insurance Markets: When Nudging Hurts
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Cited by
Adverse Selection and Inertia in Health Insurance Markets: When Nudging Hurts
Handel, B. R. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.7.2643 · Cited by 707
Kleven, H. J. (2016) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015234 · Cited by 416
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Measuring the Sensitivity of Parameter Estimates to Estimation Moments*
Andrews, I., Gentzkow, M., & Shapiro, J. M. (2017) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjx023 · Cited by 313
Sampling‐Based versus Design‐Based Uncertainty in Regression Analysis
Abadie, A., Athey, S., Imbens, G. W., & Wooldridge, J. M. (2020) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta12675 · Cited by 285
Housing Market Responses to Transaction Taxes: Evidence From Notches and Stimulus in the U.K.
Best, M. C., & Kleven, H. J. (2018) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdx032 · Cited by 276
The anticipatory effects of Medicare Part D on drug utilization
Alpert, A. (2016) · Journal of Health Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2016.06.004 · Cited by 69
Cost-sharing design matters: A comparison of the rebate and deductible in healthcare
Remmerswaal, M., Boone, J., Bijlsma, M., & Douven, R. (2019) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.01.008 · Cited by 26
Metadata
- Authors
- Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., & Schrimpf, P.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2015-02-08
- Volume
- 130
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 841-899
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2171331269
- Cited by
- 182
- References
- 46
- FWCI
- 53.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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