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Cited by 504

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Collateral versus Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks

Manove, Michael, Padilla, A. Jorge, Pagano, Marco·2001·The RAND Journal of Economics

Abstract

Many economists argue that the primary economic function of banks is to provide cheap credit, and to facilitate this function, they advocate the strict protection and enforcement of creditor rights. But banks can serve another important economic function: through project screening they can reduce the number of project failures and thus mitigate their private and social costs. Strict protection of creditor rights would leave the tradeoff between these two banking functions to the market. In this paper, we show that because of market imperfections in the banking industry, strong creditor protection may lead to market equilibria in which cheap credit is inappropriately emphasized over project screening. Restrictions on collateral requirements and the protection of debtors in bankruptcy proceedings may redress this imbalance and increase credit-market efficiency.

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Metadata

Authors
Manove, M., Padilla, A. J., & Pagano, M.
Venue
The RAND Journal of Economics
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2001
Volume
32
Issue
4
Pages
726
ISSN
0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3125948480
Cited by
504
References
7
FWCI
16.99
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Collateral versus Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2696390
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Manove, M., Padilla, A. J., & Pagano, M. (2001). Collateral versus Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks. The RAND Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.2307/2696390

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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