The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Correlation Neglect in Belief Formation
Open accessAbstract
Many information structures generate correlated rather than mutually independent signals, the news media being a prime example. This paper shows experimentally that in such contexts many people neglect these correlations in the updating process and treat correlated information as independent. In consequence, people's beliefs are excessively sensitive to well-connected information sources, implying a pattern of "overshooting" beliefs.Additionally, in an experimental asset market, correlation neglect not only drives overoptimism and overpessimism at the individual level, but also affects aggregate outcomes in a systematic manner. In particular, the excessive confidence swings caused by correlated signals give rise to predictable price bubbles and crashes. These findings are reminiscent of popular narratives according to which aggregate booms and busts might be driven by the spread of "stories". Our results also lend direct support to recent models of boundedly rational social learning.
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Citations
Cites
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Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0034747 · Cited by 6,202
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Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness
Dana, J., Weber, R. A., & Kuang, J. X. (2007) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/s00199-006-0153-z · Cited by 1,445 · cited 2×
“, Dana et al. (2007), Haisley and Weber (2010), and Exley (2015). 15In addition, the correlation between response times and naïveté might be purely mechanical: conditional on having developed different solution strategies, rational subjects ought to take longer to solve the problem than naïfs because computing rationa…”
BackgroundCognitive abilities and behavioral biases
Oechssler, J., Roider, A., & Schmitz, P. W. (2009) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.04.018 · Cited by 491
Cited by
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
(2013) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/11166.1573-0476 · Cited by 358
Overconfidence in Political Behavior
Ortoleva, P., & Snowberg, E. (2015) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20130921 · Cited by 355
Gabaix, X. (2019) · Handbook of Behavioral Economics: Applications and Foundations 1 · doi:10.1016/bs.hesbe.2018.11.001 · Cited by 329
Enke, B. (2020) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjaa012 · Cited by 186
Self-citationCombining Human Expertise with Artificial Intelligence: Experimental Evidence from Radiology
Agarwal, N., Moehring, A., Rajpurkar, P., & Salz, T. (2023) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4505053 · Cited by 161
Metadata
- Authors
- Enke, B., & Zimmermann, F.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2017-12-22
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W3125211038
- Cited by
- 185
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 16.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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