The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Collateral versus Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks
Abstract
Many economists argue that the primary economic function of banks is to provide cheap credit, and to facilitate this function, they advocate the strict protection and enforcement of creditor rights. But banks can serve another important economic function: through project screening they can reduce the number of project failures and thus mitigate their private and social costs. Strict protection of creditor rights would leave the tradeoff between these two banking functions to the market. In this paper, we show that because of market imperfections in the banking industry, strong creditor protection may lead to market equilibria in which cheap credit is inappropriately emphasized over project screening. Restrictions on collateral requirements and the protection of debtors in bankruptcy proceedings may redress this imbalance and increase credit-market efficiency.
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Cites
Determinants of corporate borrowing
Myers, S. C. (1977) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(77)90015-0 · Cited by 13,169
Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information
Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1981) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8v12ft1 · Cited by 12,769
Legal Determinants of External Finance
LA PORTA, R., LOPEZ‐DE‐SILANES, F., SHLEIFER, A., & VISHNY, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb02727.x · Cited by 9,783
What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data
RAJAN, R. G., & ZINGALES, L. (1995) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb05184.x · Cited by 6,538
The effect of credit market competition on lending relationships
Petersen, M. A., & Rajan, R. G. (1995) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118445 · Cited by 3,294
A credit scoring model for commercial loans
Orgler, Y. E. (1970) · Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · doi:10.2307/1991095 · Cited by 202
Customer Relationships and Terms of Loans: Evidence from a Pilot Survey: Note
Hester, D. D. (1979) · Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · doi:10.2307/1991796 · Cited by 61
Cited by
On the implications of market power in banking: Evidence from developing countries
Turk Ariss, R. (2010) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.09.004 · Cited by 703
Courts and Banks: Effects of Judicial Enforcement on Credit Markets
Jappelli, T., Pagano, M., & Bianco, M. (2005) · Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking · doi:10.1353/mcb.2005.0021 · Cited by 547
Self-citationSecuritization and distressed loan renegotiation: Evidence from the subprime mortgage crisis
Piskorski, T., Seru, A., & Vig, V. (2010) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.04.003 · Cited by 451
Collateral, type of lender and relationship banking as determinants of credit risk
Jiménez, G., & Saurina, J. (2004) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2003.09.002 · Cited by 434
Bank Competition and Credit Standards
Ruckes, M. (2004) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhh011 · Cited by 400
Metadata
- Authors
- Manove, M., Padilla, A. J., & Pagano, M.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2001
- Volume
- 32
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 726
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3125948480
- Cited by
- 504
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 16.99
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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