The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure Regulation and Externalities
Open accessAbstract
In this paper we analyze a model of voluntary disclosure by firms in financial markets. We focus on externalities that arise when firm values are correlated and the disclosures made by one firm affect the valuation of other firms. In our model, firms can choose the precision of their disclosure, and disclosure, which is costly, has social value. In the case of one firm, we uncover interesting economies of scale in the value of the disclosure, which lead to discontinuities in the optimal disclosure policy as parameters of the model change. For example, the optimal precision may jump from zero to a positive level when the prior precision regarding the firm's value is at a threshold level. For the case of multiple firms, we show that because of the externality in the firms' valuation, the Nash equilibrium disclosure policies are often socially inefficient. Thus, there is scope for disclosure regulation to improve welfare. We study the possibilities of mandating a minimal precision level for the disclosure or setting a system of subsidies that reduce the perceived cost of disclosure. While both methods can sometimes improve welfare, for each method there are cases (where firms differ in their cost or other parameters) where welfare is not improved. Neither of these methods of regulation dominates the other in all situations.
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Cited by
Information and the Cost of Capital
Easley, D., & O'hara, M. (2004) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00672.x · Cited by 3,038
The financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature
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Accounting Information, Disclosure, and the Cost of Capital
LAMBERT, R., LEUZ, C., & VERRECCHIA, R. E. (2007) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-679x.2007.00238.x · Cited by 2,586
Mandatory CSR and sustainability reporting: economic analysis and literature review
Christensen, H. B., Hail, L., & Leuz, C. (2021) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-021-09609-5 · Cited by 1,923
LEUZ, C., & WYSOCKI, P. D. (2016) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12115 · Cited by 1,760
Metadata
- Authors
- Admati, A. R., & Pfleiderer, P.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2000-07
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 479-519
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W3124046884
- Cited by
- 515
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 57.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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