Cited by 3,098Corporate Finance and GovernanceMerger and Competition AnalysisCorporate Governance and Law

Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation

Grossman, Sanford J., Hart, Oliver D.·1980·The Bell Journal of Economics

Abstract

It is commonly thought that a widely held corporation that is not being run in the interest of its shareholders will be vulnerable to a takeover bid. We show that this is false, since shareholders can free ride on the raider's improvement of the corporation, thereby seriously limiting the raider's profit. We analyze exclusionary devices that can be built into the corporate charter to overcome this free-rider problem. We study privately and socially optimal corporate charters under the alternative assumptions of competition and monopoly in the market for corporate control.

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Authors
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D.
Venue
The Bell Journal of Economics
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1980
Volume
11
Issue
1
Pages
42
ISSN
0361-915X (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1531758582
Cited by
3,098
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 53 · 2025: 59 · 2024: 73 · 2023: 106 · 2022: 95 · 2021: 78 · 2020: 86 · 2019: 71 · 2018: 100 · 2017: 99 · 2016: 112 · 2015: 115 · 2014: 137 · 2013: 112 · 2012: 146
FWCI
64.43
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • The Bell Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
  • OpenGrey (Institut de l'Information Scientifique et Technique) (submittedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Corporate Finance and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Law
Keywords
takeover bids, free-rider problem, corporate control, corporate charters, shareholder interests, market for corporate control, competition and monopoly

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