The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Shadow Banking and Bank Capital Regulation
Open accessAbstract
Banks are subject to capital requirements because their privately optimal leverage is higher than the socially optimal one. This is in turn because banks fail to internalize all costs that their insolvency creates for agents who use their money-like liabilities to settle transactions. If banks can bypass capital regulation in an opaque shadow banking sector, it may be optimal to relax capital requirements so that liquidity dries up in the shadow banking sector. Tightening capital requirements may spur a surge in shadow banking activity that leads to an overall larger risk on the money-like liabilities of the formal and shadow banking institutions.
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Cites
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Cited by
Vives, X. (2019) · Annual Review of Financial Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-financial-100719-120854 · Cited by 362
The Rise of Shadow Banking: Evidence from Capital Regulation
Irani, R. M., Iyer, R., Meisenzahl, R. R., & Peydró, J.-L. (2021) · The Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhaa106 · Cited by 339
Metadata
- Authors
- Plantin, G.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2014-08-14
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 146-175
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2123955581
- Cited by
- 280
- References
- 25
- FWCI
- 26.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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