Takeover Bidding with Toeholds: The Case of the Owner's Curse
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This article demonstrates that a potential acquirer with a toehold bids aggressively and possibly overpays in equilibrium. The aggressiveness of a bidder with a toehold increases further if he is able to renege on his winning bid. A bidder without a toehold, however, responds by shading his bids. The target firm can increase competition and the expected sale price if it only entertains nonretractable bids. This article provides testable implications on the probability of bidder success, stock price reactions on bid revisions and on resolution of the contest, and expected gains to bidders and the target firm.
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Citations
Cites
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1986) · Cited by 17,275
Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261385 · Cited by 8,408 · cited 2×
“Grossman and Hart (1980) were most probably the rst to point to the possible use of toeholds in alleviating the free-rider problem inherent in takeover bidding.4 Shleifer and Vishny (1986) further developed this intuition.”
BackgroundMyerson, R. B. (1981) · Mathematics of Operations Research · doi:10.1287/moor.6.1.58 · Cited by 5,920
The market for corporate control
Jensen, M. C., & Ruback, R. S. (1983) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(83)90004-1 · Cited by 4,141
The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers
Roll, R. (1986) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296325 · Cited by 3,751 · cited 3×
“Roll (1986) , on the other hand, puts forward the “hubris” hypothesis to explain why many acquiring firms incur losses, even when there is no apparent conflict of interest between the target shareholders and the management.”
BackgroundInfluentialTakeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1980) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003400 · Cited by 3,098 · cited 1×
“The assumption of all shareholders tendering to the highest bidder abstracts away from the free-rider problem identified by Grossman and Hart (1980) .”
BackgroundRisk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers
Amihud, Y., & Lev, B. (1981) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003575 · Cited by 2,772
Managerial control of voting rights
Stulz, R. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90039-6 · Cited by 2,429 · cited 5×
“Stulz (1988) shows that an increase in the e ective size of the incumbent blockholder, because of voting considerations, enables the target rm to extract more surplus from the acquirer.”
BackgroundResultInfluentialShleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1989) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(89)90099-8 · Cited by 2,151 · cited 2×
“Some examples of agency considerations are the diversification of managers’ personal portfolios [Amihud and Lev (1981)], the use of free cash flow to increase the size of the firm [Jensen (1976)], and an increase in the firm’s dependence on management [ Shleifer and Vishny (1989) ].”
BackgroundAgency Cost of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and TakeoversPreprint
Jensen, M. C. (1999) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.99580 · Cited by 2,028
Cited by
Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics
Stiglitz, J. E. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/00028280260136363 · Cited by 1,455
Toeholds, Bid Jumps, and Expected Payoffs in Takeovers
Betton, S., & Eckbo, B. E. (2000) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/13.4.841 · Cited by 394
The timing and terms of mergers motivated by economies of scale
Lambrecht, B. M. (2004) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2003.09.002 · Cited by 277
Bargaining power and industry dependence in mergers
Ahern, K. R. (2012) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.09.003 · Cited by 272
Limited arbitrage in mergers and acquisitions
Baker, M., & Savaşoglu, S. (2002) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(02)00072-7 · Cited by 237
“Singh (1998) examines toeholds in takeover bidding, but the focus is on bidders rather than arbitrageurs.”
BackgroundInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- Singh, R.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1998-10
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 679-704
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2058948779
- Cited by
- 166
- References
- 27
- FWCI
- 21.52
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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