The DOI matches its Crossref record; 90 of the 91 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Cooperation in the Climate Commons
Open accessAbstract
Climate change is a global externality that has proven difficult to address through formal institutions alone due to the public good properties of climate change mitigation and the lack of a supranational institution for enforcing global treaties. Given these circumstances, which are arguably the most challenging for international cooperation, commitment problems and free-riding incentives for countries to delay costly mitigation efforts are major obstacles to effective environmental agreements. Starting from this premise, we examine domestic mitigation efforts, with the goal of assessing the extent to which the willingness of individuals to contribute voluntarily to the public good of climate mitigation could be scaled up to the global level. Although individual environmental actions are clearly insufficient for achieving ambitious global mitigation targets, we argue that they are nevertheless initial and essential steps in the right direction. In fact, individual and community efforts may be particularly important if local interventions encourage shifts in norms and behaviors that favor large-scale transformations. With this in mind, we discuss the importance of the visibility of norms and the role of beliefs when such visibility is lacking and their implications for leveraging cooperative behavior to increase climate mitigation efforts locally and globally.
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“yet it remains unknown whether human social dynamics will yield such responses”
From Stewardship of global collective behavior (2021) · cites this paper as [15]
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“Human collective dynamics are critical to the wellbeing of people and ecosystems in the present and will set the stage for how we face global challenges with impacts that will last centuries (14, 15, 64).”
From Stewardship of global collective behavior (2021) · cites this paper as [15]
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Sorted by citations
Baranzini, A., van den Bergh, J. C. J. M., Carattini, S., Howarth, R. B., Padilla, E., & Jusmet, J. R. (2017) · Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change · doi:10.1002/wcc.462 · Cited by 503
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Green Taxes in a Post-Paris World: Are Millions of Nays Inevitable?
Carattini, S., Baranzini, A., Thalmann, P., Varone, F., & Vöhringer, F. (2017) · Environmental and Resource Economics · doi:10.1007/s10640-017-0133-8 · Cited by 320
Self-citationStewardship of global collective behavior
Bak-Coleman, J. B., Alfano, M., Barfuss, W., Bergstrom, C. T., Centeno, M. A., Couzin, I. D., Donges, J. F., Galesic, M., Gersick, A. S., Jacquet, J., et al. (2021) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2025764118 · Cited by 289
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Metadata
- Authors
- Carattini, S., Levin, S., & Tavoni, A.
- Affiliations
- Georgia State University (US)
- Princeton University (US)
- London School of Economics and Political Science (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Carattini, Stefano
- Levin, Simon
- Tavoni, Alessandro
- Venue
- Review of Environmental Economics and Policy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2019-07-01
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 227-247
- ISSN
- 1750-6816 (ISSN-L)
- 1750-6824
- OpenAlex
- W2596136491
- Cited by
- 134
- References
- 91
- Citations by year
- 2026: 13 · 2025: 21 · 2024: 20 · 2023: 16 · 2022: 16 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 12 · 2019: 5
- FWCI
- 17.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Review of Environmental Economics and Policy (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- London School of Economics and Political Science Theses Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Digital Archive @ GSU (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Archivio istituzionale della ricerca (Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- COST Action IS1309 “Innovations in Climate Governance
- INOGOV
- Swiss National Science Foundation (P2SKP1_165028)
- Economic and Social Research Council (ES/R009708/1)
- ESRC Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Climate Change Policy and Economics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Climate Change Communication and Perception
- Physical Sciences › Environmental Science › Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law › Pro-Environmental Behavior and Attitudes
- Keywords
- climate change mitigation, international cooperation, voluntary contributions, free-riding, commitment problem, public goods, international environmental agreements, local climate action, social norms, belief, behavior change
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