The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Competition in Persuasion
Open accessAbstract
We study symmetric information games where a number of senders choose what information to communicate. We show that the impact of competition on information revelation is ambiguous in general. We identify a condition on the information environment (i.e. the set of signals available to each sender) that is necessary and sufficient for equilibrium outcomes to be no less informative than the collusive outcome, regardless of preferences. The same condition also provides an easy way to characterize the equilibrium set and governs whether introducing additional senders or decreasing the alignment of senders' preferences necessarily increases the amount of information revealed.
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Citations
Cites
Strategic information transmission
Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913390 · Cited by 4,293
Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications
Milgrom, P. R. (1981) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003562 · Cited by 3,123
Cited by
Information Design: A Unified Perspective
Bergemann, D., & Morris, S. (2019) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20181489 · Cited by 527
Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design
Kamenica, E. (2019) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080218-025739 · Cited by 404
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Metadata
- Authors
- Gentzkow, M., & Kamenica, E.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2016-10-18
- Volume
- 84
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 300-322
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W2889670832
- Cited by
- 226
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 11.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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