The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Why Is Bank Debt Senior? A Theory of Asymmetry and Claim Priority Based on Influence Costs
Abstract
This theory can explain why bank debt is universally senior, consistent with the presence of conflict (lawyers) and absolute priority violations in financial distress: Better organized banks would more strongly contest priority in financial distress if they were junior. Because “deterrence” can reduce creditors’ total expenses in a priority contest, the ex post stronger lobbyist/litigant should be senior ex ante. For equivalent reasons, the theory can advise when public debt should be senior to trade credit and/or implicit contracts, and can even suggest one rationale for the absolute priority rule (APR). This article further shows that Chapter 11 creditor reimbursement procedures can lower overall costs.
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Citations
Cites
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476
Cited by
N. Berger, A., & F. Udell, G. (1998) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/s0378-4266(98)00038-7 · Cited by 3,690
“…and renegotiating the loan under financial distress (Gorton and Kahn 1997), or may help reduce the costs of dividing the remaining assets in bankruptcy (Welch 1997), although it may exacerbate the agency costs of debt by discouraging maintenance of secured assets (John, Lynch, and Puri 1997).”
Zingales, L. (2000) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00262 · Cited by 1,495
Berger, A. N., Demsetz, R. S., & Strahan, P. E. (1999) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/s0378-4266(98)00125-3 · Cited by 1,477
Denis, D. J., & Mihov, V. T. (2003) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00140-5 · Cited by 974
The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation versus Chapter 11 Reorganization
BRIS, A., WELCH, I., & ZHU, N. (2006) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00872.x · Cited by 698
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Metadata
- Authors
- Welch, I.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1997-10
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1203-1236
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2066234196
- Cited by
- 169
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 31.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Welch, I. (1997). Why Is Bank Debt Senior? A Theory of Asymmetry and Claim Priority Based on Influence Costs. Review of Financial Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/10.4.1203
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.