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Evolution of Preferences
Abstract
We endogenize preferences using the “indirect evolutionary approach”. Individuals are randomly matched to play a two-person game. Individual (subjective) preferences determine their behaviour and may differ from the actual (objective) pay-offs that determine fitness. Matched individuals may observe the opponents' preferences perfectly, not at all, or with some in-between probability. When preferences are observable, a stable outcome must be efficient. When they are not observable, a stable outcome must be a Nash equilibrium and all strict equilibria are stable. We show that, for pure-strategy outcomes, these conclusions are robust to allowing almost perfect, and almost no, observability, with the notable exception that inefficient strict equilibria may fail to be stable with any arbitrarily small degree of observability (despite being stable with no observability).
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Citations
Cites
Young, H. P. (1993) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951778 · Cited by 2,399
Cited by
Homo Moralis--Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching
(2013) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta10637 · Cited by 371
Habits of Virtue: Creating Norms of Cooperation and Defection in the Laboratory
Peysakhovich, A., & Rand, D. G. (2016) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2015.2168 · Cited by 303
Metadata
- Authors
- Dekel, E., Ely, J. C., & Yilankaya, O.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2007-07-01
- Volume
- 74
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 685-704
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W1982986114
- Cited by
- 207
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 16.69
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Dekel, E., Ely, J. C., & Yilankaya, O. (2007). Evolution of Preferences. The Review of Economic Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/74.3.685
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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