The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
What's In It for Me? CEOs Whose Firms Are Acquired
Abstract
We study benefits received by target chief executive officers (CEOs) in completed mergers and acquisitions. Certain target CEOs negotiate large cash payments in the form of special bonuses or increased golden parachutes. These negotiated cash payments are positively associated with the CEO's prior excess compensation and negatively associated with the likelihood that the CEO becomes an executive of the acquiring company. Regression estimates suggest that target shareholders receive lower acquisition premia in transactions involving extraordinary personal treatment of the CEO. Target CEOs experience very high turnover rates both at the time of acquisition and, for those who remain employed, for several years thereafter.
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Citations
Cites
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
Fama, E. F. (1980) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260866 · Cited by 10,466
New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers
Andrade, G., Mitchell, M., & Stafford, E. (2001) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.15.2.103 · Cited by 2,798
Managerial control of voting rights
Stulz, R. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90039-6 · Cited by 2,429
Stock market driven acquisitions
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (2003) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00211-3 · Cited by 2,065
Palepu, K. G. (1986) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(86)90008-x · Cited by 1,308
CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical Analysis
Shivdasani, A., & Yermack, D. (1999) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00168 · Cited by 1,295
Self-citationCEO turnover and outside succession A cross-sectional analysis
Parrino, R. (1997) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(97)00028-7 · Cited by 1,264
Private benefits from control of public corporations
Barclay, M. J., & Holderness, C. G. (1989) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(89)90088-3 · Cited by 1,164
Bankruptcy, boards, banks, and blockholders
Gilson, S. C. (1990) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(90)90060-d · Cited by 1,083
Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers
Shivdasani, A. (1993) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(93)90009-5 · Cited by 906
Cited by
New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers
Andrade, G., Mitchell, M., & Stafford, E. (2001) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.15.2.103 · Cited by 2,798
Stock market driven acquisitions
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (2003) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00211-3 · Cited by 2,065
Pay without performance: the unfulfilled promise of executive compensation
(2005) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.42-4735 · Cited by 1,936
Shareholder investment horizons and the market for corporate control
Gaspar, J.-M., Massa, M., & Matos, P. (2005) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.10.002 · Cited by 1,268
The costs of entrenched boards
Bebchuk, L. A., & Cohen, A. (2005) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.12.006 · Cited by 986
Metadata
- Authors
- Hartzell, J. C., Ofek, E., & Yermack, D.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2003-08-11
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 37-61
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2126937117
- Cited by
- 421
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 39.79
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.