The DOI matches its Crossref record; 45 of the 45 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Capital Requirements, Monetary Policy, and Aggregate Bank Lending: Theory and Empirical Evidence
Abstract
Capital requirements linked solely to credit risk are shown to increase equilibrium credit rationing and lower aggregate lending. The model predicts that the bank's decision to lend will cause an abnormal runup in the borrower's stock price and that this reaction will be greater the more capital‐constrained the bank. I provide empirical support for this prediction. The model explains the recent inability of the Federal Reserve to stimulate bank lending by increasing the money supply. I show that increasing the money supply can either raise or lower lending when capital requirements are linked only to credit risk.
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Cites
Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(84)90023-0 · Cited by 18,957
Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information
Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1981) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8v12ft1 · Cited by 12,769
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476
The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data
PETERSEN, M. A., & RAJAN, R. G. (1994) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb04418.x · Cited by 5,440
Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
Cho, I.-K., & Kreps, D. M. (1987) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885060 · Cited by 3,201
Debt Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk
Diamond, D. W. (1991) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937924 · Cited by 1,801
Kreps, D. M., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912767 · Cited by 1,692
Monetary Policy and Credit Conditions: Evidence From the Composition of External Finance
Kashyap, A., Stein, J., & Wilcox, D. (1992) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w4015 · Cited by 1,473
(1985) · American Economic Review · Cited by 1,432
Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing
Jaffee, D. M., & Russell, T. (1976) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885327 · Cited by 1,411
Cited by
Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?
Boot, A. W. A. (2000) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1006/jfin.2000.0282 · Cited by 2,354
FinTech and banking: What do we know?
Thakor, A. V. (2020) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2019.100833 · Cited by 1,378
Self-citationCapital market frictions and the role of internal capital markets in banking
Houston, J., James, C., & Marcus, D. (1997) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(97)81511-5 · Cited by 464
Safer ratios, riskier portfolios: Banks׳ response to government aid
Duchin, R., & Sosyura, D. (2014) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.03.005 · Cited by 459
Competition, Adverse Selection, and Information Dispersion in the Banking Industry: Table 1
Marquez, R. (2002) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/15.3.901 · Cited by 417
Metadata
- Authors
- THAKOR, A. V.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1996-03
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 279-324
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2106926746
- Cited by
- 586
- References
- 45
- FWCI
- 10.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- THAKOR, A. V. (1996). Capital Requirements, Monetary Policy, and Aggregate Bank Lending: Theory and Empirical Evidence. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05210.x
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.