Market-Based Corrective Actions
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 41 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Many economic agents take corrective actions based on information inferred from market prices of firms’ securities. Examples include directors and activists intervening in the management of firms and bank supervisors taking actions to improve the health of financial institutions. We provide an equilibrium analysis of such situations in light of a key problem: if agents use market prices when deciding on corrective actions, prices adjust to reflect this use and potentially become less revealing. We show that market information and agents’ information are complementary, and discuss measures that can increase agents’ ability to learn from market prices.
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Cites
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Self-citationBlockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia
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Cited by
The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting
Armstrong, C. S., Guay, W. R., & Weber, J. P. (2010) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.10.001 · Cited by 1,494
“Bond et al. (2009) show that whenever a decision maker such as the board takes a “corrective action” (e.g., replacing the CEO) on the basis of information inferred from the market price of the firm’s securities, there is a - 71 ‐ complementarity between market information and the decision maker’s…”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Real Effects of Financial Markets
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Self-citationGovernance Through Trading and Intervention: A Theory of Multiple Blockholders
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The Real Effects of Financial Markets: The Impact of Prices on Takeovers
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Self-citationHave financial markets become more informative?
Bai, J., Philippon, T., & Savov, A. (2016) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.08.005 · Cited by 394
Rating agencies in the face of regulation
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The Real Effects of Short-Selling Constraints
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Trading frenzies and their impact on real investment
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bond, P., Goldstein, I., & Prescott, E. S.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2009-09-20
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 781-820
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2066368280
- Cited by
- 277
- References
- 41
- FWCI
- 76.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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