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History, Expectations, and Leadership in the Evolution of Social Norms
Abstract
We study the evolution of a social norm of “cooperation” in a dynamic environment. Each agent lives for two periods and interacts with agents from the previous and next generations via a coordination game. Social norms emerge as patterns of behaviour that are stable in part due to agents' interpretations of private information about the past, influenced by occasional commonly observed past behaviours. For sufficiently backward-looking societies, history completely drives equilibrium play, leading to a social norm of high or low cooperation. In more forward-looking societies, there is a pattern of “reversion” whereby play starting with high (low) cooperation reverts towards lower (higher) cooperation. The impact of history can be countered by occasional “prominent” agents, whose actions are visible by all future agents and who can leverage their greater visibility to influence expectations of future agents and overturn social norms of low cooperation.
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Cites
Young, H. P. (1993) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951778 · Cited by 2,399
Cited by
Young, H. P. (2015) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080614-115322 · Cited by 497
Kimbrough, E. O., & Vostroknutov, A. (2016) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/jeea.12152 · Cited by 373
Metadata
- Authors
- Acemoglu, D., & Jackson, M. O.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2014-12-06
- Volume
- 82
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 423-456
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W3125894306
- Cited by
- 236
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 16.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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