The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Bank Competition and Credit Standards
Open accessAbstract
This article offers an explanation for the substantial variation of credit standards and price competition among banks over the business cycle. As the economic outlook improves, the average default probabilities of borrowers decline. This affects the profitability of screening and causes bank screening intensity to display an inverse U-shape as a function of economic prospects. Low screening activity in expansions creates intense price competition among lenders and loans are extended to lower-quality borrowers. As the economic outlook worsens, price competition diminishes, and credit standards tighten significantly. Deposit insurance may contribute to the countercyclical variation of credit standards. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.
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Cites
Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations
Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., Bernanke, B., & Gertler, M. (1988) · Unknown · doi:10.22004/ag.econ.292693 · Cited by 4,386
The financial accelerator, and the flight to quality
Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., & Gilchrist, S. (1996) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.2307/2109844 · Cited by 2,351
Covenants and collateral as incentives to monitor
RAJAN, R., & WINTON, A. (1995) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb04052.x · Cited by 1,193
Financial Fragility and Economic Performance
Bernanke, B., & Gertler, M. (1990) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937820 · Cited by 926
Why Bank Credit Policies Fluctuate: A Theory and Some Evidence
Rajan, R. G. (1994) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118468 · Cited by 806
Gertler, M., & Gilchrist, S. (1993) · The Scandinavian Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3440134 · Cited by 733
Deregulation and bank financial policy
Marcus, A. J. (1984) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/s0378-4266(84)80046-1 · Cited by 701
Credit-Worthiness Tests and Interbank Competition
Broecker, T. (1990) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938210 · Cited by 589
Capital Requirements, Monetary Policy, and Aggregate Bank Lending: Theory and Empirical Evidence
THAKOR, A. V. (1996) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05210.x · Cited by 586
Collateral versus Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks
Manove, M., Padilla, A. J., & Pagano, M. (2001) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2696390 · Cited by 504
Cited by
How does capital affect bank performance during financial crises?
Berger, A. N., & Bouwman, C. H. S. (2013) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.02.008 · Cited by 1,684
(2014) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta10104 · Cited by 1,325
Louzis, D. P., Vouldis, A. T., & Metaxas, V. L. (2012) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2011.10.012 · Cited by 1,289
Credit Supply and Monetary Policy: Identifying the Bank Balance-Sheet Channel with Loan Applications
Jiménez, G., Ongena, S., Peydró, J.-L., & Saurina, J. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.5.2301 · Cited by 1,070
Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis
Demyanyk, Y., & Van Hemert, O. (2011) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhp033 · Cited by 989
Metadata
- Authors
- Ruckes, M.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2004-03-26
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1073-1102
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W1968635870
- Cited by
- 400
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 9.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.