The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Bank Reputation, Bank Commitment, and the Effects of Competition in Credit Markets
Abstract
This article discusses the effects of credit market competition on a bank's incentive to keep its commitment to lend to a borrower when the borrower's credit quality deteriorates. It is shown that, unlike in the borrower's commitment problem to keep borrowing from the same bank in “good” times, the increased competition may strengthen a bank's incentive to keep its commitment. Banks offer loans with commitment to the highest quality borrowers but, when faced with competition from bond markets, they also give these loans to lower quality borrowers. An increase in the number of banks has a non-monotonic effect; new banks reinforce a bank's incentive only if there are a small number of banks.
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Citations
Cites
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476
The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data
PETERSEN, M. A., & RAJAN, R. G. (1994) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb04418.x · Cited by 5,440
The effect of credit market competition on lending relationships
Petersen, M. A., & Rajan, R. G. (1995) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118445 · Cited by 3,294 · cited 1×
“21 See, for example, Hannan (1991), Petersen and Rajan (1995), as well as the references cited in Dinç (1997).”
BackgroundSome evidence on the uniqueness of bank loans
James, C. (1987) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(87)90003-1 · Cited by 1,610
Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition?
Boot, A. W. A., & Thakor, A. V. (2000) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00223 · Cited by 1,590
The role of banks in reducing the costs of financial distress in Japan
Hoshi, T., Kashyap, A., & Scharfstein, D. (1990) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(90)90021-q · Cited by 1,213 · cited 1×
“For empirical evidence, see, for example, James (1987), Lummer and McConnell (1989), Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990), James and Wier (1990), Petersen and Rajan (1994), Berger and Udell (1995). if its signal indicates sufficiently good credit quality, that is, Assumption 4. µ(x̄)(pSRS − pD(1…”
BackgroundFurther evidence on the bank lending process and the capital market response to bank loan agreements
Lummer, S. L., & McConnell, J. J. (1989) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(89)90098-6 · Cited by 856
New issues in corporate finance
Mayer, C. (1988) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/0014-2921(88)90077-3 · Cited by 716
Cited by
Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?
Hellmann, T. F., Murdock, K. C., & Stiglitz, J. E. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.1.147 · Cited by 2,088
Bank Competition and Access to Finance: International Evidence
Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt, A., & Maksimovic, V. (2004) · Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking · doi:10.1353/mcb.2004.0039 · Cited by 822
Competition and Strategic Information Acquisition in Credit Markets
Hauswald, R., & Marquez, R. (2006) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhj021 · Cited by 766
“This article is also related to recent work on how increased credit-market competition changes the incentives to forge banking relationships, such as in Boot and Thakor (2000) or Dinc (2000).”
The Past, Present, and Probable Future for Community Banks
DeYoung, R., Hunter, W. C., & Udell, G. F. (2004) · Journal of Financial Services Research · doi:10.1023/b:fina.0000020656.65653.79 · Cited by 362
Gorton, G., & Winton, A. (2003) · Handbook of the Economics of Finance · doi:10.1016/s1574-0102(03)01012-4 · Cited by 304
Metadata
- Authors
- Dinç, I. S.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2000-07
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 781-812
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2134088317
- Cited by
- 165
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 12.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.