The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Does Competition Reduce the Risk of Bank Failure?
Open accessAbstract
A large theoretical literature shows that competition reduces banks' franchise values and induces them to take more risk. Recent research contradicts this result: When banks charge lower rates, their borrowers have an incentive to choose safer investments, so they will in turn be safer. However, this argument does not take into account the fact that lower rates also reduce the banks' revenues from performing loans. This paper shows that when this effect is taken into account, a U-shaped relationship between competition and the risk of bank failure generally obtains.
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Citations
Cites
Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information
Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1981) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8v12ft1 · Cited by 12,769
ON THE PRICING OF CORPORATE DEBT: THE RISK STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES*
Merton, R. C. (1974) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb03058.x · Cited by 10,581
The Theory of Industrial Organization
Jean Tirole, Z. (1988) · MIT Press Books · Cited by 8,651
Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods
Salop, S. C. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003323 · Cited by 2,975
On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates
Merton, R. C. (1974) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2978814 · Cited by 2,751
Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?
Hellmann, T. F., Murdock, K. C., & Stiglitz, J. E. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.1.147 · Cited by 2,088
The Theory of Bank Risk Taking and Competition Revisited
BOYD, J. H., & DE NICOLÓ, G. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00763.x · Cited by 2,084
Basel Committee On Banking Supervision
Rost, B. (2010) · Handbook of Transnational Economic Governance Regimes · doi:10.1163/ej.9789004163300.i-1081.238 · Cited by 1,590
Allen, F., & Gale, D. M. (2001) · Cited by 1,584
Bank Competition and Financial Stability
Berger, A. N., Klapper, L. F., & Turk-Ariss, R. (2009) · Journal of Financial Services Research · doi:10.1007/s10693-008-0050-7 · Cited by 1,221
Cited by
How does capital affect bank performance during financial crises?
Berger, A. N., & Bouwman, C. H. S. (2013) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.02.008 · Cited by 1,684
Bank competition and stability: Cross-country heterogeneity
Beck, T., De Jonghe, O., & Schepens, G. (2013) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2012.07.001 · Cited by 1,021
On the implications of market power in banking: Evidence from developing countries
Turk Ariss, R. (2010) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.09.004 · Cited by 703
Bank competition and financial stability in Asia Pacific
Fu, X. (., Lin, Y. (., & Molyneux, P. (2014) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.09.012 · Cited by 608
Is financial inclusion good for bank stability? International evidence
Ahamed, M. M., & Mallick, S. K. (2019) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.027 · Cited by 577
Metadata
- Authors
- Martinez-Miera, D., & Repullo, R.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2010-08-18
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- 3638-3664
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W1789573697
- Cited by
- 691
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 58.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.