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Cited by 515

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure Regulation and Externalities

Open access
Admati, Anat R., Pfleiderer, Paul · 2000 · Review of Financial Studies

Abstract

In this paper we analyze a model of voluntary disclosure by firms in financial markets. We focus on externalities that arise when firm values are correlated and the disclosures made by one firm affect the valuation of other firms. In our model, firms can choose the precision of their disclosure, and disclosure, which is costly, has social value. In the case of one firm, we uncover interesting economies of scale in the value of the disclosure, which lead to discontinuities in the optimal disclosure policy as parameters of the model change. For example, the optimal precision may jump from zero to a positive level when the prior precision regarding the firm's value is at a threshold level. For the case of multiple firms, we show that because of the externality in the firms' valuation, the Nash equilibrium disclosure policies are often socially inefficient. Thus, there is scope for disclosure regulation to improve welfare. We study the possibilities of mandating a minimal precision level for the disclosure or setting a system of subsidies that reduce the perceived cost of disclosure. While both methods can sometimes improve welfare, for each method there are cases (where firms differ in their cost or other parameters) where welfare is not improved. Neither of these methods of regulation dominates the other in all situations.

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1093/rfs/13.3.479

Cites

18 of 18 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 5

  1. 10.2307/2328395 · doi:10.2307/2328395
  2. Fishman M. J. Hagerty K. M. , 1998, “Mandatory Disclosure,” in Newman P. (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Macmillan Press, New York.
  3. 10.2307/2327412 · doi:10.2307/2327412
  4. Radner R. Stiglitz J. E. , 1972, “A Nonconcavity in the Value of Information,” in Moyer M. Kihlstrom R. E. (eds.), Bayesian Models in Economic Theory, Elsevier Science, Amsterdam.
  5. Ross S. A. , 1979, “Disclosure Regulation in Financial Markets: Implications of Modern Finance Theory and Signaling Theory,” in Edwards F. R. (ed.), Issues in Financial Regulation, McGraw-Hill, New York.

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Admati, A. R., & Pfleiderer, P.
Venue
Review of Financial Studies
Published
2000-07
Volume
13
Issue
3
Pages
479-519
ISSN
  • 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
  • 1465-7368
OpenAlex
W3124046884
Cited by
515
References
18
FWCI
57.27
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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